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CHAPTER 1

AIMS AND METHODS

The aim

of this dissertation

is

to explain

metaphysical theories of modality. In

what I

will

be presupposing in

this

and evaluate various

chapter

I

attempt to

this inquiry. In section 1.1

taking metaphysical theories to be, and in section 1.2

adopt for evaluating them. In section
modality. In the final section,

1.1

1.4, 1

1.3

I

briefly

1

outline

outline

1

make

explicit

what

what

will

I

criteria

attempt to outline some of the

I

be

will

facts of

preview the subsequent chapters.

Metaphysical Theories

Throughout

I

will

assume

that a metaphysical theory consists of three

parts.
First,

of theorems

minimal

there
is

is

a collection of sentences, called the theorems.

designated as the set of axioms of the theory. These constitute a

set of sentences of

must be regarded

which

all

the others are logical consequences.^

as being asserted or

The theorems cannot be just a

assumed without

collection of

suffices to interpret the axioms.

And

proof.^

To

to interpret the

interpret

axioms

it

all

to

the theorems

suffices to

provide domains for the quantifiers and other referential devices

and

They

sounds or marks on paper -

they must say something, they must be interpreted.
it

Some subclass

to

range over,

provide interpretations for the predicates.

To make

explicit the

referential parts of a theory

domains presupposed by
is

to give

the quantificational

an account of the theory's

of the entities or kinds referred to or quantified over

defined in terms of others. But this cannot be so for

ontology.

may be constructed

all

of

them on pain

and

Some
or

of

circulant}’;

some must be assumed

to

be antecedently grasped.

list

constitutes the primitive ontology of the theor\\ The
primitive ontology

minimal, exhaustive and exclusive
theoretically

grasped

theory^ are to

be

if

list

of the kinds of things that

the cjuantificational

and other

not necessary to

the claim that

know how many

quantifiers perfectly well without

so-and-so^s there are;

knowing how many

of quantification by saying
I

will

assume

that

ontological kinds there are.

some

If

what

tell

a theory

existential claims.

and

These

if

there

pre-

is

is

smoke, then there
all,

we need only specify

it is

because

the

presupposes

its

is fire.

some

of

its

But

if

the

the various

to the existence of

e.g. if there are

the

and ultimately

how many members of

committed

it is

things are in the various

any

axioms contain

seventeen physical objects,

chairs, there are

existence of any entities at

are,

may be categorical assertions of existence:

be conditional assertions of existence:
wives;

us

some

kinds of thing the theory

kinds permitted by the ontology,

there are tables

must be

we can understand

the job of the theorems,

it is

axioms, rather than the ontology to

entities of the

a

referential parts of the

so-and-so^s are F or that

all

domains.^ So in specifying the primitive ontology

that there are.

is

intelligible.

To understand

domains

them

of

etc.

Or

e.g.

they

may

husbands, then there are

the theory

is

committed

axioms must be categorical

to the

existential

axioms.'*

Some predicates of the
cannot be so for
predicates too

all

of

them on pain

is

a

minimal

the interpretation of
predicates.^

may be defined

of circularity.

in terms of others. But this

So the meanings of some

must be antecedently grasped. These

primitives of the theory.

ideology

theory

are the conceptual

A list of them constitutes the theory's ideology. The

list

of predicates that appear in the axioms of the theor}'

which

suffices for the interpretation of all their other

3

The second part of a metaphysical
ontology and ideology;

to say

what

theor\' consists in

these are

its

primitive

make explicit what

is

to

is

in general

is

required

for the intelligibility of the theorems.
It

draw

should be noted however that there

a sharp line between the ontology

for instance, that

among

the theorems

think of this as having the form 3aBa

is

i.e.

and

no principled way

to

the ideology of a theory. Suppose,

the sentence 'some

As

are Bs'.

as involving a quantifier

We could

which

is

understood as ranging over As and a single predicate which expresses the
property of being a B.

Or we can

think of

as involving an unrestricted quantifier

it

as having the form 3x (Ax

D Bx) i.e.

which ranges over everything, and two

predicates to express the properties of being an
interpret sentences of the theory that involve a

A and being a B. Thus we can re-

number of

primitive types of

quantifier as involving a single unrestricted quantifier by the addition of extra
predicates.^ In

many

cases

we

banish various predicates A,

could just as easily

B,

move

in the other direction

—

C etc. in favour of various primitive quantifiers

3a..., 3b..., 3c... etc.

The

final part of a

metaphysical theory consists of certain sentences called

the definitions, analyses

and

logical constructions of

'definition', 'analysis'

and

'logical construction' are

will co-opt

As I
(the

them

will use the term, a definition
'=df.'

is

the result of writing

I

some expression

followed by some other expression (the

There are no restrictions on the grammatical category

expressions.
a

used interchangeably, but

to refer to different things.

definiendum) followed by

definiens).

the theory. Often the terms

Any expression containing

mere orthographic variant

of

the definiendum

an expression

that differs

is

to

from

of

definiendum

be understood as
it

only in that

contains the definiens expression in positions that the former contains the

it

4

definiendum expression.
stipulated

merely

a piece of shorthand, a

convention of notational abbreviation”.^ The point of definitions

make

to

A definition is simply

a theory easier to read

philosophical significance

may

expression

is

to

and comprehend.

be read into the

In particular,

fact that the

is

no

definiendum

be already familiar and endowed with philosophical

associations.^

As

will use the

I

term analysis^, analyses are

just like definitions except in

the following respects. First, they are intended to have philosophical significance,

they are not mere stipulations about the use of words.
syntactically
('iff)

where

I

will state analyses in

definitions

grammatical

But

I

(though

from the

it

have

that they

'if

and only

if

Second, analyses are governed by certain

and only

'if

if in

an analysis must be open

free variables. This justifies us in saying that

will use 'logical construction', a logical construction

also more.

it is

more

way

this difference

what

gets

a concept.

is

As

'=df.'

restrictions; flanking the

sentences in one or

analyzed

have

such a

To mark

is

an

analysis.

A logical construction should also guarantee the existence of

need not specify) what Quine

entities satisfying the

calls

''a

proxy function"; a

analysandum concept

total function

to those satisfying the

analysans.^
Since, unlike definitions, analyses

and

logical constructions are not

mere

stipulations but are intended to have philosophical significance, there are certain
criteria

they must satisfy.

I

will take

any biconditional in any number
criteria. First, the

analysis

an adequate analysis of some concept

hearf

must express

a necessary truth;

analysans condition. The biconditional

fails to satisfy this criterion

be

of free variables that satisfies the following

necessarily an entity or tuple of entities satisfies the
satisfies the

to

because although

it

must be

that

analysandum condition
'x

has kidneys

it is

iff

iff it

x has a

actually the case that

son'iething has kidneys
case.

iff it

has a heart, intuitively,

Second, the analysis must be

tiou-circiildr:

this is not necessarily the

the condition expressed bv the

analysans must not involve the concept expressed in the analysandum either
explicitly or implicitly

-

must be graspable without a

it

analysandum condition.

The biconditional

criterion because, intuitively,

without a prior grasp of what
theoretical intuitions that
first

two

complex

criteria.

Third,

I

we

a circle

it is

be a

to

assume

that the analysans

analysandum;

'x is

a lawyer

circulaT

is

x

iff

is

an attorney'

is

fails this

circular

analysis satisfies these

must have a more

this justifies

decomposes the concept being analyzed

The biconditional

x

only by appeal to our pre-

circle. It is

we judge whether a purported
will

iff

cannot grasp whether or not x

logical structure than the

the analysis

'x is

prior grasp of the

into

its

fails this

us in saying that

conceptual parts.
condition; logically,

both analysans and analysandum are atomic (open) sentences.^ ^

Finally, the

analysans condition should involve reference only to members of the

official

ontology of the theory and

Or it

should

at least

be possible

utilize

only

official

to replace the

conceptual primitives.

analysans expression by such a

condition by a process of definitional, analytic or logical replacement. Whether
or not a biconditional satisfies this criterion depends on what the metaphysical

theory in question

is.

To illustrate:
qualifies as
It

the analysis 'x

adequate according

is

a brother

to the

above

iff

x

is

male and x

is

criteria relative to certain theories.

expresses a necessary truth; both the concept of maleness and the concept of

siblinghood can be grasped without a prior grasp of brotherhood;
X

a sibling'

is

a sibling' has greater logical structure than

'x is

a brotheh

conjunction rather than an atomic (open) sentence; and

maleness and siblinghood

among

its

if

-

'x is

it is

male and

a

the theory contains

primitives (or analyses of them in terms ol

Its

primitives), then

analysans involves reference only to

its

official

primitives of

the theor\\

Logical constructions specify collections of entities.
a collection

verv' limited:

possible,

extensionally.

is

it is

even

practical only

in principle,

specified intensionally:
satisfaction of

simply

which

if

is

something that
sufficient for

adequacy

of

members

is finite.

So

is

method

small,

a collection

or set of conditions

is

is

and onlv
is

usually

specified

is

simply a matter of instantiating some property or
is

recursive. First,

some set

of base elements

specified. Being either a base

from operating on one of the members

is

element or
is

necessary and

membership. Logical constructions must meet similar conditions of

to analyses: they

increased structure (in

members

official

number

this

to specifv

necessary and sufficient for membership. Sometimes

some operation is
results

members. However,

the collection

But often the condition

specified; then

the

some condition

satisfaction of this condition
relation.

if

list its

One way

must be necessarily

some

sense)

of the ideology

and

true, non-circular, display

utilize or involve reference

and ontology. But they must

also

only to

meet an

additional requirement: they must guarantee the existence of a function from the
entities

being constructed to their constructions. Frege's reduction of numbers

to

set-theory provides an example: this guarantees the proxy function that takes

each of the "old" numbers n into the class of n-membered

classes.

We can think of the fact-stating part of our ordinary discourse as itself a
theory

— some

of

its

sentences are logical consequences of others and

set of primitive concepts

and

the quantifications prodigal.

quantifiers.

And many

But the

list

of primitives

is

it is

has a

long and

of the kinds of things referred to

and

primitives used are philosophically troublesome for one reason or another.

the

It is

and

the analyses

provide the bridge between

logical constructions of a metaphysical theor}- that
it

discourse: they link the set of

and the
its

theor\'

embodied

in

our ordinar\^

theorems with the antecedently familiar but

philosophically troublesome notions and entities of our ordinary' discourse.

Indeed
is

only in virtue of a theory's analyses and logical constructions that

it is

about the troublesome entities

The philosophical
theory to theory.

then

its

If

the

and notions involved

significance of

analysis can be

viewed

one way

some

to

how

understand something.

concept.

The idea

is

that

is,

despite

familiarity, obscure,

its

to regard

It

they are put together and to grasp this

Another purpose might be elimination of

an analysis permits replacement of

occurrences of the analysandum concept by the analysans.

way

from

will var\'

as providing illumination or understanding.

displays the parts of the concept and
is

in our ordinar\' discourse.

any particular analysis

analysandum concept

it

It

all

thereby provides a

use of the expressions which ostensibly express the analysandum

concept as mere shorthand for expressions for logical compounds from
conceptual primitives. There
this.

may be any number of reasons

Perhaps the analysandum concept

dubious and the analysans

raises

is

for

wanting

to

do

thought to be epistemologically

no such epistemological

for reasons of conservativeness or conceptual

economy

difficulties.

the

Perhaps

analysandum

concept ought not to appear as a conceptual primitive of the theory, even

though

it is

perfectly clear

and epistemologically

respectable. Finally, perhaps,

despite playing an important role in our thought and language, the ordinary

concept being analyzed has unclear rules of application or "fuzzy borders". By
contrast, the analysans

may be precise and yet still be suited

systematic role in our thought and language. The analysans

to play the

may

same

then be

regarded as a replacement for analysandum concept; something more precise that
is

suited to

do

all

the theoretical

work previously performed by

that

which

it

8

replaces.

(

Fhough

necessarily true

in this case the

may be hard

requirement on analyses that they be

to apply.)

For a logical construction to have philosophical significance
the kind of
entit\

being constructed must also be antecedently familiar and the
logical

construction must
properties.

show how

to construct

it

in terms of other entities

and

Logical constructions permit clarification of the nature of certain

kinds of things and they allow the elimination of certain kinds of

perhaps in favour of epistemologically

minimizing the ontology, or in order

less

to

dubious

entities,

or in the interests of

entities,

supply more exactly delimited

replacements for familiar but ill-behaved

entities, etc.

But because they

guarantee the existence of proxy functions, logical constructions permit the

replacement of the

entities of ordinary discourse

functional or quantificational structure.

without disrupting

virtue of

its

its

truth-

logical constructions, a

metaphysical theory will often entail various identities between the "old" and
the

"new"

entities.

So logical constructions also permit us

antecedently familiar entities as having been

to

regard the

ontologicallj/ reduced in

Quine's

sense.

1.2 Criteria for

The aim
to evaluate
criteria

Evaluating Metaphysical Theories
of this section

explain briefly

some

of the criteria by

and adjudicate among competing metaphysical

theories.

which

These

may be summarized broadly as a requirement of maximum explanatory

power: one theory
But

is to

this is

is

preferable to another

vague and in what follows

it

if it

has greater explanatory power.

will helpful to separate out various

aspects of this criterion. In particular, certain epistemological criteria can be

distinguished from criteria of theoretical
concern:

(1)

utility.

The epistemological

the intelligibility of the theory's primitive ontology

criteria

and ideology;

(2)

the plausibilih' of

theorems; and

its

(3)

the extent to

explanation of the origin of our knowledge of

The

criteria of theoretical utilitx^ concern:
(4) the

maximizes the accommodation

primitive ontology and ideology; and

imposes on

to

we would be

(7)

which the

initial

to

problem

is

if

is

a

fact that

criteria.

which the theory
its

its

it

low degree

some

enhanced or diminished by

is

Unfortunately, our

criteria is also
or,

if

further exacerbated by the fact that

—

not,

some

very limited;

how

a high degree of satisfaction of one
of satisfaction of

some

other.

to

it is

order them. The

It is

may be possible only

also complicated

of these criteria are linked, perhaps inextricably. So there
I

And I will

treat

them as

if

its

the quantifiers

no

on

their

is

that

its

theorems and

analyses and logical constructions be intelligible. So the

terms in which they are stated must be

must be plausible

is

the

they were separable.

The first epistemological requirement on a theory
the left-hand sides of

by

if

will state the criteria

ceteris paribus clauses to reflect a position of neutrality

relative importance.

far

of the criteria pull in

immediate prospect of any calculus of theory evaluation.
with built-in

of the

very primitive. Moreover, our understanding

they are of equal importance,

opposite directions
there

is

weigh and balance the various

from clear

to

some numerical measure

probability of a theory

degree of satisfaction of these various

how

degree

the degree of systematization

able to extract

understanding of each of them
of

ontology, ideology and axioms.

the parsimoniousness of

(6)

an

this data.

Ideally,

degree

theor\' permits

of the pre-analytic data; (3) the simplidU^ of

axioms, analyses and logical constructions;

its

its

which the

to say that

intelligible.

This entails at least that

it

we have some pre-analytic grasp on the domains of

and the conceptual primitives

rather than defined within the theory.

since these are presupposed by,

10

But

intelligibilitv' is a

matter of degree and

we have

pre-theoretical

opinions about which kinds of entities and which notions
are better understood.

So not

kinds of entities and concepts are on a par as far as

all

eligibility for the

status of primitive ontological category or conceptual
primitive

is

concerned.

A

theory should aim to analyze or logically construct traditionally
or pretheoretically puzzling entities or concepts in terms of kinds of entity
or

conceptual primitives which are as intuitively clear as possibled^ To the extent
that the entities over

which the theory quantifies

contains obscure primitives, the theory
explain.

So of

or kinds of

tivo theories

entities, the

which aim

itself is

to

are obscure or

obscure and

its

ideology

fails to

illuminate or

analyze or construct the same concepts

one whose ontology and ideology

is

clearer

is to

be

preferred, other things being equal.

The second epistemological requirement on a metaphysical theory
its

to

theorems should be as plausible as possible.
be paid

theories,

here special attention needs

theories of modality, concerns the

plausibility of their existential axioms.
is

that

Much of the dispute about metaphysical

to the existential axioms.

and especially metaphysical

theorems

And

is

However, judging the

plausibility of the

not in general possible independently of the analyses and logical

constructions they permit. For the prima facie plausibility of a collection of

theorems

may well be enhanced by

the illumination

and explanatory gain

conferred by the analyses and constructions they permit.

A final epistemological requirement is that the origin of our purported
knowledge or understanding
its

conceptual primitives and

One

of the
its

members

of a theory's primitive ontolog)’,

axioms must be as improblematic as possible

source for this understanding

is

causal acquaintance with

members

of the

kinds of entities posited by the ontology, instances of the fundamental
properties or relations contained in the ideology and facts asserted by the
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axioms.

A second

source

is

axiom

set to

best

decided by the other

is

such a primitive ontology and ideology and

for

be part of the best explanation of the data, where what
counts as
criteria of theor>^ evaluation.'^

The questions concerning

plausibility

and those concerning

origins are

separate issues. In particular, the existence of a certain kind of
entity
intuitively plausible despite

one

traditional strategy

being causally isolated from us. In such a case,

to logically construct the

is

epistemologically suspect

over and reference

its

members

to entities

may be

kind of entity from other

less

of the ontology. This permits quantification

whose

existence

we

did not doubt, while

still

respecting our epistemological scruples. Russell's attempt to logically construct

ordinary material objects such as tables and chairs from sense-data
this strategy.'^

tables

and

chairs;

to legitimize

Following

The point

of such a construction

is

illustrates

not to eliminate reference to

no-one seriously doubts that there are such things. Rather,

such reference by showing

this tradition,

I

will just

why

assume

it is

it is

not epistemologically suspect.

that a theory that substitutes logical

constructions for entities and notions that are in principle causally isolated from

we can give a causal explanation of how we

us and whose axioms are such that

know them is

preferable to one that lacks these features, other things being

equal.

Next let us consider the

criteria

having

to

do with

theoretical utility.

The

analyses and logical constructions are analyses and constructions of some preanalytically familiar notions

assess

them

for

adequacy

—

it is

we need

these that the theory
to

compare what

is

a theory of - so to

the theory says about the

notions and entities analyzed or constructed with pre-analytic data involving
them.2"

To be genuinely explanatory

the pre-theoretical data about

them

the axioms should

as possible. This

is

aim

to entail as

much of

simply because the more
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that the

axioms of a

criterion of theoretical

where the strength

more

theor\' entail, the
utilitx' is

of the set of

the theor\- explains. So the

that the

axioms should be as strong as

axioms

is

a measure, roughly, of

first

possible,

how much

of

the data they entail.

But the set of axioms should also be as simple as possible. The
simplicity
of a single

The
in

axiom

is

a

measure of the complexity

simplicity of the set or axioms consists in

how simple each one

set.2i

is;

the fewer

of

its

internal logical structure.

how many axioms it contains and

and simpler the axioms, the simpler

the

Theories that assume less to accommodate the same data are preferable

because, intuitively, such theories are

ad hoc.

If,

for instance, a

more genuinely explanatory; they

number of intuitive

principles are

consequences of a single axiom, then, although

this single

unexplained, the principles have been accounted for

-

all

are less

logical

axiom may be

they are true because

they must be true, given the axiom.

The requirement
conflict

that the set of

axioms be as simple as possible tends

with the requirement that they be as strong as possible.

theory to accommodate the data

is

axioms. Such an axiom set would,

would not be very

simple.

It

for

it

to

trivially,

One way

add them individually
have

would be very ad

to

its

maximum strength.

hoc;

it

for a

set of

But

would not explain

to

it

the data.

On the other hand, one way to guarantee maximum simplicity would be to have
as axioms only those required to guarantee the logical truths. But such an axiom
set

would

entail,

and so

explain, nothing about the subject matter.

It

would be

consistent with any data. Roughly then, the simplicity of a set of axioms

inversely proportional to
set achieve

some kind

as simple as

it

its

strength.

So

in part

what is needed

of optimal balance of simplicity

can be consistently with entailing as

and

is

is

that the

strength;

it

axiom

must be

much of the data as

possible.

However, the pre-theoretic data

itself is

often a

mixed bag

of

common

sense opinions, rough principles, and perhaps also some
rudimentary^
theorization.

And

these elements

opinions and principles
inconsistent with

them

intuitive plausibility

may

may have

is

vary- greatly in plausibility'.

the status of

Moorean

thereby refuted. Others

without being Aloorean

any theory

facts:

may have a

Some

high degree of

facts; a theory's plausibility' is

severely diminished by contradicting one of these, but

is

may

not refuted. There

also be initially plausible but not compelling data; the plausibility of
any theory
that contradicts these

is

diminished in inverse proportion

intuitive support. Finally, there are

to the strength of their

mere “off-hand" opinions, those

inclined to hold but can easily be disabused

of,

and

these carry very

we

that

are

little

weight.22
In short,
its

one theory should be preferred over another,

if,

ceteris paribus,

axioms have a higher degree of strength-cum-simplicity with respect

pre-analytic data,

where the notion

of strength

is

to the

thought of as weighted with

respect to the degree of intuitive support that the data receive.
Third, the theory should be as parsimonious as possible. In particular

it

should respect Occam's Razor and avoid postulating kinds of entity or
conceptual primitives beyond necessity
data, the

Of two

theories that explain the

one that does so on the basis of a smaller ontology -cum-ideology

intuitively,

more explanatory and

Finally, the theory

so

is

to

impose a greater uniformity

good theory

of, e.g.

of logical structure

modality, by this criterion

would

modality have a similar underlying logical structure.
helps to illuminate the logical interrelations

opinions about what

is

possible

is,

be preferred.

should be as systematic as possible:

theories that

same

and what

is

among
not.

we should
on

prefer

the data.

A

entail that all the data of

Among other things

this

the data of modality, our
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1.3.

Modality
All the metaphysical theories to be considered in
this dissertation are

metaphysical theories of modality. So

them

out

to set

some

it

will

be helpful before considering any of

of the pre- theoretical data of modality that they

aim

to

accommodate.

some states

Intuitively,

of affairs or propositions

might, or couldn't be the case;
impossible,
is

and so

some

must be the

are necessary, others possible,

two plus

three

is

five

must be

the state of affairs that consists in there being colourless blue frogs

or a modal

classify

status.

assume
modal
will

any

state of affairs or proposition

Throughout

modal

modalities or

this dissertation

others

I

will

is

is

to assign to

assume

may be modally

classified,

Quite what propositions or states of

affairs

and

impossible.
it

a modality

that the bearers of

and

I

will

may be assigned some
and modal

be something that an adequate theory of modality must
But modal discourse

swans

the case;

statuses are "states of affairs" or "propositions"

that every proposition

status.

still

on. For instance, the state of affairs of there being blue

a possible one; the proposition that

To so

case, others

tell

statuses are

us.

actually conducted in sentences. Indeed, any

is

ordinary declarative sentence of English can be converted into a modal claim
either
that',

by prefixing the adverb

'it

might be

that',

'it

'possibly' (or the adverbial phrases

could be the case thaF

etc.)

'it is

or by restating

it

possible
in the

subjimctive mood. Call the result of either transformation, a "modalization" of
the original sentence. Modalizations of e.g. 'There are blue sw^ans' include
'Possibly, there are blue swans',

'There might be blue

and so on.

It is

thoughts. So

if

sw’^ans',

'It

might be the case that there are blue swans',

'There could be [or could have been] blue sw'ans',

by means of modalizations

that

we actually express

our modal

propositions are taken to be the bearers of modalities, what

is

the

relation

between the operation

of modalization

on sentences and

the

modal

classification of propositions?

Consider

first

adverbial modalizations of the form 'Possibly,

an ordinary' declarative sentence. Usually, sentences are said
propositions.

It is

I

will not discuss

it

further.

Now,

if

expresses proposition p, then the adverbial modalization of

p

possible.

is

s is

to "express"

the job of the philosopher of language not the metaphysican
to

explain this relation and

iff

where

s',

Thus an account

of the

modal

sentence
s,

s

'Possibly,

s' is

true

statuses of propositions yields a

straightforward explanation of the semantic effect of this type of adverbial
modalization.

Notice next that

mere

stylistic variants of this

something be the
just

many

another

way

may be regarded as

other forms of modalization

adverbial form. Often saying that

case, or that

it

could be the case, or that

of saying that possibly

it is

the case.

it

And

it is

possible that

might be the case

still

other modal

idioms are straightforwardly explicable in terms of 'possibly' and negation,

something

is

dissertation

necessarily the case

I

will take the adverbial

declarative sentence) as the basic

mere

either

iff it is

e.g.

not possibly not the case. In this

form

'Possibly,

modal idiom.

stylistic variants of this

is

I

s'

will

(where

assume

form or are definable

s is

an

ordinarv’

that the others are

in terms of

and

it

negation. This allows a straightforward connection between the assignment of

modal

statuses to propositions

and the semantic

general, thereby permitting us to concentrate

effect of

modalization in

on the modal statuses

of

propositions, ignoring modalized sentences. Each declarative sentence simply
"inherits" the

modal

status of the proposition or state of affairs that

it

expresst's.

This assumption does, however, involve an important simplification. For
it it is

far

from clear that all modal idioms can be regarded as

the adverbial

form or as definable

in terms of

it

stylistic variants ot

together with negation. In

1

particular sorrie of the

mood

subjunctive

modal claims

resist

The justification for

that vve tv'pically express

by sentences

in the

straightforward assimilation to the adverbial form.^^

no analysis

this simplification is that

of modalit\' will be

considered that could not be complicated so as to deal with these
problem cases,
if

this is really

needed, and none of the problem cases will actually

arise.25

We do not learn the modal statuses of states of affairs one by one. For we
can

all

assign the correct

modal

status to a potentially infinite

of affairs

which we have never pondered

number

one by one. So our

of facts

modal

the various
principles.

I

principles.

The

find

statuses

it

them

helpful to think of

what

is

to

I

impossibilities that

impossible.^^

and negative

the range of possibilities

is;

The remainder of section
principles.

There

is

be precise here because the principles themselves can be

will

aim merely

must be recognized, leaving

1.3.1 Positive Principles of

this varies in its

to characterize possibilities

the job of the various theories to be

The

how vast

by comparing them with the data and

intuitive support.

certain general

as falling into positive

rough characterization of some of these

no point attempting

It is

classification of states of affairs according to

positive principles concern

1.3 will consist in a

we cannot learn an infinite

must be governed or generated by

the negative principles concern

tested only

before. Yet

number of states

more

it

degree of

and

open whether there

are more.

precise about the middle ground.

Modality ^^

positive principles of modality are usually called principles of

“plenitude" because they

complete; that

it

tell

us that the space of possibilities, "logical space",

is

contains no gaps or non-arbitrary boundaries. Thus they

involve universal quantification: they say that logical space consists of all
instances of a certain kind.

Among them must be the way

the world actually

is --

()

17

if

something

is

actually the case, then

are supposed to be alternatives to the

it

must be

way

possible.

I

he other

the world actually

is.

that logical space consists of all other instances
of the kind of

world actually
So as a

is is

first

just

to

...the
little

This suggests

which

the

way

the

one instance.

step towards a

more

detailed characterization of these

principles, let us start with a characterization of

According

possibilities

how

the

world actually

is.

Lewis

world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one
thing and then another.. .We have a geometry: a system of external

relations of spatiotemporal distance

spacetime

itself,

between

Maybe points of
point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, or
at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural
points.

maybe

maybe both. And

which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated. For short: we have arrangement of qualities. And that is
all. ..All else supervenes on that.^^
intrinsic properties

The actual world then can be seen
seen as built up from certain materials
stock of perfectly natural properties

which determines the way

The

it

can be

a spatiotemporal framework and a

- by means

of

an instantiation

relation

these properties are arranged within this framework.

rest supervenes.
It is

natural to think that a

specify not just
that

—

as articulated in a certain way:

its

full

characterization of the actual world

arrangement of properties, but also the stock of individuals

have locations within the framework and which

and stand
location,

in various relations.

and

must

instantiate these properties

However, since every individual must have

since the spatiotemporal

framework

itself

a

can be thought of as

consisting of a collection of points together with a system of external relations of

spatiotemporal distance

among

them, Lewis simplifies by identifying the

individuals with their locations. Indeed, since the above characterization aims
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only to capture the

basic" facts of the actual world on which
"all else

we may

supervenes

Intuitively, the

as well identify the simple particulars with
the points.

complex particulars and

point-particulars of

their properties will

which they are composed and

supervene on the

their intrinsic properties

and

interrelations.

But in order

to

be

fully explicit let

us deviate slightly from Lewis and

think of the actual world as consisting of
four elements: a stock of individuals or
point-instants, a stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties,
a system of

external relations

among

these point-instants that defines the actual

spatiotemporal structure, and an instantiation relation that determines
intrinsic properties are actually distributed

among

how

the

the individuals within this

framework.

this articulation into four

It is

elements that provides the key

detailed understanding of the kind, ways that the actual world might

to a

be,

of

more
which

logical space contains all instances. For each of these four elements can be

thought of as

itself just

Consider

first

one instance of a kind.

the actual spatiotemporal framework. Intuitively this

is

just

one possible framework among many, one instance

of the kind possible

spatiotemporal framework.

the actual spatiotemporal

framework

is

If

current physics

is right,

non-Euchdean and has four-dimensions and a

But, intuitively,

it

could have been Euclidean.

number of dimensions

comprehends a vast array

these should be included within logical space
I

Or it could have had a

different

or a different curvature. Intuitively, the kind possible

spatiotemporal framework

plenitude.

certain curvature.

if

of structures.

logical space

is

And each of

to constitute a

will call the claim that logical space contains every instance of this

kind, the "Principle of the Plenitude of Structures" (PS).^^
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Consider next the actual stock of individuals.

Intuitively, this too

one instance of a kind of which there are many other

instances, in this case the

kind possible stock of individuals Of most individuals
that actually exist
.

clearly a contingent matter that they
car.

do

is.

So

intuitively

individuals
It

is

also

in

its

to exist.^» Intuitively then, the

stock of individuals than

any proper subset, or contraction, of the stock

seems

that there

among

we have granted

might have been. To deny
terms of

its

may

in

is

special in

well be special

possibility.

—

But not in

it

comprehends

controversial than the previous claim,

it is

this

hard

is

to

to deny.

For

is

(or,

we must admit

the world

how it
how it

as rich as possible in

hold that the possibility instantiated by the
this is unacceptable.

The

quite a different kind of thing from a

way. For

if

actually impoverished relative to

some way. And

may

it is

stock of individuals relative to

this is to

that there

actual world

mere

subscribe to a form of modal

perhaps, implicitly to assume

some

theological

might have been particulars

addition to or other than those that actually
individuals

of actual

of the actual stock. In other

hold that our world

this, to

parochialism about actuality
premise). Hence,

its

that

stock of individuals,

actual world

more

is

symmetry demands

is,

some sense

the previous claim,

might have been impoverished
actually

actually

possible stocks of individuals are those of which the actual stock

merely a proper subset. This

but once

world

might have been more or other individuals than

instances that are "augmentations" in

is

it

my

also a possible stock of individuals.

there actually are, that the kind possible stock of individuals also

words,

it is

exist. It is possible, for instance, that

New York or even the Earth should fail

might have been more impoverished

is just

exist.^^

comprehends not just any contraction

The kind

in

possible stock of

of the actual stock but also any

zo

niii^nientatum of this stock;

any stock that contain individuals

that

do not but

might have existed.
Moreover, intuitively the kind

comprehend

also any stocks that result

and augmentation.

some

possible stock of individuals

from some combination of contraction

should comprehend stocks of individuals that contain only

It

of those individuals that actually exist but

individuals that

should

do not actually

which also contain other

exist.

Intuitively, the

kind

possible stock of individuals

stocks of individuals.

And

each of them should be included within logical space

if

logical space

is

to constitute a plenitude.

I

comprehends

all

these

will call the claim that logical space

contains every instance of this kind, the "Principle of the Plenitude of

Individuals"

(PI).

Intuitively, the stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties that aire

actually instantiated

is

also just

one possible stock among many,

just

one

instance of the kind possible stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties?^ Of most
of the properties that are actually instantiated,
that they are actually instantiated;

it

it

seems

seems possible,

to

be a contingent matter

for instance, that nothing be

blue or that nothing have a mass of 5g. So the actual world could have been

more impoverished

in

its

stock of instantiated properties.

But again — though

—

it

also

seems possible

this too is

for there to

not actually instantiated; perhaps

more

controversial than the previous claim

have been instances of properties which are

Hume's missing shade

of blue, perhaps

some

"missing physical value", perhaps some different properties entirely beyond our
ken.^3

Jo deny

this, to

hold that our world

instantiated properties,

is

actuality (or implicitly to

to subscribe to

assume some

is

as rich as possible in

its

stock of

an intolerable parochialism about

theological premise). So

we should

also

admit there might have been instances of properties
other than those

that are

actually instantiated.^*^

Moreover,

if it is

possible for there to have been fewer instantiated

properties than there actually are and

then

It

seems also possible

of properties

for there to

which contain only some

instantiated but

which

possible for there to have been more,

it is

have been combinations of
of those properties

these: stocks

which are actually

also contain other properties that are not actually

instantiated.

Intuitively then, the actual stock of properties

the kind possible stock of properties
properties.

Some of

is

not the only possible one;

comprehends many possible stocks

of

these are contractions of the actual stock, others are

augmentations of the actual stock and

still

others are contraction-augmentation

mixes. Each of these should be included within logical space
constitute a plenitude.

I

if

logical space

is

to

will call the claim that logical space contains every

instance of this kind, the “Principle of the Plenitude of Properties" (PP).35

The

final

element in Lewis's characterization of the actual world

relation of instantiation. This specifies
intrinsic properties is distributed

among

the actual spatiotemporal framework;
together".

Once again

this

seems

many, one instance of a kind.

how the actual stock of perfectly

to

be

if

something

is

Ig,

fewer instances, some
possible arrangements

it

the

natural

the actual stock of individuals within

how the actual
just

world

is

“stitched

one possible arrangement among

Intuitively, all sorts of variations in the actual

arrangement of properties are possible —
blue;

is

if

something

is

red,

it

might have been

might have been lOOg; some properties may have

may have more; and

so on. Intuitively then, the kind

comprehends a vast array

of alternative arrangements.

And

the plenitude of loj;icdl space requires that

ail

such alternative arrangements be

included.

However, even

this is

only half the story. For

we saw

that the actual

spatiotemporal framework, the actual stock of properties
and the actual stock of
individuals are not the only possible ones. And, intuitively,
for each possible

framework, each possible stock
properties, there are

many

of individuals

possible

ways

and each possible stock

for those individuals to instantiate

those properties and be arranged within that framework.
logical space requires that

contain not just

it

all

And

the plenitude of

the possible alternative

arrangements of the materials of the actual world, but also
alternative arrangements of

all possible materials. It

all

the possible

contains a plenitude of

"recombinations" of any given inventory of materials, whether
inventory or a merely possible one.

I

of

this is the actual

will call the claim that logical space

contains every instance of this kind, the "Recombination Principle" (RP).

1.3.2

Negative Principles of Modality

Not everything

that

can be said, thought or otherwise represented

expresses a genuine possibility. The negative principles of modality concern

gap between what can be
possible. For simplicity

of representors;

I

said,

thought or represented and what

is

will consider only sentences rather than

whatever

this

genuinely

any other

sort

said about sentences applies mutatis mutandis to

is

the rest.

Sometimes
an impossibility,

it is

an individual sentence

e.g. Tt is

number of sentences each

may

collectively express

raining'

and

'It is

that expresses

what

is,

intuitively,

both raining and not raining.' But sometimes a
of

an

which on

its

own expresses a genuine possibility,

impossibility. For instance, even

though each of

not raining' might be true, they cannot both be. So in the

'It is
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interests of generality let us think of the
negative principles of modality as

applying

to collections

These principles

tell

or sets of sentences rather than to individual
sentences.

us which sets of sentences could not

all

be true together.

VVe can categorize such sets of sentences
roughly into four classes

according to why, intuitively, they could not

because

it

could not

there are sets of sentences

all

be true together because

violation of logic.
raining, then

be true together. This

open whether the categorization

is left

First,

all

it is

Examples include
cold',

'it is

if

exhaustive or exclusive.

“logically incompatible sets"

they were, then there
raining',

{'it is

raining',

is

'it is

not cold'},

'it is

{'Bill is

that could not

that

{'if it is

chubby', 'Nobody

is

be true together on

logic.

Second, there are sets of sentences
-

all

-

would be a

not raining'},

chubby'} and so on. The members of these sets could not
pain of violating

rough

is

all

—

be true together because

"mathematically incompatible sets"
if

they were, then there would be a

violation of mathematics. Mathematical sentences are necessarily true or

necessarily false

and any sentences whose joint

truth

would

contradict a

mathematical theorem jointly express an impossibility.^^ The

and {'some natural number

is

mathematically incompatible

meanings

any

set

it is

a bachelor

bacheloT and 'Plato

is

be true together in

what we might

call

“semantically

impossible for anyone to be both hairy and not hirsute

semantically incompatible.
is

all

of the subsentential parts of their contained

which contains the sentences

anyone who

5'}

sets.

sentences. Sets of such sentences are

incompatible". Since

+2=

the greatest prime'}, for instance, are

Third, there are sets of sentences that could not
virtue of facts about the

sets {'2

And

is

'Plato

since

it is

is

hairy'

and

part of the

unmarried any

married'

is

'Plato

meaning

set that contains

is

not hirsute'

is

of 'bacheloT that

both 'Plato

also semantically incompatible.

is

a

-
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Finally, there are sets of sentences

incompatible sets"- which could not

- what we might call

"metaphysically

be true together because

all

if

then there would a violation of some true metaphysical
principle.^^
principle concerns the relation

between the stock

of individuals

they were,

One such

and

the

spatiotemporal framework: simply put, the framework
must be the right size

and shape
there are

accommodate

to

the individuals.

all

continuum-many individuals within

contains only denumerably-many points.

It

cannot be, for instance, that

a spatiotemporal

Nor can

framework

that

there be three-dimensional

individuals within a framework that has only two dimensions. So any
set of

sentences that contains sentences the joint truth of which would violate
such a

requirement

is

metaphysically incompatible.

Another principle concerns so-called w-consistency. Suppose
property

P, 1

has the property

sentences {T(0)', T(l)',

P, 2

T(2)',....,

has

it,

and so

on. Consider the infinite set of

'3n ~Px'}. For each natural

contains a sentence which means that n has P. But

which means
no violation

that there

is

some

of logic in supposing that

together. But intuitively this

be true that there
natural
all

natural

number

is

is

some

not

P.

the natural numbers.

At

As

it

least

number which does not have

it is

this set

P.

There

is

the sentences in such a set be true

all

number
it is

number n,

also contains a sentence

would not represent a genuine

natural

that 0 has a

that

is

it

cannot

not P unless some particular

not possible

sometimes put,

possibility;

if

we assume that 0,

existential claims

1, 2,...

are

should be

"witnessed".

There are also principles that concern the pattern of instantiation of the
stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties. Such properties are not in general
logically

Some

independent of each other but stand in complicated relationships.

pairs of properties are such that

any individual

instantiate the other; they are contraries.

instantiating

one cannot

No individual can be both red

all

over

and blue

some

all

over, for instance; or both Ig

scarlet, for instance,

some

properties entail others.

must be

some

individual

or yellow

or...;

Vermillion

On

or...

and

is

if

coloured, for instance, then

some

the other hand,

individual

red,

is

Finally there are relations

it

perhaps anything coloured must not be
I

X

is

nor yellow
abstract'

}

it

individual that

that

must

must

among

must
is

red must be

is

their determinates.

either be red or orange

either be scarlet or

the determinables themselves;

one another, and maybe others exclude one another. Examples
are

entail

},

Any

among determinables and

controversial, but perhaps anything coloured

blue

mass.

and any individual

red;

coloured. There are also relations

some

in

pairs of properties are such that any individual
instantiating one

instantiate the other;

If

and Sg

scarlef, 'x

is

nor...'}, {'x is

are

all

not

must have some area or

abstract.

So the

no

area'}

metaphysically incompatible

and

and

sets, {'x is red', 'x is

red'}, {'x is coloured', 'x is neither

coloured', 'x has

other,

{'x is

red nor orange

coloured', 'x

is

sets.

A final type of principle concerns the relations between the properties of
a

complex individual and the properties and arrangements

Intuitively

it is

impossible that the particles that compose

have exactly the same

intrinsic properties that they in fact

exactly as they in fact are without
that
is

it

in fact does.

So {'my lamp

properties of
of

and

is

e.g.

do and be arranged

my lamp is red'

We might express this in general by saving

complex individual supervene on the
its

parts.

Perhaps some

intrinsic

intrinsic properties

colour properties, supervene solely on the intrinsic

properties of their parts, while others
the arrangement of their parts.

supervene on both.

parts.

my desk-lamp should

black', 'each of the parts of

the arrangement of

complex individuals,

its

my lamp having just the colour and shape

a metaphysically incompatible set.

that the intrinsic properties of a

of

Still

e.g.

shape properties, supervene

solely

others, e.g. aesthetic properties, perhaps

on

1.4

Preview of Subsequent Chapters

The

rest of this dissertation will

metaphysical theories of modality.
outlined in section

1.1

and

I

main

them

in accord

their analyses

to the pre-analytic

I

to the criteria outlined

and

theory,

data summarized in the

-

much of

Lewis's modal realism. Although this

the critical literature

on modal realism

about precisely what parts of the theory are objectionable.
presentation and evaluation of

help to clarify exactly what

modality

and

is

will

closely

relations.

is

become

it

problematic about

clear in the final chapter,

detail,

I

this

account

is

this

unclear

that

chapter should

an understanding of

of the nature of properties

alternative metaphysical theories of
will

an account of the nature of properties and
is

hope

is

is

it.

bound up with an understanding

modality to modal realism in

I

according to the scheme of

And before considering

basic properties

logical

present and evaluate a version of one of the clearest

metaphysical theories of modality

As I hope

with the scheme

1.3.

In the next chapter

now a familiar

an examination of various

to

them according

adequacy of

will refer in the

principles of section

will present

will evaluate

I

in section 1.2. In assessing the

constructions

1

be devoted

devote a couple of chapters

to giving

relations. In chapter three a theory of

developed and defended against objections. In chapter four

extended

to cover non-basic properties

and

relations

and

certain

other loose-ends are tied up.

The remaining chapters

are devoted to a discussion of

"ersatz" theories of modality. Like

modal realism

familiar quantificational analysis of the

proposition p, possibly p
differ

iff

from modal realism

there

is

modal

what Lewis

calls

these theories endorse the

statuses of propositions: for any

some world

at

which p

is

true.

But they

in their accounts of the nature of the entities

quantified over, the worlds. In particular, they
hold that

some

abstract entities of

kind,

we quantify

where modal realism holds

only over

that rve quantify over

concrete entities.
In chapter five

I

outline the ersatz strategy,

form of ersatzism. Lewis has presented

a puzzling

against even this generic form of ersatzism.

respond by arguing that neither horn

development of an adequate form
In the sixth

and

final

and consider a very general
and

abstract

The argument

is

argument

dilemmetic and

I

dangerous. This clears the path for

is

of ersatzism.

chapter

I

present a rather crude form of ersatzism

and discuss some powerful objections

to theories of this

kind due to Bricker and

Lewis. Drawing on the analyses of properties and relations of chapters three and
four

I

then refine this theory so that

endorse

this

it is

immune

I

tentatively

theory as the best metaphysical theory of modality.

In order to reduce this dissertation to a

impose certain

restrictions. First,

I

number of such

theories

modal

I

by any means.

promising few proposals. Second,

I

size

have had

to

theories that reject a

interesting,

do not even attempt
I

I

statuses of propositions.^^ There

and they are very

space to do them justice here. Indeed,
quantificational theories

manageable

do not discuss any

quantificational understanding of the

are a

to these criticisms.

discuss only

do not discuss

but there

is

just not

to discuss all

what seem

to

me

such

the

most

the role of quantification over

"merely possible" individuals, individuals that are "less than" whole worlds, in
the analysis of modality. So
re modality

and so

on.

I

do not deal with issues concerning

Although

this

essentialism, de

considerably simplifies the presentation,

explanation and evaluation of the various theories to be discussed, these
theories are incomplete

and

the evaluations can only be provisional.
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There are a number ot ways of understanding the
notion of logical consequence and quite
which IS being employed by a given metaphysical theory
may prove crucial. In such cases the
theory will need to make its understanding of the
notion of logical

consequence clear. For
metaphysical theory of modality that cannot
succeed if it employs a purely proof-theoretic notion of
logical consequence.
A proof requires premises, so, on pain of infinite regress, there must
be some non-null set of
axiorns. However, there may not be a unique
smallest set of axioms. For instance it may be
that t^he theo^ contains three sentences A, B
and C such that assuming any two we can prove
the third, and none is provable from any other
sentences. Thus, a set which includes two of
the three as axioms is as minimal as any other, but
there is no one smallest set. Usually
however, it will not matter which we adopt as the axioms.
^Though perhaps there must be at least one if the kind is to exist at all,
and so quantification
over, or reference to, members of that kind is to be
intelligible.
instance, in chapter six

we

will

examine

a

^ Usually, of course, quantification
theory

is

formulated

in

such a

way

that

its

theorems

and only those sentences that come out true in all interpretations in all
non-empty
domains. And then it follows from the semantics alone that there are
some entities without
the aid of any axioms. However, this way of developing
quantification theory so that the
empty domain is ignored is a mere technical convenience; it could easily be
reformulated so
that the empty domain is included. Since the above characterization
of metaphysical theories
include

all

is intended to be taken in as philosophically
netural a way as possible, such technical
conveniences are not being presupposed. Think of the logic being presupposed here

that
5

is

as

one

free of existential assumptions, a so-called "free logic".

Again there may not be

unique smallest set of conceptual primitives. Sometimes a theory
- perhaps predicate A is defined in terms of B and B in
terms of A and neither defined in terms of anything else. Then the ideology must include
either A or B but it need not include both. In such cases, we can think of there being
a number
of equally minimal axiom sets and ideologies, though, in view of their simple
interconvertibility, it will not usually make any difference which we adopt as the axioms or
a

will contain a circle of definitions

the

ideology of the theory.

^ Perhaps,

though, this is not generally the case. For perhaps some quantifiers are not unary
but essentially binary (see e.g. S. Neale, Descriptions, (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT
Press, 1990), Chapter two). 1 will ignore this issue from now on.
^ W. V. O. Quine, 'Truth by Convention", in his The Ways
of Paradox and Other Essays, (New
York: Random House, 1966), p.71; see also B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Second

(New York: Norton & Co., 1902), p. 249
perhaps best to think of definitions as correlating the language of the theory with a
more compact, easier-to-read, parallel language, rather than as a part of the theory proper.
But if we like we can add the results of definitional substitution into the axioms and their
consequences and regard them as additional theorems. Perhaps, we add the definitions to our
list of axioms, or perhaps we could think of all substitution instances of the logical
consequences as logical consequences of the original axioms by courtesy. It does not really
matter since definitions do not add anything new; they have no philosophical significance.
See W. V. O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in his From a Logical Point of View, Second
Edition (revised), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 20-46.
^ See W. V. O. Quine, "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers", in his The Ways of
Paradox and Other Essays, (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 199-207.
Here the priority involved is supposed to be epistemic rather than logical or metaphysical.
It must not be that we could grasp or understand the analysans only if we grasp the
Edition,

^

It is

analysandum.
Sometimes two purported primitives of a theory are identified e.g. states of affairs with
propositions — perhaps in order to achieve some minimization of the ontology or ideology,
perhaps because one is more familiar than the other. But e.g. 'x is a proposition iff x is a state
of affairs' would not qualify as an analysis according to the above construal because there is
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no

However, disqualify
ng th,s as an acceptable analysis
one thing, the issue will not actually anse m
the course
-

IV" ‘TV*

really problematic: for

,

is

not

of this

dissertation; for another, the biconditional
could be treated simply as a definition or as
a
to provide an alternative ideology or
primitive ontology.

wav

intend the notion of a kind or a collection to
be understood ,n as neutral a way as possible
I assume that it is
pre-theoretically understood. The notion of a
kind or collection should
not be automatically identified with the notion
of a class for classes are controversial in
many
ways. (Are there really any? Is there a universal class
I

and

corresponding to unrestricted
the legitimacy of classes can be secured, it
may turn out that
this IS an theoretically attractive identification
to make. And I will do so in chapter two.
Here I assume that the idea of a mereology of concepts is
workably clear. It is not to be
assumed that a concept has a unique decomposition into conceptual
parts.
quantification? etc.)

However,

if

Note that in saying that the analysandum concept and the entities
to be logically
constructed must be "antecedently familiar" I am not saying
that they need be either more
familiar or less familiar than the notions involved in their
analysans or logical constructions.
The idea is only that we must have some grasp of them that is independent
of the analyses
and constructions under consideration; we must know what it is that is
being analyzed or
constructed.
It is this aim that provides the rationale for
the requirement on logical constructions they
guarantee the existence of proxy functions. Often philosophical analyses are
assumed to be
expressible in first-order theories. However, one version of the
Skolem-Lowenheim theorem
entails that for any first-order theory T there is a translation f
from T into R such that (i) R is
ontologically committed only to the natural numbers, and (ii) f is truth-preserving
i.e. for any
sentence s of T, f(s)— a sentence of R— is true iff s is. Yet clearly such "reductions" as
the

translation of T into R will not in general be adequate. It is this additional
requirement of
structure-preservingness that rules out such unacceptable translations as are guaranteed to

by the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem from qualifying as reductions. This
theorem does not guarantee the preservation of structure in the translation.
exist

because the

is

What is meant by 'preserving the structure' here is difficult to say in abstraction from
any particular theory, but a minimal requirement is that each of the existential claims of the
theory to be reduced be translated into a corresponding existential claim of the reduction:
'The reduction is not intended to provide a restructuring of logical form, only a switch of
underlying ontology"

(P. Bricker,

"Reducing Possible Worlds

to

Language",

Philosophical

Studies, 52 (1987), p. 334).

See W. V. O. Quine, "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers", in his The Ways of
Paradox and Other Essays, (New York; Random House, 1966).

^^To require that the primitive enhties or concepts should be as clear as possible is not the
same as requiring that they be more familiar to the layman. Highly theoretical entities and
concepts are often far clearer than their more prosaic cousins, even though mastery of a
complex theory may be required to grasp them.
^^The direct method of causal acquaintance may seem to have an advantage over the indirect
method of mference to the best explanation: the latter requires a premise that is almost
impossible to establish with certainty,

indeed the best explanation. However, it
a priori, causal acquaintance with all the
entihes or notions contained in the primitive ontology and ideology will just be out of the
question — every remotely plausible metaphysical theory requires positing at least some

seems

that

when

viz. that

it is

the subject-matter of the theory

is

beyond the possibility of causal acquaintance.
"The RelaHon of Sense-Data to Physics", in his Mysticism and
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1917), pp. 140-73.

entities that are

See
City,

B. Russell,

New

According

to the stipulations

1

made

Logic,

(Garden

above, the theorems are to be stated entirely in terms

and ideology whereas the kinds of entities constructed and the
appear
in the primitive ontology and ideology. So to test the
notions analyzed do not
analyses and constructions we must add the analyses and constructions to the set of axioms
of the primitive ontology
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and then compare what the theory entails about these
pre-theoretically familiar kinds of
entity and notions with the pre-theoretical
data about them. To this end it is helpful even

before beginning the theory briefly to outline the
set of pre-analytic data against which
its
claims are to be compared. And in section 1.3
will attempt to outline some of the basic
pre^
theoretical data about modality.
1

Note

that conjoining

according

all the axioms to give a single axiom
does not simplify the set
to this characterization since the resulting
conjunction has a more

structure than any of the originals. Nor will the
introduction of
simplify the axioms, analyses and constructions
this will result in

other ways:

if,

an increase

in simplicity,

it

complex

artificial

succeed in enhancing a theory For although
does so only by decreasing the theory's value in

for instance, these artificial predicates are
taken to be conceptual primitives,

our grasp on the ideology will generally be decreased in
proportion to the
primitives. So will assume that some sense can be
made of the idea of
1

strength of

logical

predicates to

artificiality of the

the simplicity-cum-

some axiom

set that is not language-relative. This of

course is highly controversial.
be appealed to in order to adjudicate among
theones only when the verdict is very clear. In such cases it should
be clear that one theory
has a definite advantage over the other that is not obviously
covered by the other criteria,
whether or not it is aptly described as a matter of greater simplicity -cum-strength.
So I will
Ignore the interesting but tricky problems that surround the notions
of simplicity and

However,

in this dissertation this criterion will

strength.

Moreover, there can be no a priori guarantee that the best theory can entail all the data.
Perhaps, the data is confused or even incoherent. Nor is it clear that it should
entail all the
data even if that data is coherent. To the extent that we are natural theorists, for
instance,

intuitions probably incorporate crude folk-theoretical elements,

our

and clearly there should' be
our aim is to produce a new

no presumption in favour of accommodating these especially if
and better theory.
This construal of Occam's Razor involves a slight departure from tradition. Traditionally
Occam s Razor is taken to dictate only that the ontology should be as minimal as possible.
But, as we saw above, it is often the case that reference to some kind of thing may be
eliminated in favour of reference to some thing in general together with the appropriate
adjective or adverb. This may seem to provide an easy recipe to cut down on ontological
commitments — we avoid naming or quantification, and so additional ontological

commitment

in our theory, by introducing the right sort of adjectives or adverbs into it. But
any appearance of explanatory gain is illusory if the notions expressed by these
adjectives and adverbs are taken to be conceptual primitives; if they remain unanalyzed.
Buying off ontological commitments with additional conceptual primitives generates no extra
explanatory power. Moreover, the reverse is also sometimes the case: the introduction of new

clearly

primitive quantifiers

may

permit the elimination of certain conceptual primitives. But again

any appearance of explanatory gain would be illusory. So, in view of their exchangeability,
the fact that we can often achieve a more minimal ontology at the cost of an expanded
ideology or vice versa, Occam's Razor should be seen as applying to the ontology and
ideology both:

it dictates their joint minimization.
For interesting discussions of arguments to the effect that certain subjunctive modal claims
cannot straightforwardly be assimilated to the adverbial claim see P. Bricker, "Quantified

Modal Logic and

the Plural

De

Re", in

MidWest

Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language

Wettstein (eds.), (Notre

Dame,

II,

Studies in Philosoplty XIV: Contemporary

Peter A. French, Theodore Uehling,

Indiana: University of Notre

Dame

Howard

K.

Press, 1989), pp. 372-94; C.

Parsons, "Sets and Modality", in his Mathematics in Philosophy, (Ithaca: Cornell University

Hazen, "Against Pluralism", in Australasian journal of
No. 2, (1993), pp. 132-44; and others.
Sometimes it seems to be properties (or predicates) to which modal statuses apply swans, e.g., may be said to have the property of possibly being blue. I will, however, ignore
Press, 1983), pp. 298-341; A.P.

Philosoplry, vol. 71

this issues raised

will not

by such properties

make any

in the remainder ot this dissertation.
difference to the subsequent discussion.

T

he simplihcation

A little care must be taken in how we interpret the claim that there
are "principles
concerning what is impossible". This is not to be taken to
imply that there are states of affairs
that have a certain feature - they are impossible.
For most standard accounts of propositions
or states of affairs entail that there is only a single
impossible state of affairs. So at the very
least the implication of plurality
to interpret this

claim

is

possible states of affairs:
possible states of affairs.

is misleading. A better, though rather
rough-and-ready,
construe it as a claim about which sentences correspond
to
the negative principles tell us which sentences don't
correspond

way

to

to

“^Throughout

this discussion of the positive principles rely on
the lead of P. Bricker,
"Plenitude of Possible Structures", loiiriml
of Philosophy
No. 11, (1991), pp. 607-22.'
D. K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol II, (Oxford, New York:
University
I

Press, 1986), pp. ix-x.

do not wish to discuss here whether this really is all there is to the world,
but certainly there
IS this much whether or not there is more. It
should be pointed out that this characterization
is controversial in many ways. First and most
obviously many would disagree with Lewis's

1

claim that

all else supervenes on the local distribution of
qualities. Second, many would find
the claim that perfectly natural intrinsic properties need nothing
larger than a point-instant to
be instantiated dubious; indeed, some would doubt the intelligibility of the idea

thatniiy

intrinsic property be instantiated at a point-instant.

these issues here and so

I

do not wish

to enter into

debate about

will just assume that Lewis’s characterization is intelligible.
Notice also that the characterization makes no mention of relations other than the
spatiotemporal relations among the points of spacetime. This is because Lewis believes that
1

ail relations supervene either on the intrinsic properties of their
relata considered separately
or on the spatiotemporal relations among them. I will discuss and explain this claim more

fully in chapter six. For now will just assume that he is right, but if this is considered
doubtful all mention of properties in what follows can be understood as implicit mention of
relations too. Whatever is said about properties extends easily and naturally to relations also.
Just think of an n-place relation as a property of n-tuples.
Although will continue to refer to possible "spatiotemporal" structures, structures that
are temporal but not spatial or vice versa may also be possible ways for the structure of the
I

1

actual world to have been (see D.K. Lewis,

On

the Pluraliti/ of Worlds

,

(Oxford,

New York:

Basil Blackwell, 1986), section 1.6).
1

have

illustrated this point with

not usually have

names

examples

that are

non-simple individuals because

for simple individuals. But the point

is

we do

unaffected.

Another way to motivate this intuition is to appeal to considerations of cardinality.
Presumably there is some definite number of particulars n which actually exist. But any
specific number of particulars is arbitrary and so contingent. If there are n particulars,
intuitively there might have been n -h 1. Thus, there might have been more particulars than
there actually are.

This is not conclusive. There may be infinitely many actual particulars. But for
numbers, adding one does not yield a set of greater cardinality. The argument fails to
show that there might have been more particulars than there actually are in any clear sense of
infinite

'more'.
In response,

it

might be said

individuals and for any

Maybe

x,

2^

is

that the intuition

greater than

is

that there

might have been

2*^

x.

such an intuition, but it is unclear whether this can be construed as a
^rrp-analytic intuition, one that must be accommodated by any adequate theory. To deny it is
not obviously to deny any Moorean fact.
Another way to motivate the intuition that stocks of individuals that are
augmentations of the actual stock are possibilities that does not appeal to cardinalities turns
on the idea of "otherness". It might be urged that it is perfectly intelligible that there be
there

is

individuals that are other than any that actually

exist.

And

if it is

intelligible,

it

is

possible. But

a stock of individuals that contains

these

would be an augmentation

all

actual indiv

iduab and soinv

ot the actual stock.

ihai arc other than each ot

we think of individuals as distinct from their locations,
then there is a third
this intuition. Intuitively, not every
location is occupied by an individual;

If

motivate

empty But

intuitively

wav

some

whether or not one point-instant

to

are

is occupied or vacant is
independent
be occupied. And then there would be
individuals that don t actually exist. This motivation
is, however, not available if
pointinstants are taken to be the individuals. And
it does not justify us in
holding that there might
have more individuals than there actually are spacetime
points.
Roughly, the perfectly natural properties are those
that features of particulars that
correspond to some genuine objective similarities among
them; the intrinsic properties are
those features of particulars that they have regardless
of the state or existence of any distinct
particular. Quite what it really is for a property to
be perfectly natural or for it to be intrinsic
will be extensively discussed in chapter three.

of

whether any other

is.

Thus,

it is

possible for

all

D. M. Armstrong, for instance, denies this (see
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),

to

his

and rejection, of his arguments.
Again this intuition may be motivated by appeal
perhaps more convincingly,

The

Theory of Possibility,
for a discussion,

below

to considerations of cardinality or,

to considerations of otherness.

instantiates a certain set of properties.

any

A Combimtorml

pp. 54-7. See 6.5.1

set of properties

Suppose

that the actual

world

has a certain cardinality. But for

number it seems contingent that the set should have this cardinality
greater cardinality. Further, it seems perfectly intelligible that there be
some
other than each member of this set.

specific cardinal

rather than

some

property that

is

In the case of properties there

is perhaps also another way to motivate this intuition,
a motivation that parallels the third type of motivation in fn.31.
Many properties belong to
families or determinables that exhibit some kind of internal structure. TTiis structure
can be
thought of as a "space" of a certain kind, some of whose locations are actually empty. The

colours, e.g., form a circle, they generate a circular space; the masses can take any positive
real value, they generate a one-dimensional continuous space; and so on. Above
we

distinguished individuals from their locations, allowing us to think of extra individuals as
filling the empty spaces. Here we can distinguish instances from their properties,
and think of
some properties as empty locations in their property-spaces. Perhaps, for instance, nothing is
exactly 3.761 g; perhaps nothing is some absolutely specific reddish hue. TTiese two properties
would correspond to the "empty" locations in the mass- and colour-spaces respectively.
Intuitively, though,

it

is

possible that something instantiate such

empty

properties.

And

stocks of instantiated properties that contain such properties would be augmentations of the
actual stock. Again however this sort of reasoning provides only limited support for the
intuition.

It

doesn't justify the intuition that there might have been

properties, properties

drawn from determinables none

of

more thoroughly alien
whose determinates are actually

instantiated.
In chapter six (section 6.5.3)

haecceitists hold that (PI)
it

I

will briefly discuss the doctrine of "anti-Haecceitism". Anti-

subsumed under

(PP). At this stage state both principles leaving
open whether or not the anti-haecceitists are correct.
Note that this is not dependent on whether we know of a proof or even whether there
is

I

could be a proof.

As Quine has emphasized in a number of places (see e.g. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism"), it
and maybe even impossible, to draw a principled line between questions of fact
and questions of meaning. So it is not to be assumed that there is a hard-and-fast principled
is

difficult

difference between the metaphysically and the semantically incompatible sets of sentences.

The distinction should be treated as heuristic only at this
any notion of inompatibility other than a logical one.

stage. Indeed,

Quine seems

to reject

discuss only those theories of modality that adopt an understanding of the modal
statuses of propositions that employs singular quantifiers over worlds. This restriction is

Indeed,

I

33

traditional though, as far as can tell,
unmotivated.
or the need to recognize plural quantifiers
I

m

A number of philosophers have argued
addition to singular quantifiers (e.g. G.
Boolos

To Be IS to Be he
, Variable (or to Bo Some Values of
Some Xanables)'' louJof
Philosophy 81 (^984), pp. 430-449 and
"Nominalistic Platonism", Philospluail Revieiu,
94, (198-)
pp. 3-7-44) Arid Bncker argues for the need for plural
quantifiers in analyzing modality (P
Rncker, Island Lniverses and the Analysis of
Modality
",

Supciimuence: Essays on the Philosophy
of David Lewis.

1

forthcoming

in Rca/,hy

and

Hmnmu

ignore this issue for simplicitv' only.

CHAPTER

2

A METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF MODALITY: MODAL REALISM
On

In his magnificent

the Plurality of Worlds

David Lewis presents

perhaps the boldest and best worked-out metaphysical theory of modality.

Lewis

calls the

theory "modal realism". The aims of this chapter are to explain

a version of this theory,

out in chapter one.
the theory

its

A Version of Modal

The

modal

this

A1 )

to evaluate

objections that have tended to

aim

of a metaphysical theory of modality

p

the

iff

there

most

is

Where p

is

at

striking features of

employing any "modal" notion,

to

which p

is true.

modal realism

is

that (Al)

worlds and the relation of

all

)

X

is

a proposition

iff

x

is

truth-at,

either implicitly or explicitly.^

a class of worlds.

is

intended

the notions

Propositions are set- theoretically constructed from worlds:

.Cl

account for

any proposition,

some world

entities involved, viz. propositions,

is

MR adopts the familiar account in terms of

as a reductive analysis of modality: IVER attempts to account for

(1

criteria set

helps to separate out the problematic aspects of

statuses of propositions .2

One of

according to the

Analyses, Logical Constructions

principal

Possibly,

it

Realism (MR)

quantification over worlds.

(

and

strengths and weaknesses.

2.1.1 Definitions,

the

hope

,

and so avoids some misguided

obscure both

2.1

I

\IR

and

without

And

the true-at relation

membership

between propositions and worlds

relation of set-theor}’:

A proposition p is true at a world w =df. w is a member of pd

(Dl)

To define world

,

MR appeals to the mereological notion of a "fusion",

something that has proper

(D2)

X

where

a fusion

itself

identified with the

is

is

a world =df. x

a part of

is

parts:

maximal fusion

a

of world-mates

f

is

maximal

of world-matesd

iff

any world-mate

of

any part of

f is

f.

The world-mate

among

relation

is

a relation that holds

and

is

defined in terms of their spatiotemporal

particulars (or individuals)

concrete

connectedness:

X and y are world-mates =df. they are spatiotemporally connected.

(D3)

From

(D2) and (D3)

part of

which

is

it

follows that a world

is

a fusion of concrete particulars each

spatiotemporally related to every other part

spatiotemporally interrelated) and no part of which of which
related to

(it is

is

spatiotemporally

any non-parts.

As I hope

to

show

in chapter six, there is

an intimate

link

between our

understanding of properties and relations and our understanding of modality. In
particular, there

seems

to

be

Little

prospect for a fully explanatory reductive
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analysis of modalit}' without logically constructing
properties

non-modal terms. So

(LCla)

F

is

MR also contains

a property in the

and

relations in

the following logical constructions:^

abundant sense of 'property'

iff

F

is

a class of

particulars.

(LCls)

F

a property in the sparse sense of 'property'
particulars and F is perfectly natural.
is

iff

F

is

a class of

R is an n-place

(LC2a)

relation in the abundant sense of 'relation'
class of n-tuples of particulars.

R

(LC2s)

is

an n-place

relation in the

of n-tuples of particulars

Having

sparse sense of 'relation'

and R

is

logically constructed properties,

iff

iff

R

R is

is

a

a class

perfectly natural.^

it is

a straightforward matter to

define the very useful relation of duplication:

(D4)

X

It

(D5)

is

duplicate of y =df. for every perfectly natural property P,

will also

prove useful

to define

Px

iff

Py.^

two further notions:

For any particular x and world w, x

exists at

w =df. some part of x

is

a part

of w.

(D6)

2.1.2

For any particular x, x is a possible particular =df. there
and every part of x exists at w.

some world

w

Axioms
Whether (Al)

part

is

constitutes

on whether MR's theorems

since a proof needs premises,

an adequate analysis of modality depends
are true.

on pain

theorems without proof. These are

its

Some may be provable from

of circularity,

axioms.

in

others; but

MR must accept some

37

Several of

MR's

definitions

drawn from mereology and
of

and

set-theor>\

some standard mereology and

the

logical constructions

And modal

part of y, then x

is

a part of y

there are

some

things, there exists

has

them

as parts

all

of

composition

is

different fusions

(i.e.

(i.e.

at least the following: (1)

parthood

something -

and which has no part

unrestricted);^ (3)

It

composition

realism contains the axioms

axioms of some standard impure

The mereological axioms include

some

employ notions

is transitive); (2)

their "fusion" or

distinct

from

all

If

x

set-theor\'.

is

a part of

Whenever

"sum" - which

of

them

(i.e.

never happens that the same things have two

is

unique).

There are a number of different axiomatic bases for impure set-theory each
of

ZF

which would serve MR's purposes equally

well; for instance the

set-theory plus individuals or the axioms for

individuals.!^

These

differ in

some respects

BGN set-theory plus

that are important to various

questions about the metaphysics of modality. However,

them

as

I

will not

axioms for

I

will not choose

among

be discussing any of the questions to which these differences

are relevant.
Finally, there are the

Lewis

explicitly

consists of

two

axioms that have

mentions only one axiom

parts, the first of

-

to

do

specifically

with modality.

the "principle of recombination".

It

which

Roughly speaking.. .is that anything can co-exist with anything else, at
provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions. ..Thus if
there could be a dragon, and there could be a unicorn, but there couldn't
be a dragon and a unicorn side by side, that would be...unacceptable.!2
least

This

is

rather sketchy

and

several interpretive remarks are in order.

the quantifiers are to be understood to range over

all,

but only,

First,

possible

individuals, simple or complex; they are not restricted to actual individuals, but

they are restricted to "world-bound" individuals. Second, "co-existence"

is

to

be
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understood in terms of duplication rather than identip'

such as Lewis's
with

y, is to

own counterpart relation);

say that

it is

is

to

possible parHculars, but to any

be understood

IS

it is

to

to

number of them;

collection of possible particulars,

And

say

it is

related notion

possible for x to co-exist

possible that there be both a duplicate of x and
a duplicate

of y.i3 Third, the principle

exist.

to

some

(or

it is

apply not
roughly,

just to

any tav

allows that for any

it

possible for duplicates of

all

of

them

to co-

be understood also to allow that for any possible individual,

possible that there be multiple duplicates of that particular.

spatiotemporal arrangements are not explicitly mentioned,

it

Finally, although

it is

clear that

Lewis

intends the principle to say not just that any possible individuals can
co-exist, but
that they can co-exist within

So the

first

any possible spatiotemoral arrangement.

half of the recombination principle

perspicuously expressed

might be more

as:

For any collection of possible individuals, and any possible spatiotemporal
arrangement, it is possible that those individuals co-exist according to that
spatiotemporal arrangement.

Even though

this is

not quite adequate as

it

stands,

it

whll suffice for

our

purposes.

The second part of
failing to co-exist with.

the recombination principle concerns the relation of

Lewis intends

it

as

an expression of Flume's famous

denial of necessary connections between distinct existences.

"anything can

fail to

understood

range over

to

co-exist with anything else."
all

It

says roughly that

Again the quantifiers are

possible individuals, "co-existence"

terms of duplication, and the principle

is

understood

to

is

understood in

apply not just to any two,

but to any collection of possible individuals whatsoever. Additionally,
qualified in

two

w^ays. First, since to duplicate anything

is

it

must be

thereby to duplicate

all

Its

parts, in general x

can

tail to

co-exist with
y only

Second, since to duplicate anything
in general, x

can

fail to

co-exist with

is

x

if

and y do not overlap.

thereby to duplicate any of

y only

if

its

duplicates,

x and y are not duplicates. The

second half of the recombination principle then might be
more perspicuously
expressed as follows:

For any collection of non-overlapping world-mates none of which
are
it is possible that a duplicate of any one
of them exists without

duplicates,

duplicates of any of the others.

This too

is

not

cjuite

adequate as

it

stands, but again

it

will suffice for

our

purposes.

2.2

Evaluating

MR

In chapter

one I adopted seven connected

metaphysical theory.

These concern:

(1)

First,

there

were a group

criteria for

of broadly epistemological criteria.

the pre-theoretic intelligibility of the theory's primitive

ontology and ideology;

(2)

the plausibility of

which the theory permits an explanation

its

theorems; and

of the origin of our

ontology, ideology and axioms. Second, there were
utility.

These concern:

accommodation
and

(4)

the degree to

some

and

of the pre-analytic data;

(7)

(3)

the extent to

knowledge

(5)

the simplicity of

the degree of systematization

it

its

of

its

criteria of theoretical

which the theory maximizes

logical constructions; (6) the parsimoniousness of

ideology;

evaluating a

its

the

axioms, analyse^

primitive ontology and

imposes on

this data.
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Z 2.1

The

2.2.1 .1

Intelligibiht\- of

The

MR's P r imitives and

the Plausibilit\’ of

its

Hieorems

Acceptability^ of Set Theory-

MR employs various unexplained elements drawn from impure settheory^ In particular,
classes,

it

it

presupposes the

presupposes the

intelligibility of quantification

intelligibility of the

membership

axioms properly include the axioms of impure

However, with respect
philosophical objection to

mathematics and mathematical knowledge
of premises of

any philosophical argument

be granted Moorean status: philosophers

should not

reject

it.

is

should be no

an entrenched branch of
as secure as

to the contrary

Philosophers are just not

its

set-theory.i‘^

is at least

may

and

relation,

to its set-theoretical parts, there

MR. For set-theor\'

over

any collection

So set-theory should

attempt to explain

it,

but they

entitled to reject the intelligibility of

the primitives of set-theory or the truth or knowability of

its

theorems.

Lewis:

Mathematics is an established, going concern. Philosophy is as shaky as
can be. To reject mathematics for philosophical reasons would be absurd...
ThaF s not an argument, I Imow. Rather, Tm moved to laughter at
the thought of how presumptuous it would be to reject mathematics for
philosophical reasons

2.2. 1.2

The

Intelligibility of

But even
of

if

..

.22

MR's Non-Set-Theoretic Quantifiers

quantification over sets

MR's other quantifiers

are not.

appear among the theorems of
quantifiers

he claims,

—

is

is intelligible,

He points out

that

MR - what he calls

Lycan argues

some of

that

some

the quantifiers that

"Relentlessly Meinongian"

take merely possible individuals as values of their variables.

And

this,

objectionable:

I

have

to take

my place among those who find Relentlessly (i.e.

genuinely or primitively) Meinongian quantification simply unintelligible...!
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mean

that

I

really

quantification at

The problem
that

do

that

do not

not, but

all;

to

me

supposed

it is

to

might have existed

(actually) exist.

But the
only that

is

cannot understand Relentlessly Meinongian

And

literally

be that
is

tantamount

have

were

existed.

to

Lycan seems

this,

the kinds of entity

it

to

saying that there are things

be saying,

just gibberish.

refers to or quantifies over.

intelligibility of its quantifiers

of such a notion. In the presentation of

is

portion of a theorv’ presupposes

not specified as consisting of particulars that

So the

over things

And

MR reveals that the domains of the

inspection of the above presentation of
quantifiers

to existentially quantify

intelligibility of the referential

we understand

gibberish or mere noise.

do not but might

does not presuppose a grasp

MR the only kinds of entity referred to or

quantified over in addition to classes are what were called “concrete parti culars“.

To play

the roles assigned to

MR these concrete particulars must be

them by

memberless and they must have some location
just

obvious that

we grasp

in space

and

time.^^

[\-

the kind concrete particulars thus understood?

We all

quantify over such things every day. Indeed, to reject such quantification as
unintelligible
unintelligible.

is

to reject the

And

the philosopher has

realists

what

is

one

thing,

worlds and

there are,

their other properties

theorems of modal realism are
will include

to

more than just actual
its

right to

do

this

than she has to

do however make some very unusual claims about quite

how many concrete particulars
there are,

no more

of the ordinary person as

mathematics.

reject the intelligibility of

Modal

most mundane claims

be

and

true,

how many maximal fusions of them
relations are,

and so

on.

And

if

the

then the domain of concrete particulars

particulars.

But the

intelligibility of a

theorem

truth quite another. Quantification over possible individuals

their parts

—

is

intelligible

—

because they are concrete particulars and

quantification over concrete particulars

is intelligible.

And even if we strongly

42
disagree u'lth the various other claims that

such disagreement does not show that
In particular, a grasp of haiu

we

MR makes about concrete particulars,

don't grasp quantification over them.

many members

there are in a given

not required for the intelligibility of
quantitynng over

quantification over

all

sorts of

domains whose

2. 2. 1.3

The

I ntelligibility

such things.

cardinality

galaxies, ants, bacteria, electrons. Lycan's objection

domain

is

I

I

my

just don't

to literature,

there

is.

And

my

and so
it is

table, the

on.

It is

misguided.

is

includes

1960s bears to the twentieth century, poetry bears

about as

basic, familiar

the intelligibility of this relation. Indeed,
it

it

the relation that the leg of

and pervasive a

hard to object to any theory on the grounds that

theory could do without

know -

MR s Non-Set-Theoretic Primitives

of

some standard mereology.25 Parthood

table bears to

clearly

grasp

MR appeals to a primitive mereological relation, parthood, and
the axioms of

is

(or at least

it is

hard to see

it

relation as

presupposes

how any metaphysical

without cognate notions such

as, e.g.,

overlap, or fusion). Moreover, the axioms of mereology can be regarded as a
partial explication of

axioms are

The

our

intuitive grasp of parthood.

I

will also

assume

plausible.^^
intelligibility of

MR also presupposes the intelligibility of the tw'o-

place relation of spatioternporal connectedness

among concrete particulars.

particulars are spatiotemporally connected whenever, intuitively, there
relation of spatioternporal distance
farthest galaxies

me, so they are

and everything

all

between them.^^

in betw^een are

aU

New York City,

at

some

is

some

the sun, the

spatiotemporally connected to me. The individuals that

one) and everything in between are
all

Concrete

distance in space from

comprise the Big Bang, the Second World War, the Big Crunch

are

that these

all at

some

spatiotemporally connected to me. Even

(if

there will be

distance in time from me, so they
if

there are things

which

lack

43

spatial locations

-

spirits,

thoughts, Cartesian egos

spatiotemporally connected to

from me. The
regardless of

of Atlantis,

city'

me by

how complete and

to

virtue of being at

still

some temporal

distance

telepathic powers,

plausible their descriptions, are not at any

me and so are not spatiotemporally connected

me.2« Spatiotemporal connectedness

seems

they are

Hamlet and people with

distance in space or time from

relation

-

is

be pre-theoretically

an equivalence

intelligible

relation.29

and something

Again such

like

to

a

perhaps

it is

indispensable in any complete metaphysical theory. At least
there are compelling

reasons to think that spatiotemporal relations cannot be analyzed
solely in terms
of the intrinsic properties of their relata.^o

The

final primitive of

MR is the property of naturalness. Intuitively, some

things "go together", they are similar in
collection of

measure of
are.^^

them

is

arbitrary in

how well some collection of things

hue, for instance,

And

is

more

this in turn is

respect; while others

do

not, a

some way. Naturalness can be thought

The collection of all and only

things.

some

goes together,

the things that are

of as a

how similar they

some specifically reddish

natural than a collection that consists of most reddish

more natural than

particular piece of dust, the

first

person

to

the collection that consists of

shop

at

Wal-Mart and the

one

city of

Florence in the fourteenth century.

MR takes naturalness to be a property that comes in degrees and applies
only to classes.

When a class

perfectly natural,

natural.

and when

Most classes

it

has the highest degree of naturalness,
has no degree of naturalness,

are non-natural.

be a language- and mind-independent

and

objectively similar

However, a

its

members

fact

about

and with

it

it;

said to be

said to be non-

naturalness of a class
a measure of

is

supposed

to

how genuinely

are.

tradition that derives in part

of objective similarity

it is

it is

from Goodman

rejects the notion

any related notion such as naturalness.
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Although things might ^ecm

to

us to be similar or dissimilar, there

nothing,

is

is

it

argued, to license us in thinking of such
appearances as grounded in any mindor language-independent facts about reality.
For similarity

and any two things share vast numbers

properties,

vast

numbers

of others. There

is

just

is

a matter of sharing

of properties

no good reason

and

fail to

share

for thinking that similarity

anything but a matter of which shared properties are of
interest

to us.

is

Goodman

writes that “Similarity, ever ready to solve philosophical
problems and overcome
obstacles,

But

some

a pretender, an imposter, a quack."^^

is

if

we do not suppose

properties are genuinely perfectly natural (or at least

others), a

wide range of philosophical problems

So there must be something
alternative

one of

that

it

And

in that case

primitives. This

its

is

it is

perfectly in order for

claim that naturalness

needed

role.

it is

(This

the real

is

theoretically

And

is

MR to adopt naturalness

not to say that naturalness

could not be further analyzed. Adopting

contrary,

be completely unsolvable.

to play the role of naturalness or similarity; the

putting off an explanation to another day. In

the

will

more natural than

— permanently unsolvable philosophical difficulties — is just

unacceptable.
as

that there are objective facts of similarity or that

it

is

self-explanatory or

as primitive

fact,

the

modal

amounts merely

realist

need not

anything other than a place-marker for whatever plays

in that case,

it is

unfair to call

McCoy whatever that should

intended only

it

a pretender;

on the

turn out to be!^^

to establish the legitimacy of

understood primitive of naturalness.

It

assuming

a pre-

doesn't establish that

correct to take naturalness as a property of classes of particulars or that
correct to think of

it

as a property that

suggest a slightly different and,
that takes

it

to

to

I

comes

MR

is

it is

in degrees. In chapter three

I

w ill

believe, clearer understanding of naturalness

apply to rather more complicated classes than MR's candidates.)

4

In short, there should be

ideology or to

its

set-theoretical

no objection

to

MR's

and mereological axioms. Mowever,

virtue of (Al) that these unobjectionable parts
of

what

primitive ontology and
it is

only by

MR have any relevance at all to

MR is supposed to be a theor\^ of: our intuitions about modality. So let us

turn next to an examination of the adequacy of this
analysis. In section 2.2.2

consider

some

purported

of

its

advantages. In section 2.2.3

difficulties

with

this analysis.

And

I

I

consider and reject some

in section 2.2.4

I

consider

some

genuine problems.

2.2.2

Some Advantages of MR's

Analysis of Modality

(Al) analyzes modality in terms of quantification over worlds. This permits

MR to treat the traditionally recalcitrant idioms of modality within the kind of
simple extensional languages that have been so extensively studied in the
century or

so.

Moreover,

this quantificational

other intensional contexts

model can be extended

e.g. scientific contexts, ethical

contexts

to

last

many

and

propositional attitude contexts. These other contexts can be illuminatingly
treated as involving restricted quantification over worlds: physical possibilities

can be explained in terms of quantifiers that are restricted
the

same physical laws

as our

own; moral

to

worlds that share

necessities or obligations, as involving

quantifiers restricted to worlds as they should be; beliefs, as involving quantifiers
restricted to

worlds which

the quantificational

model

we could
of

modal idioms,

generally, permits the unification of

discourse.

not distinguish from the actual world. Thus

many

if

extended

to intensional contexts

superficially disparate types of

MR imposes great systematicity on the data.^^

However, many other metaphysical
terms of quantification over entities they
benefits of systematization claimed

theories also account for modality in

call

"worlds". So they too can claim the

by MR. What

is

characteristic of

MR, what

.')

4(>
distinguishes
identihes

its

from these

it

rivals, is its

account of the nature of

worlds with certain concrete

its

particulars; specifically,

worlds.

MR

with maximal

fusions of spatiotemporally interconnected
particulars that are supposed to exist
quite independently of

One advantage
modal

realist

what we say or

of this

is

that

particulars having

some

keeps MR's ontology

it

draws her worlds from

think.

a category^ of entities

location in space or time

-

to

to a

-

minimum. The

concrete memberless

which we are already

committed by our ordinary, mundane claims. Thus a commitment

to

represents no expansion of the basic everyday ontology.

modal

committed

even

to

Moreover,

any additional mathematical
all

the terms involved in (Al)

objects.

and

And

ideology. In

there

is

good reason

ideology could be more minimal.

this

and

The version

instance, locates

relations without

by MR.

is

intelligibility

not achieved at any

its

and

is

clearly preferable to

the version of magical

five).

for

MR over all its

of mathematical ersatzism to be considered in

worlds among the other

MR are committed: (impure) sets. And

analysis of modality

(e.g.

does not represent an advantage

quantificational rivals.
six, for

of conceptual

no complete ontology and

In this respect IVIR

ersatzism to be considered in chapter

it

to think that

other metaphysical theories of modality

chapter

list

MR can claim an extremely parsimonious ontology-cum-

fact,

But again

and

simply

all

each of these too has a good claim to pre- theoretical

ideological cost.

realist

the logical constructions

and, indeed, indispensability. So MR's minimal ontology

many

the

These are

are defined or logically constructed in terms of a very short
primitives.

is

to additional ontological categories of propositions,
properties

relations, or
classes.37

Nor

worlds

it

entities to

which both

too attempts to give a reductive

to logically construct propositions, properties

and

employing any primitive predicates other than those employed

4

Where

the identification of worlds ivith
concrete particulars does confer a

unique advantage on

MR is with respect to accommodating the "negative data"

of modality.
In chapter one (section 1.3.2)

consequences of principles that

tell

I

characterized the negative data as

us what

analyze modality in terms of quantification

is

all

impossible. Rival attempts to

construe the domain of

quantification as consisting of representational entities;

matter of what they represent. But
possible.
difficult

And
it is

it is all

them

to

accommodate

is

true at

too easy to represent

in his discussion of these rival theories

for

what

what

them
is

is

a

not really

Lewis emphasizes

just

the negative data of modality, at least

how
if

they eschew appeal to modal notions (which they must in
order to achieve a

reductive analysis of modality).
IVIR s

we

worlds are concrete

think about them.

theoretical roles of

MR's worlds play

its

And notice

possibilities,

will discuss his

whose

entities

MR, by

contrast to

worlds

to

arguments

existence

its rivals,

how

does not attribute the

simply in virtue of

that although

we can say

entities that

no thing can itself be impossible. So since

things that

their ordinary

do not express genuine

otherwise represent what
it

is

impossible,

cannot be that impossibilities

contradictions, violations of metaphysical principles
it

independent of

MR identifies what is true at its worlds with what is true of

and there can be

MR's worlds,

is

in chapter six.

any representational powers they might have.

their theoretical roles

properties. In effect

them.

I

etc. --

cannot be that any impossibilities are true

—

are true of any of
at

any of

the "thing-like" rather than representational nature of the worlds of

them.^‘^

It is

modal

realism that automatically guarantees the pre-theoretic negative modal intuitions;
that automatically excludes "impossible worlds".
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2^3 Does MR \Hsrepresent the Meanings of Ordi nal- Laneuaoe \[oddl
It IS

sometimes argued

of quantification over
particulars,
If

that

MR, by

virtue of treating modalit\' as a matter

maximal spatiotemporally interconnected concrete

already a w/sanalysis of the ordinary language
idioms of modality.

is

asked, most perfectly competent users of modal
idioms in natural

language would be
to the existence of

So the modal

surprised to learn that using these idioms commits
them

ver>^

maximal spatiotemporally interconnected concrete

realist's analysis of

modality (Al)

unsuspected ontological commitments.

what the idioms

of modality

Moreover, (Al) seems
that possible

And so,

it is

argued, (Al) misrepresents

mean - we know what we mean and
to distort English

that's not

it.

grammar. Stalnaker points out

is

not".4« Indeed,

way

Lewis himself introduced them in

been and one of them

is

the

way

that

I

Similarly, there are

many ways

I

that the universe as a

is

MR's

identification of the entities quantified over in

it

actually

with concrete particulars

is

is.

But

it

tantamount

might have been with concrete

too

is

I

might have

of these, not even

not a way.

whole might be and one

modal discourse — worlds —

And

ways

that the actual

world

that just obliterates the

fundamental and maybe irreducible distinction between particulars and
properties.

Such objections are not compelling.

of

an individual thing, not a way. So

to identifying

particulars.

none

that

am a individual thing,

them

that

many ways

actually am. But

the latter, can plausibly be identified with me:

way

way.^t But

this

things might have been' seems to be a property-expression

rather than an expression for a particular. There are

the

on ordinary speakers

worlds are usually introduced as "ways the actual world might

have been but
in English a

foists

particulars.

First,

because appeals

to notorious

creatures of darkness like meanings are clearly suspect. Indeed, on one

49

understanding of the notion of a meaning, meanings
need not be

even

to

competent users of the language - meanings

fully accessible

“ain't in the head".

So

perhaps, on one understanding of 'meanings', (Al)
really does give the meaning
of ordinary

users of

modal statements however surprising

this

to

competent

modal idioms.

But second,

MR

is

a metaphysical theory of modality not a theor\' of the

semantics of natural language modal idioms. As such
theoretical data of modality, rather than give the

means

might be

of

which we express

this data.

it

aims

meanings

to explain the pre-

of the idioms

by

A good explanation must maximize

ontological and conceptual economy, axiomatic simplicity and so on. Natural

languages, however, have

many

other uses than simply explaining and should

aim, for instance, to maximize communicative efficiency
this

diminishes ontological and conceptual economy.

explanatory functions

may

means

of

And

speakers, even

modality

which we express

is

at

once

to give the

this data. In particular,

no good reason

meanings

if

if

these other non-

well be reflected in the meanings of the idioms

to express the data of modality. In short, there is just

to explain the data of

among

we

to think that

of the idioms

our business

is

use

by

to give a

metaphysical theory, then any presumption in favour of respecting ordinary'

language distinctions

economy. So

economy

is

it is

is

at least defeasible

by considerations

of theoretical

quite in order for Lewis to argue, as he does, that

if

theoretical

thereby enhanced, ways things could have been should be identified

with concrete particulars, regardless of whether

this gives the

meanings

of

ordinary language modal idioms or obliterates the distinctions built into English

grammar:

Given modal

realism,

world could possibly

it

be' with

becomes advantageous
worlds themselves.

closely corresponding entities: a world,

and

to identify

'ways

Why distinguish

also the

maximally

two

specific

a

50

way

that

world

is?

Fconomy

dictates identifying the 'wavs' with the

worldsd^

Indeed,

when

seems quite

comes

it

to analyses, the explanatory'

odds with the aim

at

expressing the data. For one

decomposing

its

way

of giving the
in

into

it is

hard

that (Al) fails to give the

worry the modal

meanings

of

our ways of
is

and analysandum

to see

meaning

by

and displaying how these

parts

its

parts are connected. ^3 But then the analysans

The complaint

of a metaphysical theory'

which an analysis explains

analysandum concept

logical structure. .“\nd in that case

aim

how

differ in their

they could

of our

mean

the same.

modal idioms should not

realist.

MR and The Positive Data of Modality

2.2.4

But there are some genuine problems with MR's analysis of modality.

These

have

to

do with

me, they point

to

two problems with MR:

all

the "positive data" of modality and, or so
iFs analysis of properties,

analysis of modality in terms of quantification over

it

seems

and

to

its

maximal spatiotemporally

interconnected concrete particulars (rather than over classes).

Obviously,
only

if

every instance of (Al)

MR's worlds
so.

If,

MR is adequate to the pre- theoretical positive data of modality'

at

is

true;

it

must be

which so-and-so whenever,

for instance, there

is

just

that there really exists

intuitively,

possible that so-and-

one of AER's worlds, or just seventeen, then (Al)

gets the positive facts of modality badly wrong;

more

it is

one of

possibilities than that. In 1.3.1

1

there are

for, intuitively,

suggested that

we

can be a

little

many

more

precise about the range of possibilities that any adequate metaphysical theory

must recognize. For we can think

of the

way

particular combination of various elements
collection of particulars,

and a

the actual world

is

— a spatiotemporal

as the result of a

framework, a

collection of (perfectly natural intrinsic)

SI

properties. c:)ther possibilities are

actual world

is.

We can

think of

combinations of these very'

elements

supposed

some

of

to

be alternatives

them as the

same elements.

to the

way

the

result oi alternative

But, intuitively, each of these three

is itself

just

one instance of

So the

full

extent of logical space can be thought of as delimited
by

instances.

the possible

ways

kinds. In 1.3.1

I

of

combining or recombining

summarized

principles, (PS), (PR), (PP)

Since

a kind of w'hich there are

this

and

all

many

other

the various instances of

account of the extent of logical space

all

all

the

in four

(RP).

MR is adequate to the pre-theoretic positive data of modality only

there really exists one of \IR s worlds at

which so-and-so whenever

that so-and-so, the four principles of chapter

conditions of adequacy

modality only

if

on MR.

one may be

it is

if

possible

recast so as to yield

MR is adequate to the pre-theoretic positive data of

the following are true:

For each possible spatiotemporal structure, S, there exists at least one
of MR's worlds having S as its spatiotemporal structure.^^
For each possible stock, I, of individuals, there exists at least one of
MR's worlds having I as its stock of individuals.
For each possible stock, P, of properties, there exists at least one of MR's
worlds having P as its stock of properties.
For any spatiotemporal framework S had by any of MR's worlds, any

(PS')

(PF)

(PP)
(RP')

had by any of MR's worlds, any stock of
properties P had by any of MR's worlds, and any possible combination of
members of P and I within S, there is at least one of MR's worlds having
stock of individuals

I

just that combination.

This
there
calls

is

means

if

MR really is adequate to the positive data of modality,

an extremely vast and

infinitely varied plurality of

what the modal

realist

"worlds". (PS') entails the existence of enough worlds to instantiate an

infinite variety of

that

that

is

spatiotemporal structures.

actually instantiated; but, intuitively,

One

of these

many

indeed from the actual spatiotemporal structure

--

is

familiar

—

the one

of the others are very different

some have

five or five-

hundred dimensions, others quite
entail that

among

different curvatures,

and so

on. (PI')

and

(PP')

these worlds are to be found vast infinities
of individuals and

instantiated properties.

Some

of these individuals actually exist

and some

of the

properties are actually instantiated and there will
be worlds that include
unicorns, cities of cheese, and talking donkeys

among

their parts.

But the vast

majority are "alien" to the actual world and are
indescribably strange. Finally,

(RP

)

entails,

roughly, that there are enough worlds to instantiate every
possible

combination (permutation, distribution or arrangement) of
possible individuals

and properties within any possible spatiotemporal
of cheese

structure

- worlds with cities

talking donkeys, worlds with fifty spatial dimensions and
mile-high

purple cows, and so on. The actual world instantiates one such combination;
other worlds instantiate various recombinations within the actual
spatiotemporal
structure of the actual particulars

and

actually instantiated properties;

others,

still

combinations of alien individuals and properties within alien spatiotemporal
structures.

But notice that each of MR's worlds

is

a maximal fusion of

spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars; worlds are

merely possible alike — the same kind of thing:

real,

particulars having parts instantiating properties

2. 2.4.1

The Incredulous
Many,

if

of reality". “^5

jg

it

relations.

Stares
all this is just

wildly

offends against what Russell famously called a "robust sense

jygt incredible, they argue, that

particulars really exists in as full-blooded

chair I'm sitting on,

— actual and

concrete memberless

and

not most, philosophers think that

implausible; that

all

and

such a vast plurality of

and concrete

the stars, puddles

a

way

and horses I can

as

you and

I,

the

see. Intuitively,

such

things as five-hundred dimensional spacetimes, cities of cheese and purple cows

are "mere possibilities".^ Indeed the existence of
such a vast plurality of concrete
particulars strikes so

presentations of

many people

as implausible that Lewis reports that his

modal realism used

often than arguments.47

meet with "incredulous

to

And even he

frankly acknowledges

its

stares"

prima

more

facie

incredibility:

Modal realism does

disagree, to an extreme extent, with firm
there is... small wonder if you are

common sense opinion about what
reluctant to believe

it.4«

Perhaps the modal

realist will

seems surprising only because

it is

be tempted

not obvious that modality

quantificational in nature. But there

good reason

is

accounted for in terms of quantification.

must be interpreted

to reply as follows. This all

And if so,

as carrying ontological

really

is

to think that

modality must be

then our modal intuitions

commitment

to worlds. Re-

examination our pre-theoretic intuitions about the truth-values of various modal
claims, specifically (PS),

(PI),

(PP)

and

(RP), in this light reveals a

a surprisingly vast plurality of worlds. But this should not be

commitment

grounds

to

for

rejecting the theory; at least not in the absence of a viable non-quantificational

account of modality.

But

this reply will not do.

entities that is

being objected

For

it is

to here. After

at least as great a plurality of entities.

that these entities

about

MR

is its

not the mere fact of a vast plurality of

do not deserve

account of their

to

Nor

all,

is

mathematicians are committed

the objection a terminological one

be called 'worlds'.

nature:

What is

fact, if it is

a

fact, that

-

objectionable

MR identifies this plurality of worlds with

a vast plurality of maximal spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars. Yet

from the

to

modality

is

quantificational in nature nothing

follows about the nature of the entities quantified over. So the quantificational

S4

nature of modality

itself

provides no reason for believing

ctmcrete particulars. The modal realist must
in

show

that

in this vast plurality of

understanding modality

terms of quantification over maximal fusions of
spatiotemporally

interconnected concrete particulars confers on
to its quantificational

2.2A.2 Does

rivals.'^^^

MR Really Explain the Positive Data of Modality?

A genuinely
data as possible.

explanatory theory should entail as
(Al) that connects the theorems of

It is

the pre-theoretical intuitions about
that so-and-so

Now,

MR some peculiar advantage over

if

is

possible

Lewis

is

iff

right

there

and

what

is

is

and

is

much
MR,

of the pre-theoretic

its

entailments, with

not possible, the data; (Al) says

a world at which so-and-so.

there really

is this

vast collection of

maximal

spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars, then every instance of (Al)

may
it's

well be true. But for

MR genuinely to explain some positive modal datum,

axioms together with (Al) must entail that datum.

It is

not enough merely that

the relevant worlds exist (and the relevant instance of (Al) be true);

must say they

exist.

MR's axioms

Otherwise, (Al) would amount merely to a translation

scheme, not an explanation of the data.

The

positive data of modality

distinct possibilities.

general principles of
principles; they will

comprehend a

potentially infinite

So the data must be the consequences of a

modal reasoning. These
tell

us that

the having of any feature

if

G that is related

list

of

form of "generating"

will take the

the having of feature F

(short)

number of

is

to F in a certain

a possibility, then so

is

way. These principles

allow us to "generate" certain possibilities from certain others. Our specific

modal

intuitions, those concerning specific individuals, properties

are generated by applying these generating principles to what

from experience, about the actual world. The idea

is this:

and

relations,

we have learnt,

by experience we know

that the actual
is

world has a certain feature F (and so

possible); second,

we

having of any features
that there are also

that the having of this feature

apply one of these general principles

G generated

from F

is

to

conclude that the

also possible; finally,

we conclude

worlds that have such features G.

Above, and

in 1.3.1,

1

suggested that the

way

the actual

world

is

can be

thought of as a particular way of combining a particular stock
of particulars, and
a particular stock of (perfectly natural, intrinsic) properties
within a particular

spatiotemporal framework.
just

And

I

suggested that each of these features

one among many possible such combinations, stocks

properties and spatiotemporal frameworks.
C[uantificational theory that

is

If

intuitions about modality should contain

of particulars, stocks of

this is right,

really to capture all

among

our

is itself

then any

infinitely

many

(positive)

theorems some instance of

its

each of the following generating principle-schemata:

[PS*]

For any

there

is

a world having S as

Gs(S*, S) there

is

also

framework.
For any I*, if there

is

a world having

is

also a

and
[PI*]

S*,

if

its

spatiotemporal framework,
its spatiotemporal

world having S* as

I as its stock of individuals, and
world having I* as its stock of individuals.
[PP*] For any P*, if there is a world having P as its stock of (perfectly natural,
intrinsic) properties, and Gp(P*, P), then there is also a world having

Gi(I*,

I),

then there

P* as

its

stock of (perfectly natural, intrinsic) properties.

An adequate quantificational

theory should also guarantee a plenitude of

combinations (and recombinations) of these various possible elements by
containing

(RP*)

among its theorems some

principle of the form.

For any spatiotemporal framework S had by any world, any stock of
individuals I had by any world, any stock of (perfectly natural, intrinsic)

P had by any world:
For any A*, if there is a world at which I, P and S are combined
according to arrangement A and Ga(A*, A) then there is also a

properties

,

world at which 1, P and S are combined according
arrangement A*.

Here

Gs,

G^ Gp, and Ga are the “generating"

relations;

to

it is

these that

allow the inference from spatiotemporal frameworks,
stocks of individuals

known

that are
etc.

To

to

be possible,

illustrate the idea,

section

I

for

new

possible frameworks, stocks of individuals,

consider spatiotemporal frameworks. In the next

udll suggest that

framework, then

to

etc.

if

there

a world having S as

is

its

spatiotemporal

any instance S* of any natural generalization of the

geometry instantiated by
framework. Physicists

S,

tell

there

also

is

world having S* as

us which geometry

is

its

instantiated

spatiotemporal

by the

spatiotemporal framework of the actual world; and mathematicians

geometries qualify as natural generalizations of

metaphysician then applies the principle

to the

this

tell

us which

geometry. The

geometry instantiated by the

spatiotemporal framework of the actual world to

tell

us that instances of any

natural generalizations of this geometry are also possible spatiotemporal

frameworks, ones had by various worlds. Clearly,
instance of instance of [PS*]: in this case, Gs(S*, S)

generalization of the geometry instantiated by

this

iff

S*

generating principle
is

an instance

is

an

of a natural

S.

Theories of modality should aim to explain our general modal intuitions.

So they should contain as theorems some such "generating"
theories should not

aim

principles.

to entail the specific data of modality; for these

follow from the theory only

when it

is

supplied with specific

to state only general

when given other particular facts — boundary
However,
entail

all

should

facts as input, viz.

manifest facts about the actual world (much as theories of physics,

Newtonian mechanics, aim

But such

e.g.

laws which entail particular

conditions

etc.

—

as "input").

collectively the general principles of modality should be such as to

the general facts of modality;

and they should

entail all the

known

facts

specific

modal

facts

when

supplied with certain

about the actual world as

facts

"input".

Notice that
correct,

if

this

approach

accommodating

the positive

MR must not only entail instances of the above schemata,

without appealing

to

any modal notions. Otherwise,

modality would be reduced to
relations

to

its

circularity. In particular,

involved in the above principles

-

it

is

must do so

proposed analysis of
each of the generating

- must be

Gp, and Ga

Gs,

modal data

characterized in entirely non-modal terms.

Now let us return to MR.
Lewis

offers only a single principle to

do

the

work of all

of the

above -

his

"principle of recombination":

For any collection of possible individuals, and any possible spatiotemporal
arrangement, it is possible that any number of duplicates of those
individuals co-exist according to that spatiotemporal arrangement.

and
For any collection of non-overlapping possible coexisting individuals none
of which are duplicates, it is possible that a duplicate of any one of them
exists without duplicates of any of the others.

Is this sufficient to

all

generate a sufficient plenitude of possibilities to do justice to

the positive data of modality? In particular, does

it

entail

(non-modal)

instances of each of the above generating principles?

As I noted above, Lewis's
principle
entail

is

a

little

sketchy.

actual presentation of the recombination

However, even

in the

above form

adequate versions of the generating principles. Since

problems that an adequate version of

[PS*] raises for

I

it

does not seem

wdU discuss

to

the

MR in the next section, and

58

since Lewis endorses a position

subsumes
I

[PI

]

argued

under

known

[PP*]50

as "anti-haecceitism"

^g concentrate only

in 1.3.1 that there

and

c>n [PP*]

might have been properties

those that are actually instantiated. So,

which

when applied

effectively

[RP*].

that are other than

to the stock of actually

instantiated properties as input, an adequate version
of [PP*] should entail
I

also argued in 1.3.1 that there might have been
alternative combinations

of the properties that are actually instantiated. Perhaps
there
that

is

this.

both gold and has a mass of 10^ ^kg, but,

been. So,

when

However, neither of these

intuitively, there

might have

entail this.

intuitions follows

from Lewis's recombination

when combined with the other axioms of MR).

recombination principle
particulars

actually nothing

applied to the stock of actually instantiated properties as input,

an adequate version of [RP*] should

principle (even

is

tells

For the

us only about possibilities involving duplicates of

drawn from various

worlds. So

it

will not generate

any

possibilities

involving "new" or "alien" properties. In particular, given facts about the
properties instantiated at the actual world as input,
of worlds at

which there exist instances

instantiated.

Nor

will

it

generate any

it

will not entail the existence

of properties that are not actually

new

intrinsic natures

obtained by

rt^combining the properties that constitute a given intrinsic nature;

allow us

to

be recombined. In particular, given

instantiated at the actual

which there

world as input,

it

does

exist particulars that instantiate

these are actually co-instantiated. So

which something

is

it

intuitions

does not

both gold and has a mass of

we do have; it

fails to

facts

about the properties

not entail the existence of

worlds

two or more properties unless

In short, Lewis's recombination principle

modal

will not

"break up" whole intrinsic natures into their constituent properties

that can then

at

it

entail the existence of a

world

at

10^ ^kg.
is

inadequate

to explain all the

explain fully the positive data of modality.

Can
There

is

the principle be modified so as to

a problem.

The troublesome modal

accommodate

intuitions both involve properties.

But properties stand in complex logical relations
entail others

- being

these intuitions?

to

one another: some properties

red, for instance, entails being coloured,

and being Ig

entails

having a mass; and some properties exclude others

- being

blue, being Ig in

So not every describable

mass excludes being lOg

combination of properties
unless

it is

is

in mass.

red excludes being

a genuinely possible one, for nothing can be red

coloured and nothing can be simultaneously red

(all

over) and blue.

How then can the recombination principle be reformulated so as to guarantee an
adequate version of

[RP*],

one

that entails all

and only those recombinations

properties that are, intuitively, possible without any appeal

Lewis himself seems
six,

he argues that

entails all

to

to think

it

cannot be done. As

to

of

modality?

we

will see in chapter

formulate a version of the recombination principle that

and only those combinations

of properties that are genuinely possible,

we would have kncrw which combinations really

are possible. But concerning at

least the incompatibility of (perfectly natural, intrinsic) properties,

there seems to be no way at all of fixing our modal opinions, and we just
have to confess our irremediable ignorance... Is it absolutely impossible for
one particle to be both positively and negatively-charged?...! do not see
how we can make up our minds.. .Whatever the truth may be, it isn't up to
us.

The only safe course is to resort to primitive modality. The declaration
must be conditional: //it is impossible for any one particle to be both
positively and negatively charged, then let there be an axiom of unique
charge.51

Perhaps then

MR is not to be faulted for failing to entail intuitions about "new"

combinations of properties. For intuitions about which combinations of

GO
properties over and above the recombinations
of duplicates are just not secure

enough

that they

we do

intuitions that

But

need

this

to

be accommodated.

we

have, not those that

response

is

An

not acceptable.

recombination principle should entail

all

MR

is

required to explain only those

don't and couldn't have.

adequate version of the

the general facts about modality.

Lewis's formulation of his recombination principle,
since
duplicates, entails
reject the

modal

no worlds

that involve

Lewis needs

to

applies only to

new combinations

charge that the recombination principle

intuitions,

it

of properties. So to

fails to entail all

argue that there are no

known general

about entailments and incompatibilities among properties. But

we do

not and could not

know whether or not it is

possible for

be both positively- and negatively charged does not establish
general

modal

chapter

I

fact

~

it

among

it is

falling
facts,

to point out that

some

this.

particle to

For

this

not a

we know,

for instance, that

distinct determinates

facts

it is

concerning

impossible that

from the same determinable and

impossible that any particular instantiate a determinate without also

under the corresponding determinable. Since these are general modal

they

must be explained by any theory

pre-theoretical

modal

ignorance of the

intuitions.

specific

same determinable;
of the

we do know certain general modal

properties;

any particular instantiate
that

facts

concerns two specific properties. Indeed, in the next

will suggest that

the relations

the general

it is

is

adequate

The ignorance Lewis

modal claim

to explain all

highlights

is

our

merely

that these properties are determinates of the

not ignorance of the general modal fact that determinates

same determinable exclude one

notion of a determinable

that

is

a

modal

another.

notion.

So

it

in reformulating the recombination principle.)

(And

notice that prima facie, the

cannot legitimately be referred

to

G1

To summarize; we can grant

that

MR provides an illuminating

regimentation or systematization of our modal intuitions
in non-modal terms.

But

it

does not thereby explain them. For a

data requires not merely that the theory
in

non-modal terms,

must provide

it

for

full

explanation of the (general) modal

show how
axioms

to rewrite

our modal claims

them.

to entail

.A.nd

MR,

specifically Lewis's recombination principle, fails
to explain all the (general) data

of modality. For

it

fails to entail

the existence of worlds at

which

certain

properties are instantiated even though these are not actually
instantiated.
fails to entail

worlds

at

which

it is

particularly hard to see

the recombination principle could be reformulated so as to entail
such

worlds, for to do so requires

entailment and exclusion
possibility of

some non-modal

among

properties.

characterization of the relations of

And Lewis seems

such a characterization, arguing instead that

firm intuitions about such combinations and hence that

we

to rqect the

really

of specific

modal

certain general

facts

modal

and so
facts

is

not to the point.

about the relations

do not have

MR need not

accommodate them. This response however rests on an appeal

our ignorance

to

We do have knowledge of

among

properties

and

these

should be accommodated by any adequate account of modality. MR's
this

it

different combinations of properties are

instantiated from the actual world. In the latter case

how

And

regard points to an inadequacy in

One

final

problem: even

accommodated by some
principle,

entirely

account of properties.

the data of modality could be fully

non-modal version

of the recombination

MR would still have to regard this principle as axiomatic. For

not follow from the axioms of

succeed in showing

modal

if

its

failure in

how

set- theory or

to interpret

notions, this reasoning

must

mereology. So even

modal reasoning so

still

that

it

if

it

does

MR does

involves no

be seen as involving certain (otherw^ise

incredible) additional axioms.

shown how

to

At best then the modal

realist

exchange an ideology of modal notions

can claim

have

to

for certain additional

principles that are irreducible further to the
axioms of logic, mathematics, or

anything

else. It

can claim perhaps

to

have shown

how

define modal reasoning

to

without appealing

to

distinctive axioms.

MR would still have to regard modal reasoning as

any modal notions but only

constituting a stubbornly irreducible or

2.2.4.3

Does

autonomous

endorsing certain

subject matter.^2

MR Render the Origin of Modal Knowledge Mysterious?

Clearly

we have extensive modal knowledge. One constraint (criterion

on an adequate metaphysical theory
origin of

at the cost of

of modality

is

that

(3))

should not render the

it

such knowledge mysterious.

MR will explain our modal knowledge as originating in our knowledge of
the recombination principle. But just

recombination principle

we

Presumably,

existence

and so

it

did not come

asserts are for the

beyond

to

know it by causal acquaintance

would

modal knowledge

in principle

conflict

as a priori. For another, the entities

the possibility of causal acquaintance.

knowledge

of the existence of electrons viz. that positing

explanation of the

modal

facts are

in the

phenomena

not

among

Indeed, there

knowledge

is

as a priori

same

that

sort of

is

way

we do observe.

the observed

observe only that something

its

whose

most part spatiotemporally unconnected with us

of

be justified

with

with the traditional

knowledge

it

the

itself?

subject matter. For one thing, this
classification of

how could we have come to know

a physicist might justify our

it

them

For, as

phenomena

the case, not that

Nor can our

to

is

the best

Hume emphasized,^^

be explained

— we

might or must be the

case.

a clear tension between the classification of modal

and MR's understanding

of the recombination principle.

For

MR

if

right,

is

supposing that
about concrete

supposing that modal knowledge

we can have a

entities.

Whatever

To suppose

least

that

a priori

amounts

of the existence of

and

by

their nature

we have knowledge

to

facts

entities is traditionally

the abstract /concrete distinction

at least entails that concrete entities are not

posteriori.54

of

knowledge

But knowledge of concrete

classified as a posteriori.
it

priori

is

of

them a

amounts

to,

unknowable a

priori

anyway

is at

unprecedented, and perhaps just plain implausible. Notice that
the axioms

modal realism even

entail facts

about how many such causally isolated concrete

entities there are. Lewis:

modal realism tells you. ..that there are uncountable infinities of donkeys
and protons and puddles and stars, and of planets very like Earth, and of
cities very like Melbourne, and of people very like yourself..
[^ly italics]

And just how could we know a priori how many concrete Melboumes
Nor can Lewis appeal

to

explain our knowledge of the

ways

there are?

our pre-theoretic intuitions about modality

new axioms,

as

some

sort of "projections" of

to

our

of thinking about modality. First, this conceptualist approach to modality

quite at odds with his intentions. For the existence of

be a mind- and language-independent
intuitions

and the vast plurality

supposed

to

to trust

any

fact

about

MR's worlds

reality.

of worlds posited

we do have.

At

supposed

to

Second, since our modal

by modal realism are

be mutually causally independent, there seems

intuitions

is

is

least not unless

to

we are

be just no reason

prepared

to posit a

mysteriously trustworthy faculty of modal intuition or some kind of pre-

estabhshed harmony between our thought and extra-mental concrete
Tliird,

and connectedly,

to

reality

appeal to knowledge of our modal intuitions

to

explain our knowledge of the fundamental modal principles would be to reverse
the proper order of explanation.

How do we have intuitions about a potentially

C)4

infinite

number

of possibilities

principles in the

place?

first

Finally, as

not by deriving them from the general

if

we have just seen,

be an axiom of modal realism;

it

the recombination principle

modal realism

knowledge

of

it

and

this includes all the facts of

terms of knowledge of principles
e.g. the

axioms of impure

In chapter six

The mathematical

I

to

its

to

guarantee the existence of

consequences - and according

modality

- cannot be

examine an alternative

to N^IR,

mathematical ersatzism.

ersatzer also adopts the quantificational analysis of modalit)'

of her other definitions, analyses

constructions, the mathematical ersatzer attempts to

axioms

explained in

set theory.

will

By judicious choice

existential

to those of

of modality. Thus, apart from

show

and

logical

that

no additional

impure set-theory are needed
its

sets of a certain

to entail

analyses and logical constructions,

all

it

the data

actually

dispenses with any specifically modal axioms altogether. Modal reasoning

shown

to result

from the application of mathematical operations

of the actual world, given the appropriate analyses

Mathematical ersatzism attempts,
theory in

much

pure set-theory.

to

which we have an antecedent commitment

but she defines the entities quantified over, worlds, to be impure
kind.

the

same way

And

in effect, to

and

is

to the material

logical constructions.

reduce modality to impure

set-

as Russell attempted to reduce mathematics to

that really

would count as an adequate explanation

of the

data of modality.

Moreover,

if

successful, mathematical ersatzism also ameliorates the

second, epistemological problem.

how we know

the

to

does not follow from the axioms of set-theory or

mereology even when supplemented with axioms
actual entities. So our

must be taken

It is

true that the problem of explaining quite

axioms of impure set-theory has also proved peculiarly

recalcitrant. But, as

I

argued

in 2.2.1. 1, thut they are

known should

not be

()

disputed; the knowledge-claims of mathematicians
are not

to

be rejected on

philosophical grounds. Yet the axioms of impure
set theor\' already guarantee a

plenitude of

So given the mathematical

sets.

constructions, the plenitude of logical space
the axioms of set-theory. So

now

to

explain

ersatzer's analyses

logical constructions.

And

how we know

know them a prion, seems

own definitions,
priori

all

to

prioricity is preserved

sides that

how we know

how we know

knowledge

of the

is

is

a priori.

It is

because

But there

is

Is

them, indeed

how we

under

logical

consequence and

axioms of set-theory

is

how it is

it is

a priori. So the

that

modal

MR identifies its worlds with concrete entities

rather than classes, that this explanation

2.2AA Island Universes:

her analyses and

the least problematic type of a

mathematical ersatzer also has a ready explanation of

knowledge

the facts of modality

be relatively unproblematic. For knowledge of our

analyses and constructions

knowledge, a

agreed on

surely explaining

logical

simply a logical consequence of

is

the mathematical ersatzer has to explain only

and

is

just not available to it.^^

MR even Consistent with the Positive Data?

an even more serious problem:

MR may even be inconsistent

with some of the positive data of modality. MR's worlds are maximal fusions of
spatiotemporally interconnected particulars and spatiotemporal connectedness

an equivalence

relation.

So

all

the

modal

realist's

worlds will have

to

is

be

spatiotemporally unified: any two parts of any world are spatiotemporally
connected. Thus

MR is forced to deny that

have had spatiotemporally disconnected

And

this is

it is

possible for the actual world to

parts.

very controversial. Intuitively,

all

sorts of

weird and wonderful

spatiotemporal structures seem to be possible ways for the spacetime of the
actual world to have been.
of

We can,

two regions connected by

a

for instance,

"wormhole" such

imagine spacetimes
that to pass

that consist

from one region

to

another

it is

necessar>' to

actual world

may be

wormhole has
connects. But

to

it

go through

thought of in

the u’ormhole.5« Indeed the
spacetime of the

this

way

seems
it

clear that the

it

even seems possible that the two regions should
be

spatiotemporal structure

by a single spacetime point - then
like this

don't assume that the

wormhole could be narrower, much

connected by a single spacetime point. .\nd
this

we

be spatially or temporally "narrower" than
the regions

narrower. Indeed,

have

if

-

if it is

consisting of

is it

possible for a single world to

two regions

that are connected

not possible for a single world to be just

but lacking the one connecting point? The spacetime
structure of such a

world would be

that of

two disconnected

regions. Things in one region

would

coexist with things in the other but not be spatiotemporally
connected to them.

Yet

MR rules out the possibility of such a spatiotemporal structure
Bigelow and Pargetter give a similar argument

"island universes" within a single world based

on

ci

priori.

for the possibility of

such

the possibility of "branching"

spatiotemporal structures.^^ Since Lewis accepts such structures,

this is a

powerful ad hominen.^^^

We can certainly imagine worlds with branching

time,. ..Worlds

where there is one past, but different futures. By parity of reasoning, we
should have worlds with merging times, that is where different pasts
merge and have a single future. Thus, it seems we should have worlds
with parts that just share a time segment - where their times merge and
then branch. And finally there is the world where they come together for
just a moment. An unusual world with effectively two temporally
disconnected parts, sharing just an instant in common...

We are struck by the arbitrariness of denying that they must at least
moment in common. What about worlds where there is some
objective chance that they will share that moment in common, a chance
that of course may not lead to an actual shared moment?^^ [Lewis also

share the

accepts objective chances.^2]

In reply, Lewis bites the bullet; he simply denies the possibility of such
isolated spatiotemporal regions, such island universes, within a single world. But

C)

he says that he would rather not and admits
some inclination
possibility.

A

theory

plausibility

supposed
not,

So he devotes

is

is

energy

to

explaining a^vay

possibility being denied has.

which

to the

The

agree

to their

this inclination.

not refuted by failing to accommodate

diminished in proportion

Lewis argues,

principle

his

to

all

the data. Rather

its

degree of intuitive support that the

possibility of

a Aloorean fact. Nor, he says,

is it

a

such island universes

is

consequence of any

is

central to

our reasoning about modality. So a denial of such

possibility is not a

damning

objection to the theory. Moreover, he points out that

modal realism

entails the existence of

worlds which, although they do not

contain island universes, do contain parts that are "world-like"
in their

separation from each other. These include worlds whose spatiotemporal
structures are n-dimensional but

which have n-1 dimensional parts spread out

along these n-dimensions "like a stack of flatlands in three-space"; worlds
which

have world-like parts sharing a

where

common space-time without interacting; worlds

the metric structure of time

is

not that of the real

line,

but of

many

copies

of the real line laid end-to-end; worlds where, even though the metric structure

of time

is

that of a single real line, history

to-end but where events sp>eed

up

as the

is

divided into

many epochs

lying end-

end of each epoch approaches. Each

such world has parts which are causally isolated from one another, or

infinitely

spatiotemporally separated from one another, or inaccessible to one another. So

each mimics the possibility of island universes within a single world by having
disconnected parts; though

this

disconnection

is,

in

each case, something other

than spatiotemporal disconnection. But then, Lewis asks,

you be

mind the supposed
possibility [of island universes] that 1 reject? Are you sure that it was an
essential part of your thought that the world-like parts were in no way
spatiotemporally related? Or might you not have had in mind, rather one
of these substitutes I offer? Or might your thought have been sufficiently
lacking in specificity that the substitutes would do it justice?^^
...how sure can

that

you

really

had

in

()8

This reply

is

not entirely convincing.

For one thing, even having been appraised of
these ersatz island
universes,

it still

seems

that there

might also have been genuine island

universes .^4

But there

is

more fundamental

intuition that there

objection.^5

might have been genuine island universes were direct

contemplation, imagination or picturing of them, then

be sure that

we

source of the

if

it

really

would be hard

really are thinking of island universes rather than

substitute worlds with their (differently) isolated world-like parts.

even
the

this is

if

one source of the

intuition,

most fundamental one. For the

may

also be arrived at

it

does

it

seem

to

to

one of Lewis's

However,

be the the only or even

intuition that island universes are possible

by reasoning as follows:

The spatiotemporal framework

of the actual world is an instance of a
certain mathematical type, a geometry. If current physics is right, the actual

spatiotemporal framework is an instance of a four-dimensional, nonEuclidean geometry having a certain curvature. But this geometry is not
the only (consistent) geometry. Mathematicians recognize countless

some

many ways to the geometry of the actual world,
others very different. In particular, they recognize geometries that may be
thought of as generalizations of the actual geometry. For we can abstract
others,

similar in

from the various elements that go into characterizing the actual geometry how many dimensions it has, what its "fifth postulate" is, and so on —
and treat them as parameters. And then by instantiating each such
parameter to a different value from the actual value, we can generate other
geometries — geometries with five or five hundred dimensions, geometries
with different curvatures, geometries with different fifth postulates, and
so on. Perhaps not all the structures generated in this way deserve to be
called "geometries" — perhaps only certain values are permissible as
instantiations of the parameters. So let us refer to those that do as natural
generalizations of the actual geometry, leaving it open what it is that
makes one generalization natural and another not.
Notice next that there just does not seem to be anything
mathematically special about the geometry instantiated by the actual
spatiotemporal framework; in particular, it does not seem to enjoy any
special mathematical privilege over geometries that result from it by a
-

()9

process of natural generalization. Hence,

framework

of the actual

world

if it is one possible ivay
for the
have been, so surely are instances of

to

these other geometries. And since logical
space constitutes a plenitude of
ways that the world might have been, every instance
of these other

geometries should be represented in logical
space. But what good reason
is there to deny that among
them is the sort of geometry that would be
instantiated by a world containing island
universes? Yet MR rules this out

a priori!

Indeed, the question of the possibility of island
universes does not really

seem

to

be one for the metaphysician, or

about a plenitude of structures
to

mathematical

entities, a

is

not entirely. For

at least

if

reasoning

a matter of applying mathematical operations

matter of taking natural generalizations of the

geometry instantiated by the actual world, then, presumably,
mathematician rather than the metaphysician that
island universe structure qualifies.

At

least

it is

it is

we must look

to the

to see

if

an

not for the metaphysician to rule

out the possibihty of such structures a priori as modal realism does.^^

Anyway,

it

seems plausible

to

suppose

that reasoning thus

general or recursive principles such as 'any instance of

of the actual geometry

been

is

making

a possible

an alternative way

to

definitive decisions

theoretical intuitions.
IS

is

a consequence of

hard to see

way

world

to

have

argue for the possibility of certain structures from

on a one-by-one basis by comparison with our

principle central to our

pre-

possibility of island universes

modal reasoning.

In

fact,

in

world unless they were

such general principles.

Notice, moreover, that this approach to accounting for our reasoning

about spatiotemporal structures suggests a

knowledge

it is

how we could have intuitions about an infinite number of

possibilities for the spatiotemporal structure of the actual

grounded

certain

any natural generalization

for the structure of the

So maybe, contra Lewis, the

some

from

of (PS*).

way

to explain the origin of

And we have already seen that accounting for such

our

70
knowledge
is

problematic for \fR. This approach suggests that
such knowledge

is

derived on the one hand from seeing the actual
spatiotemporal framework as

an instance of a mathematical
mathematical

entities

and operations

of them. Furthermore, since our

operations

is

a priori,

it

it is

hard

to see

is

there any

a priori

a priori. (Indeed,

how we could even

way would be

defining

it

modify

to take the

realists'

compossibility

small.

account

is

not even roughly

it

does not rule out island universes

the mathematician's

domain? One

world-mate relation as primitive instead of

even such a

slightly

However, the world-mate

would

a paradigmatically

that they co-exist.

modal

notion: x

So the world-mate

appear in the ideology of any theory that aims

increase the

expanded ideology

relation

version of the traditional notion of compossibility.
is

and

contemplate, imagine or picture any

MR so that

of conceptual primitives but

is possible

this

if

entities

why modal knowledge

in terms of spatiotemporal connectedness. This

would be appealingly
modal

to

of

Where would such an idea come from?)

and thereby avoid trespassing on

obvious

number

way

knowledge

geometries and natural generalizations

knowledge of mathematical

alternative spatiotemporal structure.
Is

viz.

the other from our

also suggests an explanation of

about possible structures
correct,

and on

entity,

is

clearly the

And

and y are compossible

iff it

relation cannot legitimately
to analyze modality.

Are there then any non-modal notions other than spatiotemporal
connectedness in terms of which to analyze the world-mate relation? Nothing
springs to mind.^^ Causal relations for instance seem to be modal

y

is

in part for x's occurrence to necessitate y's occurrence

would not be an option

for

Lewis

who wishes

to

--

—

for x to cause

and anyway

this

analyze causality in terms of

worlds via an analysis of counterfactual dependence.^^

2.3

The Balance Sheet on
Finally, let us tot

MR

up

the balance sheet

on MR.

contains a primitive ontology of only two
categories: concrete
particulars

and

classes (both

entitled to declare the

pure and impure). Since philosophers are not

most basic quantifications of

the mathematician unintelligible,
theoretically intelligible.

And

it

MR's primitive

either the ordinary person or

quantifiers are indeed pre-

contains an ideology that consists only of

membership, parthood, spatiotemporal connectedness and naturalness.
With the
possible exception of naturalness, these too

So

intelligible.

Moreover,
is

seem

to

be pre- theoretically

MR is not to be faulted on the intelligibility of its primitives.

this is

an extremely parsimonious ontology-cum-ideology. Indeed,

it

about as minimal an ontology-cum-ideology as any metaphysical theory could

hope

MR's axioms include those

for.

some standard mereology. And
Yet despite

this

it is

of

some standard impure

set- theory

not to be faulted on this score either.

paucity of materials,

MR proposes a reductive analysis of

modality in the form of (Al) and the associated definitions, analyses and
constructions. This

is

the greatest advantage claimed

argues that no rival theory can claim.
great systematization

on

an extremely

It

was agreed

the data of modality

of the negative data of modality. So

and

if

and

it

logical

by MR, something Lewis

that (Al)

does indeed impose

clearly involves

(Al) were adequate,

no

violations

MR would indeed be

attractive theory.

However, we also saw a number of difficulties.
First,

MR contains implausible theorems. The analysis (Al) is adequate to

the positive data of modality only

Some

will

of cheese

if

there exists a plenitude of concrete worlds.

have weird spatiotemporal

among

their parts,

some

structures,

some

talking

instances of alien properties

donkeys and

and

relations

cities

and

so on. But

many

philosophers just find the claim that such
things exist very

implausible.

MR is importantly incomplete when

Second,

positive data of modality.

The mere existence

comes

it

to explaining the

of a plenitude of

its

worlds does

not suffice for (Al) to count as an explanation
of the data. For even

worlds

exist, if

MR itself is to have explained the data,

a fully explanatory theory should entail as

much of

existence of a plurality of worlds sufficient to
intuitions does not follow

from the axioms of MR;

must

these

say that they exist;

the data as possible. But the

do justice

follow from Lewis's recombination principle.

our modal

to all

in particular, this does not

And

it is

reformulate the recombination principle and secure
to

it

if

its

hard

to see

how

to

sufficiency without appeal

modality.
Third, even

if

the

modal

realist

of the principle of recombination,
this principle.

it is

could provide an acceptable reformulation
unclear

VIR renders the origin and a

how we could

priori status of

have come

to

know

modal knowledge

mysterious.
Fourth, since the recombination principle
to

which we have an antecedent commitment,

somehow concerned with an autonomous
Finally,

is

not reducible to any principles

MR must

subject-matter.

and perhaps most importantly, MR's

out a priori the possibility of island universes.

Nevertheless, Lewis argues that,

...the

price

true.

The

is

right,

high as

it is.

all

And

definition of a world rules

this is unacceptable.

things considered,

Modal realism ought

theoretical benefits are

regard modality as

still

worth

to

it.

Provided, of course, that they cannot be had for

less.^^

be accepted as

he

I

rest of this dissertation will

can indeed be had

for less.

I

will

be an examination of whether or not they

attempt

to

make

a start

on showing how they

can.

The

first

step will be to develop an account of properties

and

relations that

requires neither the vast plurality of non-actual
concrete particulars posited by

MR, nor any modal

primitives. This

the project that will occupy us for the next

is

two chapters.
On the Plurality of Worlds, ( Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), hereafter
See also D. K. Lewis, Counterfactuals, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press,
1973), chapter 4 and a number of papers in his Collected Philosophical
Papers, vols
D. K. Lewis,

>

Plurality.

1

(Oxford,

New

and

II

York: Oxford University Press, 1983, 1986).
^ As I mentioned in chapter
one, 1 will assume throughout that it is propositions rather than
sentences that are the primary bearers of the various modal statuses; it
is propositions

that are

possible, necessary, that

might be the

and so on. It is because a sentence expresses a
proposition and so may be said to "inherit" its modal status that sentences too can
be said to
have modal statuses; but sentences have modal statuses derivatively. will also be assuming
that to explain modalization in general, it suffices to explain the modal
statuses of
case,

I

propositions.
I have no criterion to offer for
merely rely on intuitions.

when a given

nofion qualifies as a modal notion. Instead,

I

'^This account of propositions

is presented as a logical construction rather than a definition
because the notion of a proposition is supposed to be antecedently familiar from the

and MR's propositions are supposed to be suitable entities to play the roles
traditionally assigned to propositions. Often, however, quite what roles they are supposed to
play is not spelled out as fully as one would like. And it is even unclear whether there really
literature,

is

a unified role. For

bearers of the

modal

our purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is propositions that are the
statuses; whether or not propositions thus constructed are also suited to

play the various other philosophical roles they are assigned, e.g. being that towards which ue
bear propositional attitudes, is left open. The literature on the nature and role of propositions
is vast. See Plurality, section 1.4 for discussion and (the beginning of a chain of) references.
^

I

have

tried to present the theory in

such a way that there

is

a clear distinction

between

on the one hand — mere conventions concerning how a word is to be used - and
analyses and logical constructions on the other — philosophically significant statements. Note

definitions

in particular that

I

have taken 'world', despite

its

familiarity

from the

literature, to

be defined

must be shorn of all familiar connotations
and taken to mean just what it is defined to mean. Indeed definitional substitution could
simply eradicate all reference to worlds. The philosophically significant components of this
part of the theory are the logical constructions and analyses, (LCl), (LC2), (LC3) and (Al). It is
only these that explicitly connect up the theory with our modal thought and language. The
rest of 2.1.1 consists simply of stipulations about how words are to be used.
^
Lewis himself is agnostic about whether or not there are also universals in addition to
individuals and classes. See D.K. Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", Australasum
journal of Philosophy, 61 (1983), pp. 343-77. In this version of MR however universals play no
rather than analyzed or logically constructed.

It

role.

doubling up here is that it seems that any adequate account of properties
must distinguish what Lewis calls a "sparse" from an "abundant" sense of 'property' and

^The reason

for the

ation (see

DK

rJZ

^
Phis distinction

Lewis,

New Work

for a

1

heorv^ of

properties and relations

L niversals", and

Plimilih/

section

1

S

both senses have been constructed
and the adequacy of the above constructions will
be discussed in chapters
in

and four Note that these definitions implausibly
disqualify propositions, properties
from themselves instantiating properties and
standing in relations. Removing
his restnction is very simple, but it in
no way illuminates what follows and indeed
makes the
exposition less easily graspable, or so it seems to
me.
In order that complex individuals might
be duplicates according to this definition, it
must
be allowed that they sometimes instantiate natural
properties. So to alow this will simply
assume that "structural" properties, properties that can be
iree

and

relations

I

proper

had only by objects

that

parts, can be perfectly natural.

have

This provides an illustration of the point of
introducing the above definition of a possible
particular. For notice that the pnnciple of unrestricted
mereological composition guarantees
the existence of sums of parts of distinct worlds,
including sums of whole worlds. Such
entities exist only partially at any particular
world; they do not exist wholly at any particular
world. In the above sense, they exist at a number of worlds, but
they are
not possible

Such sums are sometimes called "transworld" individuals and what
we have
called a possible particular is sometimes called a
"world-bound" individual.
These core axioms, common to all mereologies, are taken, with slight
individuals.

rewording, from D.

New

K. Lewis, Parts of Classes, (Oxford,
York: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 74. As Lewis points
out, in light of (2) and (3) we may legitimately "talk of
'the fusion of', and rely on it to be a
functor defined for any plural argument whatsoever." For a thorough
discussion of

additional axioms and alternative mereologies see P. Simons, Parts:
A Study in Ontology,
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), especially chapters
one and two.
1

1 See e.g. W. V. O. Quine, Set Theory and
its
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1969),

Logic,

Second Edition, (Cambridge, MA, London:

for a brief but clear discussion of these various

alternative set-theories.

Whichever set-theoretic axioms are adopted, I will assume that they
whenever some individuals exist, so does the set whose only members are those
individuals and that a set exists only if this is the case. So some sets exist contingently — those
with contingent members. And since properties and relations are classes of their instances,

entail that

according

to

Pliiraliti/,
1 "X

MR

these too will not in general exist necessarily.

p. 88.

Roughly, the reason for this is as follows. The recombination principle is supposed to be a
it aims to tells us what worlds there are. So — though this is very rough

principle of plenitude;

— what we want

it

to tell us is that all possible patterns of perfectly natural intrinsic

some world or other. For it is Lewis's view that all else
supervenes on such arrangements of qualitites, including relations of "identity" across
worlds (see 1.3.2 above). TTius, the principle has to do primarily with what patterns of
properties are instantiated at

may be instantiated at various worlds. Hence, it would be inappropriate
formulate the principle in terms of notions such as identity or Lewis's own counterpart

intrinsic properties
to

Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", fotirmlof
may depend on extrinsic features of the objects in

relation (see D. K. Lewis, "Counterpart

Philosophy, 65 (1968), pp. 113-26) that

question.

Indeed, formulating the principle in terms of literal identities across worlds would be
inappropriate for a second reason. Lewis argues that literal transworld identities of
particulars

ought not

to

be accepted by a modal

some

realist (see Plurality, section 4.2 Against

intrinsic to them and
Suppose that x is a human hand and F is the property of having five-fingers.
Intuitively, whether or not x has this property does not depend on the state or existence of
anything but x - whether x has five fingers or not is a matter just of how x itself is. So F is
intrinsic. And clearly it is a contingent matter how many fingers a hand has - having five
fingers is not essential to x; x could have had four or six fingers without ceasing to exist. Thus
there is a world where x has five fingers and there is a world where it is not the case that x

Overlap). For, intuitively,

non-essential.

entities

have properties which are both

has hve hngers. bo h x

,s

one and the same

hteralty

m

both these worlds, then x hterally both

Lewis argues that

,t is preferable to
the literal identity of x across worlds
rather than the existence of genuinely
intrinsic
but accidental properties. Although his
argument is directed specifically at modal rLlists,
here is some reason to think that rival theories
would also do well to abandon

aba "h
abandon

transworld

genuine
^

identities.

’^

Though quite how large a collection of particulars or how
many duplicates of a given
individual should be allowed is left open here. It
would be most natural to allow any number
including any infinite cardinal number. But there
is a glitch. Lewis points out
that "Only a
limited number of distinct things can exist in
a spacetime continuum. It cannot exceed
the
infinite cardinal number of points in a
continuum. So if we have more than continuum many
possible individuals to be copied, or if we want
more than continuum many copies of any
single individual, then a continuum will be too
small to hold all the coexisting things that our
principle requires." Plumlitxj,
pp. 89-90. So he suggests
that a fully adequate principle of
recombination be qualified by a 'size and shape permitting'
proviso. have ignored this
complication for ease of exposition. Nothing in what follows
hangs on it.
For a discussion of possible spatiotemporal arrangements
1

^

We

see

need, for instance, to give

below

2.2.4.4.

some account

of the notion of a spatiotemporal arrangement
and what it is for particulars to exist "according to a spatiotemporal
arrangment". It may be
that if sufficient care is taken in how these notions are
to be understood, the need for a 'size-

and-shape-permitting' proviso may be avoided.
Bricker argues, for instance, that this is not strong enough to express
fully the intuition
behind the Humean denial of necessary connections among distinct existences.
See P. Bricker,
Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality", forthcoming
in Reality and Superz>enience:
Essays on the Philosophy of David Leuns, S. Preyer and F. Siebelt (eds.).

Lewis himself actually takes the relation being the singleton
of to be his set-theoretical
primitive in order to distinguish clearly between the mereological and the purely
settheoretical component in traditional set-theory (see his Parts
of Classes). This interesting

though unorthodox approach is not relevant to the questions concerning the metaphysics of
modality and so take the more traditional approach and adopt the membership relation as
1

primitive in presenting

MR.

Lewis takes classes to include proper classes - entities that have members but are not
themselves members - in addition to sets (see his Parts of Classes). Proper classes however
play no role in the subsequent discussion and so 'seP and 'class' may be treated as synonyms.
At least pifrc set-theory should be granted Moorean status. Impure set-theory results from
adding a single extra axiom to the axioms of pure set-theory to guarantee that for every
particular, there exists the set whose only member is that particular. This axiom cannot,
perhaps, claim the security of the axioms of pure set-theory or an ontology of concrete
particulars, but few who grant pure set-theory and an ontology of concrete particulars would

balk at subscribing to
accepted.

it

or begin to doubt the intelligibility of the membership relation

if it is

There is a choice over the primitive of set-theory; the singleton relation, for instance, might
be chosen over membership. And it is no part of mathematics that any particular one should
be taken as primitive. However, set-theory requires

one primitive notion and since
one choice must be intelligible.
have followed the traditional course and taken membership as the primitive. It seems hard

set-theory should not

condemned

at least

as unintelligible, at least

1

object to this.

D. K. Lewis, Parts of Classes,

p. 59.

Note that the reply

is

not that set-theory provides the

foundation for mathematics and so quantification over sets cannot be rejected without
rejecting all of mathematics. For even if the project of reducing mathematics to set-theory
should turn out to be unacceptable for some reason or other, mathematics cannot be simply
rejected.

TTen we would have

foundations. Rather the reply

to
is

seek

less

new

it, or accept it without
merely that philosophers should not

foundations for

ambitious.

It

is

to

even parts of mathematics if they are sufficiently
entrenched, regardless of whether
these parts are thought to have some kind
of privileged foundational status.
reject

7''!,^™“*’'®

Worlds", in r/ir Possible and Ihe Actiuil, M.
|. Lous
London: Cornell University Press, 1979)
pp. 274-316.
This charactenzation of an individual leaves
it open whether or not
every individual
ultimately decomposes into atoms or whether
there is are individuals all of whose
proper
^ ^
^arts have proper parts ("gunk").
Strictly speaking I should say that its
ideology includes the predicate 'is a part of'
rather
than the corresponding relation. However,
will ,n general use
1
H y'lnU'’"'
(ed.),
(Ithaca,

I
'pnmitive' to refer
indiscriminately to the unanalyzed predicates of
a theory and to the properties and relations
these predicates express. This use-mention

confusion

But

is

harmless here.

from uncontroversial. In particular, the principle of
unrestricted composition is
questionable on the grounds that it seems to guarantee
ontological free lunches. Suppose
individuals a and b exist. Then this pnnciple guarantees
the automatic existence of the fusion
of a and b. But this fusion is identical neither
to a nor to b; it seems to be something extra.
However, in this context 'extra', 'distinct are clearly ambiguous,
and Lewis replies that a
far

fusion not really "extra" in the objectionable sense of
involving an additional ontological

commitment, any more than, say, the conjunction of two properties
beyond the conjuncts. For a fusion is wholly distinct neither from a

is an extra commitment
nor b and together a and

b overlap it entirely (Parts of Classes, section 3.6 Composition
as Identity). This reply is not
completely convincing but to discuss the matter further would take
us too far afield.
To be more precise, there being some spatiotemporal distance between x and
y is sufficient
but not necessary for them to be spatiotemporally connected. Bricker
argues that x and y
might be spatiotemporally connected but that the fabric of space might
contain a "rip"
between them such that there is no way to get from one to the other. Then, on the
conception
of distance as "the shortest path", distance is undefined (or infinite).
See
Fabric of Space: Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Distance Relations", in MidWest

P.

Bricker,

'The

Studies in Philosophy

XXI: The Philosophy of Science, Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling
Jr. and Howard K.
Wettstein (eds.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19%).
This primitive differs from that adopted by Lewis. Lewis assumes a class of primitive
spatiotemporal relations of "distance". These are relations among individuals which may or
may not also hold among sets or among sets and individuals. However, for ease of exposition
1

have assumed instead a single two-place relation of spatiotemporal connectedness. The idea is
summarizes" these spatiotemporal distance relations: x is spatiotemporally

that this relation

connected

to

relation to

do

y

if

its

some

there

is

job

must be understood

it

relation of spatiotemporal distance
to

involve

some

between them. For

sort of metric. But again

I

this

ignore

this for simplicity.

^^That is, every individual is spatiotemporally connected to itself (reflexivify); if x is
spatiotemporally connected to y, then y is spatiotemporally connected to x (symmetry); and
X is spatiotemporally connected to
y and y to z, then x is spatiotemporally connected to z

if

(transihvity).

See below 5.3 for a brief discussion of this claim.
Indeed, naturalness and similarity are closely related; given either

we could

define the

Things are objectively similar in some respect iff there is a natural set (or a set which
has a very high degree of naturalness) to which they both belong. The definition of

other.

is more complicated but still possible (see D.K. Lewis, "New
Theory of Universals").
For much more on naturalness and for references see chapters three and four below.

naturalness in terms of similarity

Work

for a

See N. Goodman,

Fact, Fiction

and

Forecast,

Fourth Edition, (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University Press, 1983); also "Seven Strictures on Similarity", in Experience and Theory,
Foster,

j.

W. Swanson,

eds.),

(Amherst,

MA;

(L.

University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), pp.

29.

^ See N. Goodman, "Seven Strictures on Similarity",

p. 19.

19-

These remarks do not of course settle the matter.
And the debate about the legitimacy of
js an ongoing one. For an
interesting discussion concerning
problenl about
reference and naturalness see e.g. Lewis's
"New Work for a Theory of Universals"; and his
utnam s Paradox Austrubsum Ion, ml Philosophy,
of
naturalness

I

,

the

7

ni

Moral

62 (1984), pp. 221-36; H. Putnam
(New York; Routledge, 1978) C.
XCII,6, (1995), pp. 289-302;B. van
Sciences,

•

^^^nnaturalScience", /o/<;/aj/o/P///7osop//y,
raasen, Elgin on Lewis's Putnam's Paradox",
loiinml of Philosophy, XCIII
See e.g. Plurality, Chapter ,4 Philosopher's
•Si'^'

.

1
(1997)
Paradise for an extended discussion.

1

I

assume

that the

ways

logically constructed

in

which numbers and

all

other mathematical objects can be

from sets are by now- familiar.

In particular, set-theory, for reasons
will nof discuss, has resisfed all aftempts
at
reduction to the application of mereological
operations to individuals alone. See D K Lewis
Nominalistic Set Theory", Nous, 4 (1970),
pp. 225-40.
For an argument to show why there couldn't be
1

thing-like entities at

were true see

which contradictions

Plurality, p. 7, fn.3.

R. Stalnaker, "Possible

Worlds"

in

Loux, The Possible and

the Actual, pp. 225-234.

Coiinterfactmls, p. 84.
Plurality, p. 86.

« Indeed in chapter one
more complex

I

stipulated that the analysans of any adequate analysis must
have a
analysandum. The idea was as follows. An analysis

logical structure than the

only needed when the analysandum is pre-theoretically puzzling
for some reason or other.
But it is only if the analysans has a more complex logical structure
than the analysandum that
It can be said to decompose the
analysandum concept into its parts

is

and display how these
only then that an analysans explains the analysandum concept.
Otherwise, the analysis would merely supply an unneeded synonym, a suggestion
about
parts are connected.

And

it is

respelling.

'^Though

1 will continue to speak of "spatiotemporal"
structures,
possible structures are spatial but not temporal or vice versa.
Or maybe Lewis's sense of reality is too robust!

Notice that

it

may even be

that

some

not just because these axioms entail the existence of a v^ery rich and strange
whose parts include purple cows, talking donkeys and
cities of cheese that they are implausible. For the existence of even just one more
concrete
it

is

collection of concrete individuals

world than the actual world, even a very similar one, is already incredible.
Though there has been widespread misdiagnosis of exactly which part of the theory is
incredible. Presumably, it is not the idea that modal discourse is implicitly quantificational
structure that provokes this reaction; that idea goes back at least to Leibniz and no doubt

many

of the starers themselves subscribed to

quantification
safe guess that

is

the vehicle of ontological

many

it.

Nor, presumably,

commitment

that

is

is it

in

the idea that

responsible. Again,

it

is

a fairly

Quinean doctrine. And even if
the proposed quantificational analysis of modal discourse and the Quinean criterion of
ontological commitment are indeed incredible doctrines, they are at least familiar enough not
of the starers themselves subscribe to this

reduce an audience to staring. Nor, finally, could the source of the incredible stares be the
Lewis names the entities to which the quantificational analysis of modality commit
him, 'worlds'. TTie terminology again goes back to Leibniz; and, anyway, a mere
to

fact that

terminological {X)int

is

dumb. Yet anyone who accepts
modal discourse and the Quinean criterion of ontological

unlikely to strike philosophers

quantificational analysis of

the

commitment and does not object to the terminology, believes in possible worlds. ITence, a
mere belief in possible worlds alone is not likely to be the source of the incredulous stares.
Sometimes the stares are taken to be an objection to the ontology of
grounds that it is not parsimonious enough. But Lewis points out that there
violation of the ontological parsimony dictated by Occam's razor:

on the
no obvious

the theory
is

Distinguish two kinds ot parsimony...:
qualitative and quantitative. A doctrine
is
qualitatively parsimonious if it keeps down
the number of fundamentally
different
kmds of entity: if it posits sets alone rather
than sets and reduced numbers or
particles alone rather than particles and
fields... A doctrine is quantitatively
parsimonious if it keeps down the number of instances
of the kinds it posits; if it
posits 10
electrons rather than 1q 37 or spirits only
for people rather than spirits for
all animals.
subscnbe to the general view that qualitative
parsimony is good in
1

a

philosophical or empirical hypothesis; but 1 recognize
no presumption whatever in
favour of quantitative parsimony. My realism
about possible worlds is merely
quantitatively, not qualitatively, unparsimonious.
You believe in our actual world
already. I ask you to believe in more things
of thaf kind, not in things of some new
kind. Counterfact mis, p.87.

On the score of ontological parsimony modal realism is indeed
admirably successful
recognizing only two kinds of thing. But what is incredible
is not this ontology, but the
existential claims of fhe theory. And these, as 1
have construed the form a metaphysical
theory should take, are part of the set of axioms, rather
than part of the ontology. It is of
course required that the axioms themselves be plausible
regardless of what we think of
ontological parsimony.
that

The problem that is in part responsible
modal realism contains unbelievable axioms.

for the incredulous stares

is

Plurality, p. 133.

to

Lewis himself recognizes this point and tries to argue that
which the theory satisfies the criteria of theoretical utility.
See 6.5 below for a brief discussion of haecceitism.

this greatly

enhances the degree

Plurality, p. 155.

The point here is not simply that according to MR modal reasoning concerns a separate
domain from reasoning about the concrete part of the actual world. Indeed, that may be an
advantage — modal reasoning is, after all, reasoning about alternatives to actuality.
Rather the
point is this: we are (nearly) all — the modal realist included — already committed
to a
domain other than the domain containing actual concrete particulars, viz. the abstract part of
actuality that contains mathematical enhties.

And the mathematical ersatzer takes modal
be about entities in this domain. MR however, requires an additional domain of
non-actual concrete entities for modal reasoning to be about. And that does seem to be a
reasoning

to

disadvantage.
33 See

David Hume, 4 Treatise ofHuimn Nature,
Book Part 3.

Press, 1978),

P.

H. Nidditch

(ed.),

(Oxford: Clarendon

1

34 For a discussion of the obscurity of the
abstract/ concrete distinction, see Plurality, 1.7

p. 81

33 Plurality, p. 133.

However, a similar objection applies to our knowledge of the axioms of set-theory. But, it
might be argued, any objection that applies equally to mathematics must be a bad one, for it
is not to be disputed that we have knowledge of the axioms of set-theory. Granted - it is not
to be disputed that we have it. However, quite how is still problematic. And Lewis cannot
claim the same Moorean status for the recombination principle that should be granted
mathematical knowledge.
37

Not

all rival

theories to

to

MR are as ambitious as mathematical ersatzism, but most agree

modal claims

worlds - are abstract rather than concrete entities, where
by their very nature, causally inaccessible. Of
course, quite how we know a priori about abstract entities is not unproblematic. But at least it
is nearly everyone's problem. (The only exception that springs to mind is N. Goodman’s
"Harvard nominalism" see, e.g., the system of The Structure of Appearance, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1951)). Nearly everyone agrees that we do have knowledge of at
least some abstract entities — sets or numbers, for instance. So there must be some explanation
that the subjects of

this is

taken to

mean

--

in part that they are,

how. And these rival theories can then perhaps
appeal to this explanation, whatever it
,s
our knowledge of the entities over which we
quantifv m our assignments of
modal statuses to propositions. Modal realism too is
already committed to the existence and
knowabihty of sets, so it too has to admit that there must
be some explanation of how we
know about abstract entities. However, modal realism takes
the subject-matter of its
recombination principle to be concrete entities, and
concrete entities are not causally
inaccessible by nature. So modal realism's classification
of worlds as concrete

ot

to ‘Account for

bars it from
explanation to account for our modal knowledge.
Here of course, talk of "passing from one region to
another" is to be understood simply as
meaning there being some spatial or temporal distance between
them. If there is, and we
Ignore any constraint imposed by the laws of physics
at the world in question then we can
pass from one to the other.

appealing straightforwardly

^

to this

j. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, "Beyond
the Blank Stare", Tlieoria, 53 (1987),
See Plurality, pp. 206-9 for Lewis's endorsement of such
worlds.

p. 97-113.

Bigelow and R. Pargetter, "Beyond the Blank Stare",
pp. 108-9.
See "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance", in D. K.
Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),
83-132
J.

11

pp

Pluralitxj, p. 72-3.

Island Universes

In his

and the Analysis of Modality" Bricker argues for the possibility of
from general Humean principles. Bricker's principles are not quite the same
as Lewis's recombination principle. However, we have already
seen that the recombination
principle is very sketchy and Bricker's are more carefully stated,
more general and more
plausible. Indeed, they seem to ones Lewis himself would be inclined
to accept.
Here follow closely the lead of Bricker in his "Plenitude of Structures".
island universes

1

Notice in passing that the argument suggests that certain types of modal reasoning, in
this
case, reasoning to the possibility of island-universes, have a mathematical
basis. This perhaps
gives indirect support to the idea that modal realism's adoption of specifically modal axioms,
rather than its reduction of them to mathematical axioms, is misguided. And in chapter
six
below will consider the suggestion that all our intuitions about the plenitude of logical space
have their source in the following sort of mathematical reasoning.
Bricker also draws this conclusion in his "Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality",
1

though on

slightly different

Or even one

grounds

(see

above

fn. 63).

if we could see the spatiotemporal structure of the world as an
instance of just one sort of geometry, a mathematical type that has many other sorts, where
would any of our ideas about alternative structures have their source?

alternative:

Bricker ("Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality") argues that one might use
external connectedness instead of spatiotemporal connectedness, where x is externally

connected

to

y

iff

island universes.

there

is

some

external relation x bears to y.

However, he argues

that ultimately this

suggests even rejecting (Al).
D. K. Lewis, "Causation", in Philosophical Papers vol
Plurality, p. 133-5.

II,

is

And

this,

he argues permits

stiU not acceptable

pp. 159-213.

and so

CHAPTER 3

STRUCTURAL NOMINALISM

I:

INTRINSIC PROPERTIES OF SIMPLE

PARTICULARS

3.1

Two Conceptions of Properrips
Pnma fade our ordinary unreflective talk carries ontological commitment

to properties:

we quantify
have

in

we seem

over them

common',

'the

to refer to

them by name

(e.g. 'there is

(e.g.

'red(ness)

is

a colour') and

a property which both firetrucks and roses

canvas contains every colour of the rainbow').

And most

people believe in such things as properties without thereby believing
that thev
are dependent

on

particulars, states of

This ontological commitment

is

mind, or anything

not gratuitous. There are at least two

traditional theoretical roles that properties are called

distinguishes between

what he

else.^

calls a sparse

on

to

play and Lewis

and an abundant conception

of

properties corresponding approximately to each of these roles.2 Properties in the

abundant sense of 'property' are required because we require

entities suited to

play the role of semantic value for predicates. There must be such entities for

every possible predicate in every possible language, however gruesomely

gerrymandered

may

that predicate

may be, and however impossible

be for us to master. Lewis adds

that language

that:

There is one of them [i.e. an abundant property] for any condition we
could write down, even if we could write at inBnite length and even if we
could name all those things that must remain nameless because they fall
outside our acquaintance. In fact the [abundant] properties are as
abundant as the sets themselves, because for any set whatever, there is the
property of belonging to that set.^

Properties in the sparse sense of 'property' are required to be that which

makes

for genuine, objective, qualitative similarity

among

their instances.

It is

the

81

sparse

properties that are said to "carve

interrelations natural science

Lewis points out that
the

aims

if

to

up

realit\’ at

the joints"

codifyd

our ontology already includes

abundant sense, then there

will

and whose

all

the properties in

be one for each property in the sparse sense,

so

we may as well say that the sparse properties are just some - a very
small
minority - of the abundant properties. We need no
other entities, just an
inegalitarian distinction among the ones we've already
got.5

Members
property

about

of the minority he calls "natural" properties.
is

natural

reality.^

He

Probably

is

supposed

to

Whether or not some

be a mind- and language-independent

takes this distinction as primitive.

fact

However,

w'ould be best to say that the distinction between natural
and others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly
natural. Others, even though they may be somewhat disjunctive or
extrinsic are at least somewhat natural in a derivative way.. .The colours,
as we now know, are inferior in naturalness to such perfectly natural
properties as mass or charge; grue and bleen are inferior to the colours; yet
even grue does not plumb the real depths of gruesomeness.
it

properties

One strategy

then for developing a theory of properties that unites both

conceptions would be to characterize the abundant properties

first

and then

recover the sparse properties from them by appeal to naturalness. The idea
the properties

natural

whose

relations science codifies would, ideally, all

and the properties expressed by most

some degree

of naturalness,

of our predicates

though in many cases

this will

be

is

that

be perfectly

would

less

all

have

than a perfect

degree.
Intuitively, all the sparse properties are intrinsic

(though not conversely).^

An intrinsic property of an object is any qualitative property'
object has per se, in

and

of

itself,

that, intuitively, the

regardless of the state or existence of any other

distinct thing.

And

proper^

a

property of an object at

shape or

that, this

are facts about

it.

is

this or

intrinsic simpliciter ivhenever

an

intrinsic

some other world. Whether some object has

colour or that; what

Whether an

it is

its

mass

is, its

charge,

this

length and so on,

its

object instantiates such properties or not

depends

only on the nature of the object in question. So, shapes,
colours, masses, lengths
are intrinsic properties.*^

Whether a

The

contrast

is

with properties that are

particular x has an extrinsic property

depends not

but on the state or existence of some other thing or things or

“extrinsic".

just

on

its

nature,

x's relation to

or

it

them. Extrinsic properties are implicitly relational. Intuitively, they
include being
five miles

from Boston, being an uncle and being the bookies'

favourite.

Whether

or not you are five miles from Boston, for instance, depends not on
your nature
or Boston's;

it

depends on the distance between you and Boston.

In this chapter

I

will

develop and examine a metaphysical theory of

properties in both the abundant and the sparse senses.

and

of these notions

will follow the

I

unites both conceptions.
in this chapter there

I

call the

above strategy

will follow Lewis's

usage

for developing a theory that

theory "structural nominalism" (SN). However,

not space to develop

is

I

SN in full and so in what follows

will restrict the scope of the theory to just certain properties. First,

characterize only intrinsic properties;

it

I

SN attempts

to

has nothing to say about the nature of

extrinsic properties (other than that they are not intrinsic). Second,

it

aims

to

characterize only those properties that are basic in the sense that there are "just

enough of them
supposed

to characterize things

without redundancy

to exclude, for instance, disjunctive properties (e.g.

or red) and conjunctive properties

(e.g.

This restriction

being either round

being both round and red) from the scope

of the theory. Finally,

SN aims

had by simple

whether or not they could also be had by complex

objects.! ^

objects

Xo be

six feet

tall, it is

is

to characterize only those properties that can be

necessary to be a complex object; but this

is

not so

tor charges

and masses, or

at least not obviously.

So heights

outside our

fall

scope but charges and masses are probably
included. Maybe only complex things

can be red or have a heart or be sentient, so
these too should

having stated these

an account
vividness.

of,

I

will

what follows
to

I

I

on which properties

official restrictions

will usually play fast

SN aims

and loose with examples

be careful about the restrictions only when

I

to

provide

for the sake of
necessary-. In

it is

shall suppress reference to these restrictions;

mean 'intrinsic,

outside .12 But,

fall

will

use 'property'

basic property that could be instantiated by simple

particulars'.

In 3.2

I

outline

some

of the motivating ideas behind Structural

Nominalism. In the longest section,

3.3, 1

to start with a naive version of the theory

response to certain

difficulties. In 3.4

I

develop the theory. The stategy there

and then modify

briefly discuss

it

in stages in

some of its

theoretical

advantages. Section 3.5 consists in a discussion of two further ways that

might be extended. Section 3.6

is

the theory. In the final section,

I

3.2

taken

is

up with a phenomenological

SN

objection to

give a formal statement of the theory.

Morivating Structural Nominalism
In 1921 W.E. Johnson introduced a distinction

determinable properties and determinate properties.
distinction

is familiar:

between what he
\

assume

called

that the

very roughly, properties can be grouped into families

--

shapes, masses, charges, colours and so on; these families are the determinables

and

their

members — being roimd, being

Ig,

being red and so on

--

are their

determinates.

Johnson points out that
various logical relationships.

property must also

something

is

fall

square,

it

this division of properties is characterized

First,

anything that instantiates some determinate

under the corresponding determinable property:

must have

by

a shape;

if

something

is

Ig,

it

if

must have

a

84
mass;

if

something

something

falls

is

positively-charged,

under a determinable, then

of that determinable, though there
instantiate:

if

round or

instantiate

some determinate

particular determinate

it

must

must be

either square or triangular or

something has a mass,

it

must be

either Ig, or 2g,

it

must be

(at

the

same

or...; if

something

either positively-charged or negatively-charged.

Third, no particular can instantiate

circular;

no

must

if

it

has a charge, then

and

is

it

a charge. Second,

something has a shape,

if

determinable

must have

it

more than one determinate

time): nothing

of

any

can be (simultaneously) both square

nothing can be (simultaneously) both Ig and
2g in mass; nothing

can be (simultaneously) both red

all

over and green

Traditionally, theories of properties start

all

over. *4

by trying

to

provide

entities to

play the role of determinate properties considered in isolation;
determinates are
identified with classes of their instances or
at all,

Forms or tropes or universals. Then,

if

determinables are dealt with as a kind of afterthought. But any theory of

properties that

is

really to capture the essence of

capture any logical relations

among

them.^^

And

what properties

are

the fact that properties

generally stand in various logical relations to one another having to
classification into determinates

and determinables suggests,

adequate theory of properties ought

to start

must

I

do with

think, that

their

an

with determinables-together-with-

their-determinates rather than with determinate properties considered in
isolation.^^

The

traditional approaches signally fail to capture these relations.

This starting point
"carving

up

satisfactorily

is

by the metaphor of sparse properties

For notice that no sparse determinate really

reality at the joints.

particulars for instance

it

also suggested

reality at the joints".

does carve up

joint;

is

To divide

things into Ig particulars and non-lg

not to carve at the joints any more than a cake can be

divided by cutting a single

slice.

At most

it is

to carve at a single

divides reality into one group of things similar to each other and a

miscellaneous group consisting of everything

else.^^

Rather it

is

determinables

up

that carve

which

it

reality.

A sparse determinable like mass divides up ever> thing

applies) into various groups corresponding
to the various determinate

masses such that each particular
its

(to

group with respect

to its

is

mass.

similar to

It is

like a

all

and only the other members

way

of

of dividing the entire cake into

slices.

And
among

the

this in turn suggests,

abundant properties

I

think, that Lewis's inegalitarian distinction

that selects out the sparse minority

is

better

drawn

at the level of determinables

reality

— determinables-together-with-their-determinates — rather than

than determin/ifcs.

individual determinates that result from these

ways

primary bearers of naturalness. Notice also that
the

first

if

It is

ways

of carving

of carving

up

the

which are the

naturalness were to apply in

instance at the level of determinates rather than at the level of

we would be

determinables,

left

with no ready explanation of

determinates drawn from the same determinable
natural.^^

Why,

for instance,

is it

why it is

that

are, intuitively, all equally

that although redness

is less

natural than the

property of being Ig and more natural than the property of being a foreigner,
intuitively

it is

exactly as natural as greenness?^^

Traditionally

some

it

has been held that certain determinate properties

irreducible way, "qualitative"; that each possesses

qualitative nature or "quiddity".

from

all

The being

of, say,

its

redness,

are, in

own unique
what distinguishes

it

other properties, has been supposed to consist in a certain irreducible

qualitative

ruddy essence;

There

may

similarly, for blueness or squareness.

be phenomenological reasons for positing quiddities, but

surely one major motivation

and exclusion among

was

to explain the various relations of entailment

properties: since these relations

do not appear

anything to do with truth-functional or quantificational

to

have

relations, they are

attributed to the metaphysical natures of the properties themselves.

Why redness

«(>

excludes greenness

then seen as a matter of the peculiar irreducible
qualitative

is

natures of redness and greenness, their quiddities.

A final

motivation for approaching the project of characterizing
properties

from the standpoint of determinables-together-with-their-determinates
rather
than from the standpoint of determinate properties
considered in isolation
it

undermines

this rationale for positing quiddities.

of an alternative explanation of the relations

among

For

is

that

holds out the prospect

it

propierties

--

they can be

explained in terms of the classification of properties into determinates
and their
determinables. Thus, stripped of any logical justification, distinctive
qualitative
natures or quiddities

- indeed

the very notion of qualitativeness itself

rendered theoretically superfluous.
kind of Moorean status,

this

And

- may be

unless quiddities are accorded

would surely be an advantage;

quite

what

some
quiddities

how we know about them and how they account for the relations among

are,

properties has never been clear.

3.3

Formulating Structural Nominalism (SN)

One way
dividing

all

to cash out the

the particulars

up

metaphor

into

of ''carving

up

reality"

is

to think of

groups such that every particular

falls into

exactly one group. In set-theoretic terms this corresponds to a partition

of particulars

— some set of non-empty

member of exactly one subset.
the set of all particulars

helpful to introduce

S>, a

It

subsets such that every particular

and S any equivalence
call

cell

relation

whose

is

field is P.

is

It is

each such partition of particulars <P,

of particulars (or, for short, simply a

each of the groups that results from a given
a

the set

can be represented by a pair <P, S> where P

some terminology:

total classification

on

classification,

classification),

and

each equivalence

call

class,

of that classification.
Particulars can be partitioned in

theory guarantee that for each such

all

way

sorts of

ways and

the axioms of set-

there exists a classification. But since u e

kno;v

such classifications actually

that^7//

u iil be some

that

group together

we

exist,

particulars in the

kiunv that

same

among them

precisely

ceil

there

when

they

are genuinely, objectively similar and similar
in related ways. For instance, there
IS

some classification which groups

colour; there

the

is

same mass;

and so

together particulars

a third

which groups them together

others in the sense that they correspond to

3.3.1

up

more

iff

iff

they have the

natural than

some genuine

a first shot at formulating

resulting theory,

"NSN".

Its

theoretical constructions

most

(NSN)

cells

with determinates. Call the

ontology contains only actual particulars and

from pure

sets

and

assumes a primitive notion of naturalness
that

actual particulars.

whether a given

classification

is

natural or not

the natural sciences to discover

have evolved so as

ways

and

codify.

guarantee that what seems natural to us really

it is

— mentally and

is so.

The

an extra-mental,

world which

that correspond to the natural classifications, there

the

NSN

the task of

And although we can hope

tend to classify particulars

to

is

set-

To pick out

that applies to classifications.^^^

extra-linguistic objective contingent fact about the

in

of the

objective similarity;

small minority of classifications that are to be the sparse properties,

is

same charge,

SN then we might simply identify

determinables with classifications and their

idea

they have

reality at the joints.

A Naive Version of Structural Nominalism
As

they are the same

another classification which groups them together

on. Intuitively, these classifications are

they carve

iff

is

that

we

linguistically

no a

—

priori

NSN consists of the

following:

[Def. 1]

X
is

is

X

total classification

a pair <P,

any
[Def. 2]

a

is

total

a

cell

S> where

of particulars (for short, a classification) =df. x
P is the set of all actual particulars and S is

equivalence relation

on a

(i.e. its

classification <P,

S>

field is P).

=df. for

some y

G P, x = (z: ySz}.
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lAla]

X

is

X

of 'properb

a determinable properU' in the sparse sense
of 'property'
natural total classification of particulars.

[A2a]

x

[A2s]

X

is

a determinate property in the

on some

a cell
is

cell

A3a]

'

x

iff

is

is

[

abundant sense

a total classification of particulars.

is

[Als]

d deternmiahle properU' in the

iff

abundant sense of 'property'

x

is

iff

x

a

total classification of particulars.

a determinate property in the sparse sense of
'property''
on some natural total classification of particulars.

iff

x

is

a

a property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff either
x is a
detemiinate property' in the abundant sense of 'property'' or x is a
determinable property in the abundant sense of 'property.
x is a property in the sparse sense of 'property'' iff either x is
a
X

[A3s]

is

determinate property in the sparse sense of 'property' or x
determinable property in the sparse sense of 'property''.2i
[A4]

S

is

a similarity relation

iff

<P, S>

is

is

a

a determinable property in the

sparse sense of 'property'.

3.3.2

Modifying

NSN

I:

NSN, however,

The Problem

of Accidentally Coextensive Determinates

yields an inadequate account of both determinables

and

determinates.
First, the identification of

determinates with

cells incorrectly entails that

actually coextensive determinate properties are identical.

particulars

and so obeys

the set-theoretic

properties are identified with

contain the

vice versa, then

same property. And

if

of extensionality.

determinate

structural nominalism's ontology contains

every actual red particular happened also

SN would entail

that redness

to

be round

and roundness are one and

the

that cannot be right.

This, of course,

is

a traditional objection to any form of class nominalism

that identifies properties with sets of their actual instances.

nominalist and his solution

is

to identify properties not

actual instances, but with sets of actual

Any

If

then they must be identical whenever they

same members. But since

only actual particulars,

and

cells,

axiom

A cell is simply a set of

Lewis

is

a class

with the sets of their

and merely possible instances

alike.^^

properties which are, intuitively, only accidentally co-instantiated, will

X‘)

differ

m which merely possible particulars they contain.

nominalism correctly
There
obviously.

It

are,

I

lence, Le^viss class

entails that they are distinct.

however, three drawbacks

to this solution. First,

requires the resources of an ontology that contains,
in addition to

actual particulars,

mere

Second, the solution

possibilia.

So

this is clearly

not general enough: as

is

it

not a solution for ever\^one.

stands

it still

entails the identih’

of necessarily coextensive properties, properties like
triangularity

whose extensions coincide

coextensive properties

(e.g. in

where we need

still

to

trilaterality

to distinguish necessarily

guaranteeing that the predicates

'is

triangular'

and

get assigned different meanings^^) properties should be seen as

"having some kind of quasi-syntactic structure".
are

and

at all worlds. Yet, intuitively, these are distinct

properties. Lewis responds that in cases

'is trilateral'

and most

Trilaterality

and

triangularity^

be identified with set-theoretic constructions from their instances

(together, perhaps, with various artificial devices)

course, the ver}^ same.

Where

these properties differ

constructed from these instances,

i.e.

with respect

structure". But notice that this results in

of individuation of properties:

and these instances

all

is

in

are, of

how they are

to their "quasi-syntactic

an uncomfortable duality

in the criterion

properties are sets, but the identity of

properties does not always consist in sameness of their (actual and possible)
instances;

sometimes

against a theory' that
properties.

it

it

requires, in addition,
fails to

sameness of

structure.

the theor}" in the absence of

independent argument that such a unified account ought not

its

actual

an epistemological worry.

and possible instances and each

naturalness. Let the set of
the set of

all

actual

all

must count

give a unified account of the difference of

Or at least it should count against

Finally, there is

It

actual

to

sought.^-^

A property is simply

property' has

the set of

some unique degree

and possible red things be

and possible round things be

be

some

the set O.

the set R,

and

of
let

Now suppose once

again that redness and roundness happen to be actually coextensive;

let

the set of

actual red things (= the set of actual
R,

O and

The

r.

latter,

r, is

a

round

common subset of

degree of naturalness, and, presumably,
either of the other two.25 But
distinct

even

all

r

members

we would know

of

R but

not

r.

Here

vve

that redness

less

be ruled out a priori that R and

at a

than

How? Not by acquaintance with

O or vice versa, because, ex hypothesi,

than that of

some

sort of

R and

O,

R and O.

(Moreover,

it

should not

O are equally natural.)

might be suggested, we are

properties redness

less

we have acquaintance only at best with r which has a

unique degree of naturalness

it

-

and roundness are

acquaintance with some degree of naturalness that
distinguishes

Perhaps,

sets

the other two. Each has a unique

non-actual and so beyond our acquaintance. Not
by

because, ex hypothesi,

have three

has a degree of naturalness

they actually ivere coextensive.

if

particulars that are

these are

things) be

directly acquainted with the

and roundness themselves not just

their instances. In looking

red circle one just does experience both a colour and a shape, regardless
of

whether redness and roundness are coextensive.
But
are classes

this is just

and

what

the class nominalist

r is the actual

must

explain:

if

properties really

extension of both properties, then the class

nominalist has failed to provide us with two entities to be experienced. Yet

Lewis's ontology contains notliing else that could serve to provide the distinction
betu^een

R and

In short, then, Lewis's solution seems to rule out any possible basis for

recognition that r

is

a

common subset of two accidentally coextensive properties,

rather than say the actual extension of a single natural property. This

epistemological worry,

if

cogent,

is

quite general. There

is

nothing in set-theory,

the notion of naturalness or any actual experience that could provide a basis for

our recognition that some properties are only accidentally coextensive while
others are necessarily so.

It is

similarly unclear

what could provide

the basis for

^)1

our recognition that some properties are merely
accidentally
are necessarily so. Yet

we clearly do

knoiv the difference

in

disjoint while others

many

cases.

These three drawbacks with Lewis's solution
point the way
adequate class nominalist response

to the

problem of distinguishing

actually coextensive determinate properties.
entities

- mere

possibilia

-

to distinguish

If

we eschew

more

to a

an appeal

distinct but
to

addihonal

them, while retaining the idea that

determinate properties are set-theoretic constructions
(having a unique degree of
naturalness) from ordinary particulars,

additional set-theoretic structure.

may have

to

be

the difference

made at some

we have no alternative but to appeal

The second

shows

difficulty

to

move

that this

point in any case. The third difficulty suggests that

between coextensive determinates should be one

that

accessible

is

from the actual world.

So what exactly

is

wrong with

determinates anyway? After
theoretical

all, it

identifying accidentally coextensive

would seem

to represent a considerable gain in

economy.

A naive explanation of why being 3g and redness (to change examples)
would not be

the

simply different

same property even

types of property

colour. This

shows up

relations. If

something

lOg,

perhaps that

from the
that

it's

fact that

it is

it’s

they were coextensive

if

— one is a mass property and

in the fact that redness
is

3g, then

similar in
red.

it

and being 3g

follows that

mass

to a

it

differ in their logical

has some mass, that

penny and so

coloured, not blue and perhaps that
fact that

it is

being red entails other colour facts about

it

it is

that they are

the other a

on,

none

On the other hand, if something is red,

none of which follow from the

or...);

is

of

it's

not

which follow

then

it

follow

s

similar in colour to tomatoes,

3g in mass. In short, something's

but no mass

something's being 3g entails other mass

facts

facts (or

about

it

charge

facts,

but no colour

facts (or

92
charge

So perhaps part

facts, or...).

determinate with

extension, a

its

about which determinable

So

let

it

of what's
that

cell, is

belongs

to, i.e.

wrong

doing so obliterates information

what

type of property^

us identify a determinate properU^ not
just with a

consisting of a determinable together with
one of

its cells.

the nature of a determinate the
information about

those inferences just noted.
coextensive, the account

they

would then have

particulars (which
differ in their first

member and

Now even

would not

the

happens also

to

some blue

particulars

would

And

notice that this difference

j.3.3

Modifyin g

the

NSN

II:

For although

viz. the set of actual

red

distinct.
all

its first

its first

member. And

these

For the coextensiveness of redness

the other colours

would

as

still

and masses are

also

be 2g, but some 4g, others lOOg

be green, but some purple, others yellow.

one

The Problem

that

is

accessible

from the actual world.

of Accidentally Coextensive Determin^f?/t?s.

Problem of Internal Structure and the Problem of Missing Determinates
But perhaps

this is

would

still

And

this

be 3g and vice versa
it

to

is

be sufficient

if all

the determinates of

be coextensive, then NSN, even thus amended,

entail their identity

determinates.

should

only a partial solution. For

were

certain determinables

all

build into

be the set of actual 3g particulars), they would

still

is

is to

pair

required to guarantee

entail that they are identical.

that

particulars

but with a

redness and being 3g were actually

being 3g has the mass determinable as

some 2g

The idea

its tc^pe

it is.

cell

members. Redness has the colour determinable

and being 3g does not guarantee

etc.;

if

same second member,

determinables would in general be

coextensive;

^vlth identifying a

and the

seems wrong.

identities of the corresponding

If

the fact that

all

red things also happen to

not sufficient for identifying redness and being 3g,

if it

also

and only green things are

happens

5g,

that

why

aU and only blue things are 4g and

and so on through

all

the corresponding

determinates? The problem of coextensive
determinates

might

call the

"problem of coextensive

determin/if^/cs"

Before looking at a possible solution to

two further inadequacies

in

NSN. The

first is

this

is

is

avoided but

u hat

u-e

not.

new problem

us

let

notice

fir^t

that the identification of

determinables simply with partitions on the set
of particulars would, in

Armstrong's words "seem
shapes, the colours etc."27
to redness than
IS

of

to

being lOOg

missmg

it is

..

no

light

upon

the internal ordering of the

the fact that, for instance, orangeness

to blueness; that

etc. Tlie

values".

to cast

being Ig

second inadequacy

is

is

more

is

more

similar

similar to being 2g than

what we might

call

"the problem

We often have occasion to refer to and quantify over

determinate properties that are not actually instantiated
of blue, the infinitely

many

and we grasp predicates

actually uninstantiated

mass

- Hume's

cell

missing shade

properties,

that express these properties. But

simply a pair of a classification and a non-empty

if

which

and so on -

a determinate

is

is

the extension of the

determinate, tlien there are no uninstantiated properties. Tlius, the
account
to

it

provide for the referents of

all

fails

our names, or the values of all our variables and

predicates.
In response let us

amend NSN's account of determinables and

them not just with (unordered)

partitions of particulars, but with partitions

having some kind of internal structure.
once encodes the

facts

identify

Tlie idea is tliat

it is

this structure that at

about the relative "closeness" of various determinates

of a

determinable, provides for "gaps" to function as the missing values and allows

us to distinguish even between coextensive determinables, determinables that
classify all particulars alike. In set-theoretic terms: x

m>, where

m

some metric on

is

a classification =df. x

is

a

triple,

<P,

on

This metric can be thought of as defining a "space" for the determinates of

P.

S,

is

that determinable. For instance,

the equivalence classes induced by S

m might be a function from the set of real

numbers

lo the set of cells <ind so

each

The determinable would have

the

cell.

number assigned

determinate space

-

to

each

cell

can be thouglit of as assigning
a real number

would

roughly, where

it

to

the internal structure of the
real line and

specify that cell's location in the

on

lies

the real line. Call the

new

theory,

"SN".

(And

us also require, following the suggestion
of section 3.2

let

that each determinate inherit the
degree of naturalness of

determinable <P,

its

(fn. 19),

determinable:

if

m> has degree of naturalness n, then so does every

S,

determinate of that determinable

«P, S, m>,

[x]s>.

This has the immediate

consequence that every determinate of a given
determinable has the same degree
of naturalness, but

it

of any determinates

no constraints on

places

drawn from

the relative degrees of naturalness

distinct determinables.)

A natural question that arises at this point is: Is there a single type of
structure

common

colour circle

,

to all natural determinables?

It

would seem

We talk of the

not.

so perhaps the metric on the colour determinable encodes
some

sort of circular internal structure. But intuitively

and intensive magnitudes - mass,

many

of the so-called extensive

length, temperature, density,

on - are drawn from determinables

that

have the same sort of internal structure

as the positive reals or as the real line. In such cases the metric

function from the set of positive reals or
will define a linear ordering

on the

volume and so

all

the real

numbers

is

perhaps a

to the partition

etc.,

intuitively

have

(or could have,

sort of structure as the integers. In

if

complicated

stiU

it.

many such

And maybe in some cases

— perhaps

it is

some kind

number of

sufficiently generalized) the

same

cases the metric will likely be a

function from the set of integers to the partition, and in

well-ordering on

and

partition. Still other determinables, for

instance those involving discrete quantities such as charge, valence,
sides

total

some

cases

it

the internal structure

will define a

is

more

of multi-dimensional space. In such

cases, the metric is best thought of as defining a "distance" relation of

some

kind.

^)5

Since structural nominalism aims

maintain only that there

is

to

be a general theory of properties,

some structure to each determinable
and that

should be encoded by some function from
mathematical

The nature of

A>,

SN can and

entities to the partition.

should be no more specific than

of three determinates

drawn from

second than the third

iff

A is

“closer" to

this.^^

a single determinable,

«P, S, m>, B> and «P, S, m>, C> we can say

to the

this

the structure should be a matter for
empirical investigation; an a

priori theory like

Now,

will

it

that the first

B than it

to

is

C

is

«P, S, m>,

more

“similar"

in the determinate

space defined by m. Thus, the redefinition accommodates
the internal ordering of
determinables.

And

it

may happen

number is assigned

to

that

some

exploit these unassigned

m assigns a number to every cell but not every

cell.

One way

numbers

to furnish

Hume s missing shade of blue and

cell.

And

then

we could

us with the missing values such as

the actually uninstantiated masses

to relax the definition of 'classification' to

courtesy

(perhaps not the most elegant)29 to

would be

allow the empty set as a kind of

allow that the empty set

is

assigned more than

one number. Each missing value of a determinable would be a pair whose

member is

the determinable

and whose second member

by some number assigned by the
differ

Suppose

i.e.

by

the

empty

indexed

set

metric. Uninstantiated determinates

from each other by virtue of the number the empty

determinable's metric

Then

is

first

would

set is assigned

by

that

their position in the determinable's structure.

for instance that nothing

is

exactly 3g

the determinate property being 3g

and

that nothing

would be «P,

determinate property being 7g would be

«P, S, m>,

S,

{} 7 >,

m>,

is

(} 3

exactly 7g.

> and

where S

is

the

the

is

same mass as relation and the subscripts indicate the numbers assigned by

even uninstantiated determinates actually

exist to

be referred

What makes one

to,

the

m.^‘^

So

quantified over

and assigned

as values to our predicates.

and the other

the 7g determinate despite not differing in their determinable or

the 3g determinate

their extension

is,

roughly, that the former comes halfway
between the 2g and 4g

determinates, the latter halfway between the
6g and 8g determinates.

seems

Tliis

a fairly natural explanation.

And maybe some determinables differ only

how

the cells induced by S

Thus

SN allows

which

on P are arranged within

that there can

particulars they

in their metrics,

group

i.e.

only in

the determinable space.

be distinct determinables that do not differ
together, but only in

particulars, their cells, are arranged vis a vis

how

at all in

these groups of

one another. Thus, the redefinition

allows us to distinguish even coextensive determinables.^^

3.4

The Trans world

3.4.1

SN and

'"Identiries" of Properties

Isomorphic Determinables

SN however still entails

the identity of

any determinables (and so

corresponding determinates) that partition particulars in the same

impose the same structure on
determinables

if

this partition; that

is,

SN entails

the identity of

the identification of coextensive determinates

perhaps the identification of coextensive determinables,
not clearly objectionable at

Notice

way and

they are isomorphic.

However, unlike

is

their

first

and

this latter identification

all.

that distinct but isomorphic determinables

epistemically indistinguishable to us. For suppose that

d and

would be
d' are

corresponding determinates drawn from distinct but isomorphic determinabk*s

and consider some

particular distinct

this particular instantiates

d

from

rather d'?

us.32

Not directly;

the extrinsic properties of particulars distinct

instruments and our senses.

we could deductively
any

effects are

How could we ever detect that

Nor could we

infer the presence of

for

from us -

we detect directly
their effects

directly detect anything

d rather than

d'; for, as

onl\'

on our
from which

Hume argued,

only contingently connected with the intrinsic properties

97
responsible for them.M
to distinguish them.

and

past, present

to the

from

seem

thdt tliere could be

any other evidence

For since isomorpltic determinables
classify every particular,

same way, notlung we could

distinguish those effects

presence of

distinct but

it

future, in exactly the

my particular could
due

\or does

d'.

And

clearly

if

due

detect about

the presence of d from those

the corresponding determinates

drawn

isomorphic determinables are epistemically
indistinguishable,

SO are the determinables themselves.

Indeed,

if it

were possible

determinables, then, for

shadow

we know,

the

be distinct but isomorphic

mass determinable may

''schmass" determinable, and each of

determinate. For

shadows
this is

all

for there to

for

hard

all

to

all

our

we know

there

may

its

determinates a

actually be infinitely

intrinsic properties; only

God

actually have a

shadow schmass

many such

could distinguish them.

And

swallow.

Notice also that although there are actually coextensive but
distinct

determinates such as renate and cordate, there do not seem to be any
actual

examples of isomorphic but
a

happy

distinct determinables.

accident. For scientists

Nor does

(e.g.

be just
of

temperatures to

kinetic energies of molecules). Yet the only evidence they could have, even

in principle, for

such claims

are isomorphic; for, as

would be

is

that the determinables

we have just seen,

distinct but

from which they are dravvm
isomorphic determinables

epistemically indistinguishable. In short, scientists

regard isomorphism

among

determinables as

verificationist assumptions,
facie

seem

but they do seem to

me

fairly

dubious

to constitute fairly strong

evidence for the identity of isomorphic determinables.

case the onus

is

on the opponent

of

SN

to

actually to

sufficient for their identity.

These observations are not conclusive without some

prima

to

sometimes announce the identity of types

property or the reduction of one type of property to another

mean

seem

this

And

in that

produce some positive argument

for

98
recognizing the possibiliU’ of distinct
but isomorphic (and so epistemically
indistinguishable) determinables.

But perhaps the opponent will reason
as follows. Consider any
property determinables that have the same
sort of structure
the (absolute) temperature determinables

Since

many

which are both

- say,

sides that these are distinct determinables.
Let us suppose

it is

have

in fact coextensive

a temperature of 40K;

and so

agreed on

however

all

some

that

- perhaps all and

only particulars that are
5g in mass have a temperature of 20K;
particulars that are lOg

mass and

(positive) real-valued.

of their determinates are not actually
coextensive,

mass and temperature determinates are

the

t;vo

on.

all

and only those

A very plausible

principle of recombination guarantees that the
result of patching together any
collection of distinct particulars

properties

is

also a world.^4

from any one world whatever

consider a world

their intrinsic

w obtained by patching together

only those distinct particulars from the actual world that
instantiate those mass

and temperature determinates

that are in fact coextensive.

particulars be the only particulars that exist at w.
the
is

Now,

mass and temperature determinates coincide and

the same, so the temperature

The problem

is

that

at

And

let

these

w the extensions of all

the determinable structure

and mass determinables are isomorphic

we know from

the actual

world

temperatures are distinct properties. So, contrary

to

that

SN,

there.

masses and
it is

possible for there to

be distinct but isomorphic deterrninables, their epistemic indistinguishabiUty
notwithstanding .^5
Notice, however, that this argument goes through only on the assumption
that

if

masses and temperatures are

also be distinct at w.

assumption

More generally,

that properties,

see whether this

distinct at the actual world, then they

argument

examine SN's proposed

if

this sort of

argument requires the

distinct, are necessarily distinct.

wdll

must

So before we can

convince a structural nominalist

we need

criterion of transworld identity for properties.

to

M

2

SN and

the Tra nsvvorl d Identih- Conditions
of

Pmp prHacJh

SN identifies each actual determinable property u
ith a
where P

is

some

set of actual parHculars, S

some metnc defined on

some equivalence

the equivalence classes induced

identifies determinate properties

with pairs

«P, S, m>,

triple,

relation

by S on

P.

its

m>,

S,

on P and

And

m

it

[x]k> consisting of a

determinable and one of the equivalence classes
induced by S on
indicate

<P,

P,

indexed

to

"position" in the "determinable space"
defined by m.

SN also supposes

that each actual determinable
property has a certain

unique degree of naturalness and that

this is inherited

determinates. The naturalness of any determinable
<P,
as a measure, roughly, of

how genuinely and

by each of its
S,

m> is to be thought of

objectively similar x

is to

y

whenever xSy.
In order to talk about determinables

worlds

it IS

some way

helpful to have

their degrees of naturalness.

some way

So

let

us

of

and

their determinates at different

comparing

make two assumptions.

of encoding the type of internal structure

classification

on

its

partition of particulars at

type of internal structure

world w. The idea

is

their internal structures

its

First let

us assume

imposed by the metric

world:

let

o(<P,

S,

and

of

m>, w) =

any

the

m imposes on the partition <P, S> of particulars P at

that o

should assign, for instance, the mass and (absolute)

temperature determinables

at the actual

world the same value

there, since they

are both have the internal structure of the positive reals; but, since the colour

determinable at the actual world intuitively has some sort of circular internal
structure, o should assign

it

a different value there. Second,

let

us also assume a

function that assigns to each classification at each world a value to measure

degree of naturalness at that world: n(<P,
of classification <P, S,

m> at world

S,

m>, w) =

its

the degree of naturalness

w. This degree of naturalness

is

also inherited

100
by any pair of

a classification

naturalness of
It

«P, S, m>,

seems

and one of

[x]k> at

its cells:

for an\’

w = n{<P, S,

world

something along the follmving

that

transworld identity

the degree of

m>, w).

lines is

SN's best bet

(1)

n(<P,

(2)

o(<P, S,

Determinate

[2]

[x ]|^> at

effect, to state

S,

m>, w) = n(<P', S^, m^>,
m>, w) = o(<P, S', m'>,

«P, S, m>,

w^);

=

what one

S,

and

SN is

m>,

is.

that the essence of a property,

this role is

Roughly,

and they have the same type

role.

in

whether determinable

In the case of a

[1]

S> and by how

iff

its

metric

m

natural the resulting

says that a determinable

[x]k>, this role consists in

same determinate property

[2]

D and D'

D at world w is the
are equally natural

occupying a certain location

says that determinate d at world

as determinate d' at world w'

same determinable and they occupy
its

is,

of internal structure at their worlds. In the case of a

deterrninable space. Roughly,

space as defined by

of entity

defined by the type of structure

same determinable as determinable D' at world w'

«P, S, m>,

some kind

takes the essence of that kind of entity to be. Roughly, the

partition of particulars <P,

structured partition

determinate

at

w

the transworld identity conditions for

determinable <P,
its

m’>

w').

or determinate, consists in a certain dassificational

on

S',

k.37

guiding idea behind

defines

<?',

[x]p at world
and determinate «P', S', m'>,
a distinct world w' are the same determinate iff:
, S , m'> are the same determinable;
and

(2)i

To state

for the

criteria of properties:

Determinable <P, S, m> at world w and determinable
a distinct world w are the scunc dct^nninable
iff:

[1]

its

x,

the

same

iff

w

is

the

they belong to the

position in that determinable's

metric at their worlds.

A brief examination of some of the consequences of this account should
help to

make

the idea clearer.

in

lOl

First,

and most obviously,

constructed in the same

way

this

at all

account entails that properties are

worlds. At any world a determinable

roughly, an ordered partition of
particulars, and a determinate

determinable and one of the equivalence class
on
that the relations of exclusion

them.

And

to entail

this

seems

right.

being coloured and

Second,

this

property essential

is

this partition.

and entailment among properHes
does seem

to

to

be

is,

a pair of a

Thus,

SN entails

are essential to

be part of the essence

redness

of, e.g.

exclude being blue.

account makes the degree of naturalness of any
determinate
to

at all in

how natural

and, by

[2],

the

It

to

According

it.

to [1],

if

determinables at distinct worlds differ

they are at their respective worlds, then they
are distinct;

same

determinate property

true of determinates also. Since the naturalness
of a

is

is

supposed

to

be a measure of the degree of genuine

objective similarity the property imposes

on

its

instances, the account entails that

each determinate property imposes exactly the same degree
of similarity on
instances regardless of

seems

right.

where these instances are

Although resemblance

is

a matter of degree

confers a greater degree of resemblance on
intuitively,

among its

any given property makes

instances. Surely,

if

in logical space they exist.

similar

its

greenness,

instances that grueness

is

And

the case regardless of

its

e.g.,

-

at all

what x and y are or

surely the fact that particulars are
virtue of being grue

worlds. In short,

more

is

SN entails, correctly

seems, that the degree of similarity conferred by any property on
part of

this too

for exactly the same degree of similarity

by virtue of being green than they are by

something that should be true

-

And

x and y have a certain degree of similarity by

virtue of both being green, then this

where

in logical space.

its

its

it

instances

is

a

essence.

Third,

[1] entails

determinable only

if

that determinables at distinct worlds are the

they have the

that their determinates are the

same type

same only

if

of internal structure.

same

And

[2] entails

they occupy corresponding positioas
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in this structure. Fhis

proposal thereby makes the "distance"
relations

determinates of the same determinable
essential to them;
redness

more

is

similar to orangeness than

which these properries

exist.

of the nature of redness to be

But according

to

SN

to

it is

to

do with

thereby allows:

(a)

more

same
(c)

all

blueness at every ^vorld

criteria

worlds whose domains of particulars
classifications,

and only the very same
which

it is

similar to orangeness than to blueness.

involve no constraints

the extensions of the properties at various
worlds.

particulars but

at

these features exhaust the essences of
properties.

even contain none of the same
instances of

entails that e.g.

This too seems to match intuitions;
intuitively,

Notice in particular that SN's transworld identity

having

it

among

differ in

differ,

The account

and which may

but which nevertheless contain

properties; (b) worlds containing the very

which properties are

worlds containing the very same particulars and

at

instantiated there;

and

which the very same

properties are instantiated, but which have those properties
differently
distributed

among

its

particulars.

This also matches our intuitions: intuitively, the extension of
a property,
the collection of

its

instances,

is

not essential to

it;

intuitively, the instances of a

property can vary from world to world. At the actual world, for instance,
tomatoes, firetrucks and roses are red, while the sky, the sea and violets are blue.
But, intuitively, violets

However,

might have red and roses might not have been.

intuitively, the

members

adopting these transworld identity

criteria

the identity of a given set across worlds

across worlds. In effect,
filled

by different

And

essentiaUy,

it

and the

sets at different worlds.

although

world

SN entails

it.

So by

SN effectively severs any link between
identity of a given property

SN identifies properties with certain

set that plays this role at a given

property.

of a set are essential to

It is

"roles" that

may be

the role rather than the particular

that constitutes the essence of a given

that a property has

can allow that the very same

classification

its

degree of naturalness

may differ in naturalness

from rvorld

to

classification

world;

it

and one

can alknv that

of

its cells)

has

Although, for instance, colour has

its

given classification (and so a pair
of a

a

degree of naturalness only contingently.

its

degree of naturalness essentially,

SN may

allow that the particular set that plays the
role of being colour at the actual
world

may have a

different degree of naturalness at

that contains the very

So

same

SN can allow

at

much

set

may

may be one set at one

world

at another.

And

it

world,

may be one

person

can allow that the very

play different properties roles at different worlds;

same person may be
Opposition

redness

as the inventor of bifocals

one world, but a different person

same

a

particulars as the actual world.

that, for instance,

but a different set at others;

some other world, even at

much as

the very

the Prime Minister at one world but the Leader
of the

at another.

One important consequence of all

this is that

SN allows for what we might

loosely call "the contingent identity" of properties,
though only for certain
properties.

It

seems

to

be possible for determinables

partition particulars without differing at

all

to differ in

how

they

in their internal structures or in their

degrees of naturalness. Consider, for instance, the mass determinable and
the

temperature determinable at the actual world. These seem to have the same type
of internal structure

—

that of the positive reals.

And

they are both candidates for

being perfectly (and so equally) natural determinables.
distinct determinables

the actual world

which

differ only in

how

If so,

they divide

~ some actual particulars having

the

then these are

up

the particulars of

same mass have

different

temperatures and some actual particulars having the same temperature have
different masses. But according SN,

any determinable

at

any other world

both perfectly natural and has the internal structure of the
temperature determinable.

And

it is

the

mass determinable

temperatures and masses are distinct at the actual world,

one and the same

real line just

at other worlds. Similarly,

it

may be

too!

is

the

Thus, although

SN entails

that at

is

that

that they are

some other world
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that

richer than the actual world, there
are determinables

is

and "schmass" determinables iv*'s particulars differently)

actual

the "bass"

that are distinct there (because
they partition

but which are both the same
determinable as our

mass determinable (because they are both

the internal structure of the real line).

schmass are

- say

Again

perfectly natural

SN entails

distinct determinables at w*, they are

and both have

that although bass

one and

the

same

and

at the actual

world.^*^

SN even allows
which there

that there are very impoverished worlds,
say ones at

exists a just a single particular, at

which

naturalness and any given internal structure, there

for

is at

any given degree of

most determinable

having that degree of naturalness and that type of
structure. This particular may

have

a certain temperature

and a

certain

mass and so on, but

at this world, these

temperatures and masses will be (contingently) the very same
properties.
It is

because

SN allows

that properties

may be

distinct at

one world but

identical at another that the structural nominalist can block
the anti-SN

with which

we

finished section 3.4.1.

argument

SN can also reject the possibility of distinct

but in principle epistemically indistinguishable properties, properties
that only

God

could distinguish.

And she can endorse

the actual scientific practice of

identifying actually isomorphic determinables.^o Moreover, the fact that

properties

may be contingently identical may provide grounds

any lingering mysteries about how the

and mean

is

classification of

by instruments

them by instruments

classification. Since a

numbers

of particulars,

is

discovered in the course of

The advocate of SN can maintain

that classification of particulars

same

''identity" of properties, e.g. temperatures

kinetic energies of constituent molecules,

scientific investigation.

if

for dismissing

to detect

that

to detect

mean

what

is

discovered

temperature and

kinetic energy result in the

determinable will in general involve classifying vast

you

start

with those particulars and

I

start

with these,

it

lOS

is

unsurpnsmg

that ^ve

should

fail to

realize that

our

classifications are

one and

the same.

This position

is far

comparable nchness

to

from problem-free however. Consider a
world of

our own.

And suppose

that at this

world there are several

distinct (because non-isomorphic)
perfectly natural determinables having
the

internal structure of the real line. According
to SN,

all

of

them have an equal

claim to be the temperature and the mass
determinable there.

thought objectionable; though

this

may be

not obviously so. Unfortunately there

this is

space to pursue the issue fully here.

And

I

will

merely point out that

is

SN permits

not

the

the contingent identity of a fairly narrowly
circumscribed collection of

determinate properties. Determinate properties can be the
same property

worlds and distinct

at others only if they are

drawn from equally

structurally isomorphic determinables and they

these determinables. Thus,

SN entails

are necessarily distinct (because
structures);

it

some

natural,

occupy the same positions on

that being positively-charged

and being 3g

drawn from determinables with different

entails that being red

drawn from determinables

at

and being 3g

are necessarily distinct (because

that are not equally natural);

and

entails that being

it

red and being green are necessarily distinct (because they occupy different
positions in their determinable).

3.5

Evaluaring

SN

In section 3.6

I

wdll consider

two of the remaining

These require some minor extensions of the account. But

on evaluating
in the

the theory.

(I

have stated

SN in full,

difficulties
let

us

first

with SN.

make a

start

including these modifications,

Appendix.)

The
ontology

is

particulars

first

safe

and

and most obvious advantage
and

sane:

sets.

And

it

of

SN is its theoretical economy.

Its

includes just two fundamental categories of entity

it is

a fully actualist theory: no appeal

is

made

to

any

-

10 ()

merely possible mdiv, duals.

Its

ideology

the fundamental notions of set-theory,

is

its

also very parsimonious: apart
from

only conceptual primitive

of naturalness which applies to certain
sets and

noHons are defined, analyzed or

comes

logically constructed.

in degrees.

is

.All

the notion

other

These include the

following: determinate property, determinable
property (in both senses of
property'), similarity (and, in the
is

also noteworthy that

SN is at

Indeed,

Appendix,

intrinsic nature

and duplication).

no modal notions appear among the primitives

least as attractive

on grounds

of theoretical

economy

It

of SN.‘*'

as any

other extant theory of properties.

SN entails,

Second,

without appeal

number of important theorems
a priori. First,

a

(b) It instantiates

no particular determinate

them

on. Second,

(a) It falls

some determinate
it

features of the logical relations
(c)

mass, and so

(all

on.'*'*

among properties,
Third,

over)

and green

entails that

In short,
a

it

without appeal

a particular
to

which F

of that determinable (though there
(c) It

instantiates

is

no other

SN's explanation of Johnson’s three
3.2.

In particular, in

that e.g. nothing

over), nothing can be both Ig

famous problem

and 3g

in

of incompatibilities

problem which no other extant theory solves

to

it

satisfactonlv

enables us to distinguish accidentally coextensive properties

mere possibiha, thereby avoiding

possibilia responsible for so

seems

solves the

if

SN has a number of epistemological advantages. One has already

been mentioned —

it

that e.g. red is a colour

properties outlined in

(all

known

unique determinable,

SN explains why it is, and how we know a priori,

can be both red

here:

among

is

it

that they are

under the determinable

must instantiate); and

determinate of that determinable.'*^ This

virtue of

how it is

we know a priori

mass property, and so

instantiates a determinate F,

belongs;

special additional axioms'^^, a

entails that every determinate belongs to a

it

is

any

thereby explaining

thereby accounting for the fact that
property, Ig

to

to

many

throw some

light

the

incredulous stares.

on the

role of

commitment

I'll

to

mere

mention just one more

paradigms

in grasping

10
properties such as colours. Simply
pointing at
sufficient for a grasp of blueness

some blue

particular

- how could poindng at any

clearly not

is

particular suffice to

direct

someone's attention

Nor

there any special super-paradigmahcally
blue particular which

is

to its colour rather than

any other of its properties?

we must

grasp to grasp blueness; almost any blue
particular will do as paradigm.

According

to

SN, blueness

is

a pair consisting of the colour
determinable and

some equivalence

class

To grasp blueness

requires that

equivalence

Any

class.

determined by the similarity relation

we

in this determinable.

grasp both the determinable and the relevant

blue particular will do as paradigm because
any

determines the same equivalence class under the
colour similarity

none

is sufficient,

for

it

the hopeless project of finding

paradigmatically blue thing to which
is to

nominalism.4^ In

something

is

So

is

it

which bedeviled

reality,

blue

to the

something
iodine.

all

some super-

blue things are more similar overall than

anything else or with being saddled with a vast number of
primitive

similarity-relations

perhaps

iff it is

it

seems

the

traditional forms of resemblance

that

we grasp blueness by being

same colour as

that,

pointing to

sky or the cover of some book. Or perhaps

blue

iff it

seems

that

has a colour that

is

told that

some paradigm,

we are

told that

halfway betw^een that of grass and

we actually do grasp it by grasping both some

paradigm(s) and the (ordered) colour determinable in general as

3.6

But

could not determine the colour determinable as a
whole.

To its advantage SN avoids

each

relation.

SN suggests.

Two Further Difficulties with SN: Some Extensions
The

first difficulty is

what we might

determinables". Armstrong points out that

call "the

some

problem of

relative

seem not

to

be

determinates or determinables simpliciter, but determinables relative

to

some

properties

properties and determinates relative to others.^^ Redness for instance

determinate relative to

colour,

but a determinable relative

to scarlet.

is

a

Moreover,
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fcnlet

Itself

shades
like

(for

seems

to

be a determinable relative

which we lack

SN which aims

to

predicates). This raises

encode Johnson's

the structure of those sets with

show

-

is false,

-

completely spedtic

difficulties for

among

be identified.

to

other, scarlet

aquamarine. Second, such cases seem
relations

among

be scarlet only

So even

if

such cases

that determinates of a
determinable exclude

or at least true only

aquamarine exclude each

any theory

properties into

First,

if

the determinates are "at the

« Although, redness and blueness exclude each other and

level".

on.

hvo

logical relations

which they are

that Johnson's third claim

each other

to various

and redness do

to

show

same

scarlet

and

nor do blueness and

not,

that there are further logical

properties than the ones Johnson points out.
For something can

if it is

something can be aquamarine only

red,

if it is

blue,

and so

SN succeeds in incorporahng Johnson's three features into its

account of the nature of properHes,

it

would still

fail

to give a full

account of their

nature.

To deal with

this

problem we must extend

from the axioms of set-theory
are related in the following
first

two ways:

are also classified alike

first is

When

particulars while

still

any particulars

these conditions obtain
first.

let

Roughly, one

when it provides

a

more

preserving the structure of

classifications that

by

classified alike

vice versa);

preserved on mapping

classification is a pvecisificcition of the

precisification of another

first,

sometimes be two

by the second (though not

the metrical structure of the

structure of the second.

that there will

SN in a natural way. We know

it

the

and second,

into the metrical

us say that the second

classification

is

a

fine-grained partition of

this partition.

When this

situation occurs a single cell of the former will contain

all

cells of its precisifications.

a subdeterminable relative

Let us say that such a

cell is

the

members

of several

to those cells of its predsification.'*^

Quite often predsifications are more natural than that which they
predsify; they are, after

all,

more

spedfic. But this

is

not so in general.

It is

an

10 ')
easy matter to dream up very
unnatural predsifications of
determinables. Indeed,

which

it

if

a precisification were always

predsifies, then every unit property

seems vwong. So,

in general, there

its

more

would be

natural than that

perfectly natural,

need be no straightforward

the degree of naturalness of a
determinable

of

prettv’ natural

and the degree

relation

and

this

between

of naturalness of any

predsifications.

This terminology allows us to explain
Armstrong's observation without

abandoning Johnson's

third claim.

more than one determinate

of

Johnson

is

right that

no particular

instantiates

any determinable. However, some determinables

are preasifications of others and possess
similar degrees of naturalness. In such
cases

we often give

these (strictly distinct) determinables the

same name.

Moreover, in such cases some determinates of one

classification will qualify as

subdeterminables relative to determinates from

predsifications. Colours

provide a case in point

—

strictly

its

speaking, the seven-colour determinable, the

intermediate determinable that includes scarlet, aquamarine and
so on, and the
infinitely-many, completely spedfic

determinables despite

all

hue determinable are

all distinct

being called "colour". However, they do constitute a

chain of predsifications and one deterrninable

determinable) contains determinates

(e.g.

(e.g.

the seven-colour

redness) that qualify as

subdeterminables relative to the determinates

(e.g. scarlet,

crimson,

some

absolutely spedfic reddish hue) of the other two determinables. Furthermore,

when one determinable is a predsification of another,
'predsification',

any particular

then,

by

the definition of

that instantiates a determinate of the former

also instantiate the corresponding determinate of the
entails rather than excludes being red.

latter.

must

Thus, being scarlet

But the names should not mislead:

subdeterminables are not genuine determinables

at all according to

SN and

(proper) predsifications are distinct determinables from that which they predsify

despite often being given the

same name

(e.g. 'colouT).

In short, Johnson's claim

IS

compatible ivith Armstrong's observation,
and, thus extended,

logical relations that, intuitively,
hold

among

SN

entails the

deterrmnables and their

precisifications.

r

he second difficulty

is

generated by the

classification assigns every particular
to

some

fact that,

cell

by

or other.

definition, a

Hence SN

entails that

every particular instantiates some determinate
from every determinable. But
is

not quite nght. Although

particulars of everyday

it

seems pretty plausible

life, it is

for the

this

macroscopic

clearly not the case for all the particulars
posited

by saence and philosophy. Although

chairs, cars

and buildings

all

have some

mass, colour and shape, electrons, spacetime
points and force fields do not have

any colour, and propositions, ideas and Cartesian egos
don't have any mass or
shape.

apply

hese sorts of particulars are such that some determinables
just do not

1

to

them. Indeed, there

particular
to

falls,

that

which we may
1

may even

to say, there

is

is

be no determinable under which every

perhaps no respect of similarity according

classify absolutely every particular.

will briefly

mention three

strategies for

amending SN

in the light of this

objection.

I

he

first is

simply

to

drop the assumption

that every determinable

partitions the entire set of particulars. Instead a determinable could be identified

with any partition of any subset of

most determinables.
partitions only

so on are not

It

Ihen only some particulars

under

will fall

could be urged that the colour determinable, for instance,

some not all

among

P.

those

particulars.

it

partitions.

And
I

electrons, propositions, spirits

and

hus, colour just does not apply to these

particulars.

One drawback

to this

approach

explanation of certain relations
not mentioned up

till

now.

among

Intuitively,

is

that

it

would deprive us

of an

determinables themselves which

some determinables

1

have

are such that any

parhcular falling under one must also
instance,

it is

under the other and vice

fall

impossible for any particular

Indeed these mter-determinable relations

though vague metaphysical slogans

to

be red but lack a shape, or an

may

be what

to the effect that a

it

does seem natural

every particular must instantiate at

means, then

it

understates the case. For

to instantiate just

none.

least

bare particular

Nor does

it

one property -

seem possible

seems

mass or
fully

and so

determinate

P, either
all

other,

the

-

on.

is

as that

it

One way

to take the

is

impossible. For
other,

some

this too

mass determinates; being

seems not

to

what

be the whole

two

a particular

if

reality

possible

—

it

it

must have some mass, even

such property. Yet
if it is

story. For consider

this

and so

course, the

problem

properties.

And notice

is

must instantiate

a full

complement

then to explain what counts as a
that

SN as originally

"full

stated explains

on.

were

it

does not seem

zero mass. Perhaps

accurately express the intuitions underlying these slogans by
slogan, "every particular

some

and every properN

Og, being Ig, being 2g, being 257.9g,

instantiates each

is,

must be

Now the above condition would be satished if of some physical particular
not the case that that

it

properties,

area or other,

second slogan —

as asserting that for every particular x

Px or not Px. But

this is

if

should instantiate

for a particular to instantiate just

must have some shape or

it

former as saying that

just as impossible for a particular

-

say, being red

or just three; even a "semi-clothed" particular
say, red, then surely

to take the

is

unclear what

it is

one property. However,

it

area.

behind those traditional

is

impossible or that reality must be fully
determinate. Although,
these slogans really mean,

versa. For

we might more

means

of the

of properties".

Of

complement" of

this.

For

it

entails that

every particular instantiates some determinate from every determinable and

that

may be just the sort of thing we mean when we say

fulK-

clothed or fully determinate. Intuitively, what was

exaggerated the extent of these logical relations
partial classification response,

by

that a particular

wrong with SN was

among

contrast, entails

must be
that

determinables. The

no such

relations

among

it

defermmables;

it

thus

fails to

accommodate

concerning properties. The truth seems
to
but not

lie

somewhere

determinables are logically connected

all

The second
an

the pre-theoretical data

all

actual particulars to

particulars, or into physical substances

substances, or perhaps in

some other way - and then

SN to these categories. The idea

determinables and that

all

fundamental categories - perhaps into
concrete

and abstract

proposed by

way .so

in this

strategy consists in subjecting the
set of

initial partition into

particulars

m the middle - some

is

SN as originally stated

category every particular instantiates
category s determinables. Particulars

and mental

relativizing the structure

that each category has

is

some determinate of every one of
in,

etc.

-

own

true of each category: within a
that

say, the abstract category such as

propositions would then be such that the concrete
determinables

charge

its

-

mass, colour,

don't apply to them.

One obvious drawback here

is

that

it is

unclear what the categories should

be. Electrons, for instance, are physical objects
but they

do not have a colour even

though physical objects are generally coloured. So a fundamental
category
physical objects seems to be ruled out.

Of course, colour is not a

of

serious

candidate for being a sparse property. Nevertheless, there seems to be
no a priori

guarantee that

The

this

third

problem

will not arise

approach would be

with more serious candidates.

to introduce a "null" determinate into every

determinable. Then, although every particular would have to instantiate some

determinate from every determinable, in some cases

this will

merely be the null

determinate. This account would entail that every particular instantiates some

colour or other, though in the case of electrons, propositions and the

rest,

the

colour would be this null colour.^i

One problem with

this

approach

is

that

it is

unclear

how non-arbitrarily

to

decide on the null determinate's position in the metrical structure. Indeed

uithout further development

this

approach would seem

to differ

only nominally

trom the

partial classification approach.
,\or

does

this

approach

e.xplain ivIn- a

coloured particular must have a
non-null mass.

The pnnapal

may

fail

to capture all the relations

that these really are

notwithstanding.

even

It is

to

So although

false.

among

relations at

lof;ical

properhes. However,

them

into

its

logical constructions.

I

am

or whether some hybrid approach

is

to

The opponent of SN might argue

preferable,

this

their distinctive essence

-

to

amending SN

have adopted

I

SN in

is

the partial

the Appendix.

SN

as follows. VVe

experience certain determinate properties and

is

not obvious

is

But at worst

unsure of which approach

The Phenomenological Objection

that

it

say less than the whole truth rather than
something clearly

at present

we are acquainted,

it

that

the tradihonal metaphysical
slogans

all,

classification response in the formal statement
of

3.7

approach uas

therefore unclear whether a theory of
properties should

try to incorporate

approach seems

best,

criticism of the partial classification

this

know what it is

phenomenal

like to

access reveals

their "qualitative nature" or "quiddity". In experience,

for instance, with the ruddiness of red

at least partly constitutive of the essence of redness.

and

it is

this

ruddiness

But according

to

SN

the essence of a determinate consists only in the classificational
structure

imposed on

particulars

classification

is,

by

its

determinable,

and where redness

the colour metric. In particular,

is

being classified in a certain

how natural

this

located in the colour-space as defined by

SN makes no room for the quiddities of

properties, such as the ruddiness of red,
essence.52 Indeed, the entire

e.g. colour,

and so

fails fully to

approach may seem

way does

capture their

to get the cart before the horse:

not constitute some particular's redness;

rather, red particulars are classified alike because they are all red.^^

The objection may be put

a

little

more

precisely.

account of properties really does leave something out,

Suppose

that SN's

their quiddities or

essences. Then
facts

it

mil conflate

about these quiddities. For

instantiates

that

to describe
IS,

in

which

two

thing.

which

iff it

if

particular at any ^vorld

instanhates the putative genuine

economy

dictates the identification of

To make her case then

and

particulars

all

which

classifications

particulars instantiate

which

intuitively they are distinct,

opponent of SN

the

dassificational respects

classifications exist there

differ at all in their classificatory structure,

world. So

and any

ivorlds that are exactly alike in

of naturalness are assigned to
differ in

doesn't,

then theoretical

all,

SN s candidate with the real
needs

if it

SN's candidate for redness

quiddity and

article,

-

distinct possibilities that differ
only xvith respect to

and

in

- but which

which degrees

nevertheless

properties. Since such worlds

SN will entail

do not

that they are the

same

SN is refuted.

Perhaps the fantasy of inverted spectra provides an example.54
Imagine a

world exactly
imagine that

like the actual

at this

world

world, there

is

in all dassificational respects. In particular,

a classification of particulars that groups

together tomatoes with firetrucks, grass with leaves, sea with
sky
that

matches exactly our colour

classifications.

world the partitions of particulars are ordered
the

above

classification the

And

same way.

group containing grass and leaves

to the metric to that containing the sea

and sky than

it is

it is

to redness. Finally,

suppose

is

way

at this

In particular,

on

closer according

to that containing

tomatoes and firetrucks to just the same extent that greenness
similar to blueness than

a

etc. in

imagine further that

in the

is

actually

more

that this classification

has exactly the same degree of naturalness there as the colour determinable has
at the actual world.

world

is

According

to

SN,

this classification just

identical with the actual world. Yet

of inverted spectra:

would experience

what

seems possible

colour and the
that this

is

the inhabitants of this world experience as red

as violet

and

would experience as blue and
Intuitively

it

is

vice versa,

vice versa,

what they experience

and so on through all

our world and the inverted spectrum world are

-

a world

we

as orange,

the colours.

distinct worlds.

we

despite the tact that they differ
neither in which particulars
exist nor hou- they
are naturally classified, nor even
in the h pe of structure
imposed on these
classifications.

So

SN fails.

This argument, however,
First,

coherent.
is

to

If

show

respect to

because

is

not compelling.

not clear that the inverted spectrum
example

it is

that

SN's account of properties

which

particulars instantiate

same

is

inadequate,

which

it

must

differ only

properties. In particular,

from those reflected by the corresponding actual
structures of their surfaces are the same,

govern human reactions
signs, tomatoes

and

to colour

must

and so on. Note

But could there

really

Second, since
consideration

is

it is

that the laws that

same human
levels,

reactions at

avoidance

be that the classification that groups

it

same human

etc.

would

still

not be redness

reactions as redness actually is?

stipulated that the spectrum at the world under

inverted,

it is

unclear whether

putative inverted spectrum classification
the actual world. For the metric

the metric

differ

be a world of inverted spectra without any

together stop signs with tomatoes and firetrucks
associated with the

do not

also be the same: perceptions of stop

firetrucks are associated with the

other of these differences at aU? Could

if

laws

particulars, the microscopic

each world whatever they are (perhaps increased adrenalin
etc.).

its

with

as the laws of the actual world, so the
wavelengths

of light reflected by the particulars at the
inverted spectrum world

even

even

the distinctness of the inverted
spectrum world from the actual world

are supposed to be the

behaviour

is

on

is

the

SN really does entail
same

as the colour classification at

the colour classification

on the inverted spectrum

these are distinct classifications after

classification.
all,

that the

And

so

is

inverted relative to

SN may

entail that

thereby avoiding the putative

objectionable identification of the worlds.

There

,s

a

problem

rvith this

second

repl.v lun^ ever.

that there are dist.nct classifications
that differ only

metrics are inverted relative to one
another,

worlds. So to distinguish the tivo worlds,

saying that only one

is

by virtue of the

SN entails

SN ivill

still

instantiated at the actual world

instantiated at the inverted spectrum
world.

discussed in section 3.4 that

SN

Although

SX entails

fact that their

that both exist at

require

(«fl,

some reason

and only the other

A response might exploit

is

the idea

permit that the naturalness of a given set

may

vary from world to world. For then the
structural nominaUst can say that
actual world the colour classification
classification,

(Though a

is

more natural than

while at the inverted spectrum world,

on

final verdict

this

it is

the other

type of response will depend on

way

this chapter, officially

I

it is

have played

SN is a

by simples.

of these. Indeed,

far

fast

how SN

nature,

And it is
from

far

from

clear that

clear that colours are really

if

may just fall outside

the scope of

the objection can be ignored.

they were to be

with respect to properties that

we do not directly

particulars distinct

from

if

to find actual

be essentially different in

would show

at best that

naturalness and

SN fails only

But, as

was

perceive the intrinsic properties of any

merely their

their extrinsic properties. Nor,

be able

we seem to experience directly.

pointed out above,

us,

to

to

drawn from determinables whose

structure are the same. So the objection

about the

examples

we ever directly perceive an\/ of these. So

whose phenomenology shows them

even

among

theory only of intrinsic properties that could be

Fourth and connectedly, the objection requires us
properties

resolves

and loose with examples throughout

perhaps properties that have a phenomenology

SN in which case

round.

fn. 28)).

Third, although

instantiated

at the

the "inverted"

the question of filtering out merely conventional
structural differences

determinables (see

for

effects

on us or our instruments,

the recombination principle

intrinsic properties of particulars distinct

is

true,

i.e.

can anything

from us be deductively

mferred from the effects they have on
fails

-

with respect

us.

So the objection shotvs

at best that SN'

to intrinsic properties of
particulars that are not distinct

from us

perhaps, the intrinsic properties of
ideas or sense-data.

And even

if

there

were these differences

in intrinsic properties of

our ideas

or sense-data between the actual
world and the inverted spectrum world,
hypothes! they

we behave.

would show up

.Mor

neither in

would they induce any

how we classify

«

particulars nor in

hirther logical relations

how

among

properties over and above Johnson's three
features incorporated by SN.

Furthermore, such quidditistic differences would
presumably be private and
subjective
that they

and so would not show up

would be incommunicable.

functionalist account of

-

indeed,

we accept some

kind of

in anything that
Finally,

mind according

to

if

we

say

it

seems

which sense data and other qualia are

identified with intrinsic properties of brains or
something similar, then sensedata, the last refuge of non-classificational quiddities,
picture.

I

have something along the following

a red sense-datum
appeared-to-redly,

such

iff

x

is

where

directly

aware

this intrinsic

entirely out of the

mind: x

is

directly

that x has the intrinsic property

property

intrinsic properties of brains are

lines in

drop

is

aware
bein<;^-

a physical state of x's brain.

given the same treatment as other

of

And

intrinsic

properties of particulars. Indeed this functionalist account provides the
only
plausible justification for our unreflective assumption that our colour experiences

are very

much alike: we experience

alike

because are brains are constructed

In short, the phenomenological objection to
insofar as sense can be

made

of

it, it

seems

alike.

SN is far from clear and,

that the structural nominalist has a

number of lines of reply.

In the next chapter

I

will

extend

SN

to

cover intrinsic properties that are

capable of instantiation only by complex particulars and to cover relations

whether between simple or complex

particulars.

I

will also discuss

how SN

provides for the existence of so-called
alien properties and relations.

SX

chapter

in its general

form

u-,11

In the last

be exploited in order to provide
a reductive

analysis of modality'.

Appendix: Stru ctural Nominalism (SN> 55

3.8

3.8.1

Ontolog\- and Ideology

The ontology
impure
its

of

SN consists only of pure sets, actual particulars

sets constructed

set of

from actual particulars

-

conceptual primitives

in the usual

way.

Its

and

ideology

contains only those fundamental notions
of

-

set-

theory and mereology needed to
guarantee the existence of the appropriate
sets

plus the property of naturalness which
applies to certain sets and comes in
degrees.

It

also

assumes the usual

set- theoretical

axioms and those of some

standard mereology. The only additional axioms
are the analyses and logical
constructions.

3.8.2 Definitio ns, Analyses, Logical Constructions
[Dl]
X IS a partial classification of particulars =df. x is
triple <P, S,
(1) P is some subset of the set of all actual particulars.

m> such that;

(2)

S

(3)

m

is

any equivalence relation that is total on P.
any metric defined on the partition induced by S on P

is

together with the
[D2]

[x]s is
is

a

of

cell

some

the set containing

Db

[D4]

Dt
of

[D5]

If

all

Db and
x

is

[x]s is

«P, S, m>,

of

cells,

then

f is

f is

S,

[x]s>

such that <P,

S,

m> is a member

m> or the empty set.

a function that takes each

the intrinsic nature

member of Db

into

ofx =df.

m> (in the sparse sense) in the range
X G f(<P, S, m>) (i.e. «P, S, m>, [x]s> G f) and

for all determinables <P, S,
f,

(2) f is

an

a cell of <P,

a particular and
(1)

f is

m>

=df. [x|s
particulars y such that ySx for some

=df. the set of partial classifications of particulars.

=df. the set of pairs

one of its

[D6]

set.

and only those
the empty set).

particular x (or

[D3]

empty

partial classification of particulars <P, S,

;

maximal,

i.e.

any other function f

intrinsic nature =df. f is the intrinsic

satisfying (1)

nature of

x,

for

is

a subset ot

some particular

an intrinsic nature is a maximal collection of (non-empty)
determinates — pairs of a determinable and one of its (non-empty) cells).
X. (In effect,

A determinable <l’,

1D7|

S m'>

a piva^ificnlum of another <1>,
S,
particulars x and y, xSy whenever
xS'v;
,

is

m> =df.

and

""

r m

rT
c3,

then the corresponding cells on <1>,
S', m'> c'l,
respectively are such that it is not the
case that c'l
than c 2. Where a cell c' corresponds

member of c'
than... IS

[D8]

X

to a cell c

is

a

member of c; and

determined by the metrics

like c2

than

and c'3
is more like c'3
whenever every
c'2

the relation of beitw more

m and m’

like

ajubdetermirmble =df. there are distinct
determinables <P, S, m> and
<P, S ,
> such that the latter is a precisification
of the former and x is a
determinate of the former but not the latter.
X is a taxonomy =df. x is a sequence of
classifications such that each is a
precisification of its predecessor in the
sequence.
is

m

[D9]

[LCla]

F
F
F

is

a determinable property in the abimdant
sense of 'property' iff
^
member of Db.
is a determinable property in
the sparse sense of 'property' iff F is
a member of Db and F is natural.

[LCls]

[LC2a]
[LC2s]

is

a

F

is

a determinate property in the abundant sense of
'property'

is

a

member of Dt.

F

is

a determinate property in the sparse sense of
'property' iff F is a
F's first member is a determinable in the
sparse

iff

member of Dt and

sense of 'property'.
[LC3a]

a property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff either
x is a
determinate property in the abundant sense of 'property' or x
is
a determinable property in the abundant sense of
'property.

[LC3s]

X is a property in the sparse sense of 'property' iff either
x is a
determinate property in the sparse sense of 'property' or x is a
determinable property in the sparse sense of 'property'.

[

A1

]

x

A determinate property F belongs to a determinable property D iff D is
the first

[A2]

is

member

of F.

A particular x instantiates a determinate property F iff F is determinate
property

«P, S, m>,

intrinsic nature

and u

[u]s>
is

and

m>) =

fx(<P, S,

any member of

[u]s

where

fx is x's

[u]s.

[A3]

A particular x falls under a determinable property <P, S, m> iff x

[A4]

S

some determinate whose first member is <P, S, m>.
a similarity relation iff <P, S, m> is a determinable property in the
sparse sense of 'property'
instantiates

[

A5]

is

For any particulars x and
nature of y,

y,

where

fx is

the nature of x

and

fy is

the

is intrinsically similar to
y iff there is some determinable
property in the sparse sense of 'property' <P, S, m> such that
fx(<P, S, m>) = fy(<P, S, m>);
(ii) X is a duplicate of
y iff for all determinable properties in the
sparse sense of 'property' <P, S, m>, fx(<P, S, m>) = fy(<P, S,
m>).
(i)

X

F

120
[A6j

3.8.3

[

1

a pnrmii^m of

is

Li

some determinate

F =

«P
1

/

S m>,
‘d’,

Determinable <P, S, m> at world w and
determinable <P'
a dishnct world w are the satne
determinable iff:

]

m>, w) = n(<P', S', m'>,
m>, w) = o(<P', S', m'>,

s,
S,

assigns a positive real
s

iff

Transworld IdenHtv-

0) n(<p,

1

F

number

w');
w'),

and
where n

is

S'

m'>

at

a function that

each classification at each world as
a measure of
na^ralness at that world. ,And o is some
function to encode for each

«P,

Determinate

[2]

^

m>,

[x]j> at

world

w and determinate «P', S',

a distinct world w' are the same determinate
iff:
<P, S, m> and <P , S , m'> are the same
determinable; and

[x ]k^ at
(1)
(2)

3.8.4

S,

to

j

=

k.59

A Sample Proof
Although proofs of the various claims concerning the
consequences

made in

thiis

of

SN

chapter are straightforward, for purposes of illustration,
one

example may be

helpful.

So here

is

a proof that

if

a particular instantiates a

determinate, then instantiates no other determinate of that
determinable:

A particular x instantiates a determinate «P, S, m>,
m>) =

[u]s

where

fx is x's intrinsic

nature and u

determinate. Since an intrinsic nature

equivalence classes,

which

it is

defined.

it

is

fx(<P, S,

a paradigm of this

a function from determinables to

And since each particular has a
is

unique

intrinsic nature, for

a function fx such that for every determinable <P,

m> for which fx is defined,
there

iff

assigns a unique equivalence class to each determinable for

every particular x there

i.e.

is

is

[u]s>

there

is

a unique determinate

a unique determinate of that determinable

«P, S, m>,

which x

[u]> in

instantiates.

S,

fx,
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must be distinguished from uses of 'naturar
to mean
man-made' and so on. Some property is natural
in the

intended

makes for genuine resemblance among its
instances
61. However, in what follows
will often talk, for the

it

Plural, h,, p.

sake of simpliatv as if
degrees of naturalness Explicitly
P
y

I

rZeir

This eases exposition and no point of
substance hangs on
.ht:e"!re
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thorough discussion of the relation
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^not
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‘^Though even these are not all clearly properties
of something regardless of the state or
existence of any distinrt thing. Colours,
for instance, depend, in one sense at
least, on the state
he observer. And shapes and lengths may
depend on the nature of the spatiotemporal
structure within which the particular is
located. But I will ignore these doubts and
asVume
these are intnnsic properties.

Plurality, p. 60. This restriction may be redundant;
Lewis claims that it is already built into
our sparse conception of properties.
That IS not to say that SN does not cover at least some
properties instantiated by complex
particulars. For some properties can be had by
both simple and complex particulars SN fails

cover only those properties the instantiation of which
by a particular entails that the
is complex. So SN will not cover idl
the properties instantiated at a world with
some complex particulars and a fortiori it will not cover all the
properties instantiated at a
world at which every particular is complex (if there are such
worlds). But it will cover some
properties at both such worlds.
The reason for these restrictions is that, intuitively, the excluded
to

particular

properties supiervene in

one way or another on those included, together with relations: extrinsic
properties are
implicitly relational and so supervene on relations among
particulars; "disjunctive"

properties, conjunctive properties and so on supervene on their
disjuncts, conjuncts and so
on, the intrinsic properties of complex particulars supervene on the
intrinsic properties of and
relations among their parts. These excluded properties cannot,
therefore, be characterized
independently of the properties on which they supervene, though the converse is not the
case. So the strategy should be to develop a theory of those properties
included first, and then
extend it to cover the excluded properties and relations in a way that incorporates the
relations of supervenience. I carry out this extension in chapter four. Again
intuitions vary

concerning exactly which properties are excluded by this restriction.
W. E. Johnson, Logic, Part /, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921).
Armstrong objects that this third claim is "...not quite accurate. Determinates under a
common determinable do not exclude each other in this way unless they are "at the same
level".
is a determinate to colour, but a determinable to scarlet. Scarlet is also a
determinate of colour. But redness and scarlet do not exclude each other." D. M. Armstrong, A
Theory of Universals, Volume II: Universals and Scientific Realism, p. 1 12. will ignore this
objection for now, but 1 return to deal with it below (see section 3.6).
The connections between sentences like 'a is red' and 'a is not blue' or 'a is coloured' are
1

not usually called "logical",

and the corresponding arguments are usually

said not to be valid

122
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s

evealed by translation into this language.
Surely it is better to reject attempted^
regimentations as inadequate on the grounds
that they fail to capture these
relations
properties than having to posit some kind
of extra-logical "metaphysical"

amonp

necessity to

explL

One

could perhaps start with determinates,
and then introduce determinables as
exclusive
disjunctions of determinates. That approach
too might get the logical relations
right

It

seems

to

me

that this

approach would

to provide
determinates of^he same
determinable are all, intuitively, equally natural.
The structural nominalist approach now
however
ever
does explain these (see below).

ady explanations

for certain other facts

about properties,

e.g.

still fail

why

Perhaps naturalness as a whole carves at every joint.
not to say of course that there is no explanation
available to account for this fact if
we take determinates rather than determinables to be the
primary bearers of degrees of
naturalness. Lewis, for instance, suggests (very
briefly) that the degree of naturalness
has to
do with the degree of disjunctiveness of the properties
concerned (see Plurality, pp. 60-1) The
Idea IS that perfectly natural properties constitute
some sort of "base" and disjunctiveness is
o be defined in terms of it. One problem with this
approach is that on the face of it
disjunctiveness is a property of linguistic items rather than
extra-linguistic items like
properties. Perhaps the idea is that naturalness has to
with the definitions of the various
properties
some language. But which language? Moreover, since any
definition can be
made arbitrarily disjunctive by well-known logical tricks, this approach
tilts unnervingly
close to extreme Platonism about "correcf' definitions.

That

is

m

I

menhon

the above observation by

problems with Lewis
better

drawn

s

approach

it

at least

means of motivation only. In view
seems worth exploring whether the

of the
distinction

is

in the first instance at the

determinable level.
entails that every determinate belongs

As

will emerge below, SN
naturalness applies in the

to a unique determinable.
instance to determinables, then every determinate can
also be said to have some degree of naturalness in a derivative
way: it has that degree of
naturalness which its determinable has; it "inherits" the degree of naturalness
from its
determinable. This provides a very straightforward explanation of the above
phenomenon.
Here for ease of exposition I simplify once again by assuming that naturalness is an all-or-

So

if

first

nothing matter rather than something that comes in degrees. To restore the idea that
is a matter of degree read "perfectly natural" for "natural"
in what follows.
Notice that NSN treats determinable properties and determinate properties quite

naturalness

NSN identifies determinables with classifications. Most other
them in essentially the same way. Lewis, for instance, regards both
determinables and determinates as simply non-empty classes of particulars. One consequence
of this is that what Lewis would call determinables, turn out to be determinates (in the
abundant sense) according to NSN.
differently. In particular,

theories treat

See

e.g. his

Lewis

"New Work

for a

Theory

of Universals".

doubtful whether the theoretical roles assigned to "properties" are unified enough
to talk of what they are really like once and for all, and this is why he distinguishes an
abundant from a sparse sense of 'property'. But insofar as properties are to play the role of
being the semantic values of predicates, then he admits that we may need to distinguish
is

triangularity from trilaterality in order to account for the difference in cognitive value

between the

trivial

Trilaterality

is

'Triangularity is coextensive with triangularity' and the informative
coextensive with triangularity'. However, he is reticent about admitting that

there really are necessarily co-extensive but distinct properties in the sense of 'property'

required to explain relations of resemblance
(see Plurality, pp. 55-63).

among

particulars, the sparse sense of 'property'

2-^

Bncker argues that both ordinar>^ language and
philosophical
between a s^uctural and a non-structural conception

theon,’ require a distinction

of properties. See

Properties

P.

Bricker

The Ena/clopedm of Philosophy, (Supplement),
(London: MacMillan 1996)
It follows from the
recombination principle that no perfectly natural
property can have all
its instances drawn from a single
world, so r cannot be perfectly natural.
Nor is it clear how positing quiddities will help. Even if
r is somehow associated with
two
distinct quiddities, how would we recognize
this? We have phenomenal access only
to the
effects of these quiddities but quiddities,
being intrinsic, are only contingently connected
with
any effects they have on us. What grounds would there
then be for attributing any such
effects to two qualitative natures rather than
just one?
27 D^M. Armstrong,
/\ Theoiy of Universals, Volume //;
Universals and Scientific Realism,
p. 1 13.
There are three prima facie problems with this approach of
incorporating a metric into the
nature of a determinable. The first is that is that it would
seem to rule out a priori the
existence of unstructured determinables. But it shouldn't;
perhaps, some determinables could
be unstructured. One way to accommodate this idea would
be to allow that in such cases the
metric defines a structure on the relevant partition according
to which every cell is exactly the
same "distance" from every other. The second is that it seems to make certain
numbers
essential to the nature of properties to which they are
assigned. But this is not quite right, for
there are clearly elements of convention in which numbers
are taken to encode the structure
of certain determinables, especially those whose structure
is that of the real line. So perhaps
determinables which differ not at all in their partitions or in the type of structure
encoded by
their metrics but only conventionally should be identified. There
is not space here fora full
discussion of how merely conventional differences should be filtered out. 1
in

will

however
too

much

that this can be done.

structure, as

quantitative. This

is

discussion of

But

may

The

third

problem

well be the case

related to the second

if

is

that

sometimes

the determinable in

problem and again there is not space here for a
be an insurmountable problem. One approach

does not seem to
might be to identify determinables with certain classes of
this.

it

assume

might provide
question is ordered but not
a metric

full

classifications.

2^ Phillip Bricker points out that a

more general and elegant approach might follow the
of measurement theory and consider homeomorphisms between so-called empirical
structures and numerical structures.

lead

Because the construction being discussed is, though simple and straightforward, not very
1 am being a little non-committal about the details. In particular.
I've left open exactly
how the subscript notation works. One way to think of the subscript notation is as an
abbreviation for the ordered pair whose first member is the empty set and whose second
member is the number specified in the subscript. Thus, (}3 is <{}, 3>, {j/ is <{}, 7> etc.
And notice that since naturalness applies to entire classifications, it may be that one metric
results in a more natural classification than a distinct metric on the very same partition. Thus,
determinables <P, S, m> and <P, S, m'> may differ in naturalness despite not differing in how
elegant,

they divide particulars up into groups. Speaking loosely, we may say that some ways of
ordering are more natural than others.
^2 For similar arguments concerning particulars not distinct from us, see below section 3.7.
23

David Hume, A

Treatise of Human Nature, P.

H. Nidditch

(ed.),

(Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1978), 1.1.6.
2'^

See

Plurality, p. 86ff.

and

1.3.1, 2.1.2

and

2.2.4

above

principle.
22 Ifi however, the elements of conventionality in

for a discussion of versions of this

which metric

structure of a determinable are not filtered out (see above

distinguish these determinables. But intuitively this

is

is

fn. 28),

taken to encode the
then

SN may

be able to

not the place to look for a solution.

2^ Part of the project in this dissertation

is to demonstrate, contra Lewis, the possibility of
analyzing modality without appeal to mere possibilia. So strictly speaking discussions of
transworld identities should come only when some account has already been given of the
what other worlds and their parts are. However, the plausibility of the account of worlds and
their parts discussed below rests in part on the plausibility of SN; so SN should be

independently plausible. Indeed,

it

should be perfectly compatible with modal realism
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minus the account of properties) and it should
be possible to substitute SN for
Leu ,s's
account of properties in modal realism
without loss of plausibility I he aim is
to show n
^
that the worlds of n.odal realism
are not needed to analyze modahty
not than h^e^ ^o
such worlds^So, for simplicity, assume
that
(

I

and that modal, ,s to analyzed, a la A
I),
seems to me preferable to Lewis's class
(

Lewis's vast plurality of concrete
possibilia exist
terms of quant.fication over Ihem
SUM SN

,n

nominalism.
Condition (2) is not quite accurate, again due
to the problem of "filtering
out" (see fn 28)
But the idea IS clear. To be the same
determinates, «P,S,m>,[x],-> and «P'
S' m'> |x'|y>
must have the same determinable as their first
member. And this means that m and m'
ncode the same type of structure on the

partitions <P, S> and <P, S'> respectively
e g that
To say then that k = is to say that [x), and [,x'
|k occupy the Lme positL in
this structure. Lhough it may be
that until we haye filtered out
conventional differences k
may not be the same as But they must at least "correspond"
to the same location on the

of the rea line.

j

j.

determinable space.
According to SN, each determinate property will
cons ructed from many particulars other than
or

in general be identified with a class
those instantiating that determinate property,

entails that each has that determinate's
determinable as its first member. Moreover the
entails that the essence of a determinate
property consists in its playing a
certain classificational role. And this may arouse
the suspicion that SN's determinates are
not
really intrinsic properties at all; for whether
or not a particular instantiates one of them
depends on factors - degrees of naturalness, classificational
roles, metrical structures etc that are other than the particular itself. Perhaps
then SN is best seen as an attempt to analyze
mtrinsicahty in terms of extrinsicality. This objection,
however, is not convincing.
It

above account

The

account does entail that which set plays which property
role at which worlds is extrinsic to it.
But this does not show that a property is extrinsic to the
particulars that instantiate it. And the
account does not entail that for a particular to instantiate a
property, any other particulars
must have any particular properties or even that there must exist any
other particulars at all.
For it entails that the extensions of determinables and determinates
are contingent. So it
seems to me to capture the intuitive notion of intrinsicality.
Though these "contingent identities" no more violate the principle of the necessity
of
identity than does the fact that at some worlds the inventor
of bifocals and the first
postmaster general are the same person and at others different people. In effect,
the above
proposal amounts to (a sketch of) a counterpart theory for properties (cf. Lewis's

counterpart
theory for individuals in his "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal
Logic", journal of
Pliilosoplnj, 65 (1968), pp. 113-26).
Notice that if we assume that naturalness is a function from classifications to the
positive

reals,

isomorphic determinables and their corresponding determinates are bound

to be

equally natural.

The significance of this is that it provides a possible to reply to one strand of Lewis's
charge, to be considered in chapter six, that the popular attempt to construct possible worlds
out of sets of sentences is doomed to yield a circular analysis of modality. The argument very
roughly is this. TTie propiosed analysis is that for something to be possible is for a sentence
meaning just

some world. A world is identified with a maximal consistent
some appropriate language and truth-at is identified with membership.
But prima facie consistency is a modal notion — a set of sentences is consistent iff it is possible
for them all to be true together. Drop the consistency requirement and the worlds are not
possible worlds — some will be impossible — and the analysis gets the facts of modality
wrong. Include it and the analysis is circular because it involves a modal primitive. One
that to be true at

set of sentences of

response

adopt one of the surrogate notions of consistency familiar from the study of
These can be defined in purely syntactic or model-theoretic terms without
any modal notions. But, Lewis argues, none is sufficient to exclude all inconsistent

is

to

logical languages.

appeal to

from qualifying as worlds; it is hard to see how a set such as |'x is red all over’, 'x
oveT} can be filtered out by such means, for it is not syntactically inconsistent on

sets
all

translation into the predicate calculus.

and blue

all

over and so

if

However, SN

is

blue

entails that nothing can be red all over

correct could be built into the defining condition of a world in such

way as to exclude si|^ch troublesome sets. .And since SN
reltes on no modal pnm, lives
approach w|ould avoid reducing the proposed analysis
to circularitv. See D. K.
ewis
Pluralitx/, Chapter Three for Lewis's
argument and references; and see 6.6 below for
a
development of a version of linguistic ersatzism that
n

tins

l

incorporates this solution to the

problem.

« For instance, meaning postulates of the kind discussed by Carnap
*

^

222

ff

|R.

Carnap, M«„„i,„ „„J

(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1958)

i

Proofs of these claims are straightforward, so have
omitted them here. However for
^rposes of illustration have included a proof of (c) in the appendix.
Indeed, given the definitions of 'determinate' and
'determinable' these claims are analytic
Most authors do not even attempt to provide a solution to
this problem. One who does
'
however, is Armstrong in his A Combinatorial Theori/
of Possihilitij pp. 78-84. According to
Armstrong natural properties are to be identified with universal sui generis entities that
are constituents (in some sense) of the particulars that
instantiate them. He holds that
universals are not all distinct. In particular, determinates
of the same determinable overlap
and this overlap explains their incompatibility with one another. So
he is committed to the
view that the apparent simplicity of properties like being
5g, being Ig, being red and being
blue IS illusory: since they are incompatible, they - or at least
one of each pair - must really
^
be complex entities.
I

I

This attempt to accommodate incompatibilities
three reasons. First,

among

properties

is

objectionable for

requires positing hidden structure

where common sense or even
science may not yet have discovered any. Properties like blueness,
redness etc. do seem to
common sense to be simple. Indeed some philosophers have regarded them as
paradigmatically simple properties (See e.g. G. E. Moore, Pnncipia Ethica, (Buffalo,
NY:
Prometheus Books, 1988) p. 7ff.) And although we now have scientific analyses of colour
it

properties that reveals their complexity, science presently regards certain other
properties,
mass properties, as simple. It would be extraordinary that we know a priori that the
properties treated as simple by both common sense and science are really complex! Surely,
whether or not a certain determinate property is complex should be an empirical claim. So

e.g.

this solution is at fault since

it seems wrong for a metaphysical theory to dictate that
there
must be structure where neither common sense nor science yet suspects there is any.
Second, even if we grant the contention that of any pair of incompatible properties at
least one cannot be simple, it is unclear how this really explains the incompatibility.
Armstrong suggests the following solution (taking the properties being 5kg and being 1kg as
his paradigms). To be five kilograms is to be divisible into five non-overlapping one kilogram
parts. And "Given this, it becomes clear why the very same thing cannot be both five and one
kilogram in mass. To attempt to combine the two properties in the one thing would involve

the thing's being identical with

its proper part." But this is confusing; even if we suppose he
5kg thing has five non-overlapping parts each of which is 1kg, how does that
disqualify the whole from also being 1kg? Armstrong says that it would "involve the thing's
is

right that a

proper part". But why? A thing may consist of five non-overlapping
it being identical to any of its parts (Lewis also makes this
point. See his review of Armstrong's A Combinatorial Theoiy of Possibility in the Australasian
being identical with

red parts and

itself

its

be red without

Journal of Philosophy 70, (1992)).

Third,

be the

it is

common

charged? The most

work

its

hard to see exactly

how

this solution

can be applied generally. What could

part of the properties being positively-charged
likely

candidate

is

and being negatively-

the property of having a charge. But

how does

this

exclusionary magic?

^ For examples of attempts to formulate resemblance nominalism that

fail

to

avoid both

these evils see H. H. Price, Thinking and Experience, (London: Hutchinson, 1953) and R.

Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, (Trans. R. A. George), Routledge, 1%7), sections 6793 and 108-20. For a full account of how they fall prey to the problem see D. M. Armstrong,
Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), Chapter 5.
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^

these primitive similanh' relations
with structures - partitions
have no bound on their complexity.
And it might be
questioned whether this really represents any
epistemological gam. think it does
These can
^et-theory using only the verv limited
ideology ot SN A
mn/e
ge of primitiye similarity relations is a range
of conceptual primitives; the
more^there are
me worse the ideological parsimony of the theory.
See D. M. Armstrong, A Theoiy
of Universats: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume
ll,

ogether

^ 'th some

metric

-

that

1

oT"""

p.

See

fn.

14 aboye.

These notions are defined formally

in the

Appendix, though with one

slight variation

I

require there, for re.lsons of technical simplicity,
only that a precisification provide at least
as
me-grained a classification as that which it precisifies,
rather than a more fine-grained one
hus, eyery determinable qualifies as a
precisification of itself.
It may also useful to introduce
the notion of a "taxonomy". Consider the
seyencolour determinable, the intermediate determinable
and the infinitely-many
I

specific

hue

determinable. Roughly, these can be thought of as forming
a three-membered series of
c assi ications of increasing precision. But
clearly the idea generalizes: there could be
series of
classifications containing any number of members
such that each is a precisification of its
predecessor. A taxonomy is the entire chain from the most
precise classification whose
determinates are maximally specific to the least precise
classification whose determinates are
highly disjunctiye. More precisely, x is a taxonomy =df.
x is a sequence of classifications such
that each is a precisification of its predecessor in
the sequence.
Phillip Bricker has suggested that perhaps logical
relations among determinables really
only arise with respect to complex particulars. In which case the
partial
classification

response would seem to be the best approach here.
Though the null determinate will have to be distinguished from a zeroth determinate
being Og in mass) when there is one.

(e.g.

52

The structural nominalist may be tempted to reply as follows. According to SN, each
determinate does have its unique location in the determinate-space defined by
its
determinable s metric — just why is this location ineligible to be its quiddity, its unique
essence? After all, it is far from clear exactly what it is for something to "constitute"
a

particular s redness. In particular,

it is

unclear that

we

are well

enough acquainted with

set-

theoretical relations to know that these "locations" couldn't play this "constitutional"
role.
5^ In Nominalism and Realism,
(pp. 36-7) D. M. Armstrong raises essentially this objection to
any theory of properties that identifies them with sets of some kind.
5'!

Although colours are not good candidates

for being physically

fundamental (i.e. perfectly
which we can claim
phenomenological access. If the phenomenological objection cannot be made to stick by
considering colours, it seems unlikely to succeed with respect to any other properties. We
cannot plausibly claim phenomenological access to the essences of the perfectly natural or
physically fundamental properties such as charge, mass and so on. For these properties, the
structural nominalist would may rely on the arguments of section 3.4 to show that there is no
need to posit quiddities.
natural properties), they are

SN

55 In stating

below chapt.

I

among

the best candidates for properties for

quantify over worlds, but these can,

I

believe, be logically constructed (see

six).

When a determinable is quantitative perhaps a precisification should preserve more than
simply the structure of the metric of that which it precisifies. Perhaps it should also preserve
various quantificational features. Quite how this should be done depends on the solution to
the problem of filtering out conventional differences (see fn. 28).
52 Here again simplify by assuming a hard-and-fast division of partial classifications of
56

I

particulars into the natural

and

the non-natural.

I

assume

that the theory could be easily

refined (and complicated) to allow naturalness to be a property that comes in degrees.
5^ (A6j simply identifies a paradigm with an instance, and so, in a sense, provides a trivial

stand-in for

what we usually think of as

a full-blooded paradigm.

The point

of including

it

is

127

merely to show how SN can dispense
with the need
mstances (see section 3.5).

Cond.t.on

(2) is not

quite accurate, again

due

for identiK ing

to the

-

problem

paradigmatic "
” "super pind.Pm^t

ol "filtering out" (see
fn. 37).

CHAPTER 4

STRUCTURAL NOMINALISM II: ALIENS, RELATIONS

AND NON-BASIC

PROPERTIES

In chapter six

I

will discuss

how SN may

be exploited in developing a

metaphysical theory that attempts to analyze
modality in wholly actualist terms.

The principal aim

of this chapter

is

to discuss certain aspects of

relevant to this project. In section 4.1

about so-called
cover basic

1

will briefly explore

'alien" properties. In 4.2,

relations as

1

discuss

that are

SN has to say

how it might be extended

well as basic intrinsic properties. In section 4.3

how SN might be extended
final section, 4.4,

1

what

SN

briefly

to

I

to

discuss

cover non-basic properties and relations. In the

summarize

SN and indicate its relevance to the analysis

of modalitv.

4.1

Alien Properties
In 1.3.1

1

argued that any adequate metaphysical theory of modality

should accommodate the intuition that there might have been more
instantiated
properties than there actually are, that the properties that are actually
instantiated are only

some of all

suppose, for instance, that

the possible properties. Bricker asks us to

among

the properties that are not actually instantiated

are

kinds of uniformly dense matter, and suppose that the two kinds of
matter have all of their quahtative properties in common. However, they
...two

are distinguished relative to one another by the fact that matter of
different kinds mutually attracts, matter of the same kind mutually repels.
Call one of the kinds of matter p-matter and the other kind ^-matter.

Consider the possibility that there
matter,

and the

matter.

I

exists

nothing but a single cube of

p-

possibility that there exists nothing but a single cube of n

claim that these are distinct

possibilities... to

deny

it

would be

to

-

129
hold...that u-e

contain.

[And

cannot specify other ^vorlds by stipulating
xvhat kinds they
^
this] is

strongly at variance ^vith

modal

intuitions.'

This sort of example poses a problem
for actualist theories of modality:

hou'

is

the actualist to construct different
worlds to represent the possibility of

there being just the single cube of ii-matter
the single cube of p-matter. For the

cube

is

two

and

possibilities differ only in

made of n-matter or p-matter and both

include only those properties that actually

to represent them.^

problem

I

two

these

will discuss

to the actualist

who subscribes

to

I

whose

exist.

So

it

ontological resources

seems

that the actualist

properties, or at least construct something

some

in 6.53, ^^t in this section

whether the

of these properties are alien to the

actual world. Yet actuaUst theories are
theories

must somehow “construct"

the possibility of there being just

ways

alternative

respond

to this

examine the resources available

will briefly

SN. Does

to

SN provide the actualist with the

resources to construct the property of being n-matter and the
property of being p-

matter in actualist terms?

4.1.1

Three Wavs for a Property

to

be Alien

Let us call properties that are not, but might have been, instantiated
“alien" properties. 4

world

ways

iff it is

in

And, more generally,

not instantiated at that world.

which a property might be

Intuitively,

some

for a property to

property that

is

compounded

are instantiated there.

mass of

us say that a property

It is

alien to a

helpful also to distinguish three

be alien

some

to a

sense,

world

is

“compounds"

for

it

to

of others.

be a compoimd

not instantiated there even though the properties from which

lO^O kg, for instance,

is,

The property

intuitively, a

of being both gold

compound

being gold and the property of having a mass of lO^^

some

is

alien to a world.

properties are, in

And one way

a

let

things are gold

and some things have a mass

it is

and having

of the property of
the actual world

of lO^O kg but there

is

nothing

that instantiates botli properties;
there

So the compound

is

,ust not that

propertv- of being both gold

exemplifies the hrst

way

Intuitively, there are

gold in the universe.

and having a mass

which a property may be

in

much

of 1050 kg

alien to the actual ivorld.

worlds that contain instances of some but
not

all

determinates of certain determinables. These
"missing determinates" are then
alien to those worlds.

world. Again,

way.

it

And

seems

this is a

some

that

way

second

for a property to be alien to a

properties are alien to the actual world in
this

Many determinate colours are actually

perhaps Hume's missing shade of blue

magnitude determinates ~ masses,

instantiated, for instance, although

not.

is

And

clearly

lengths, durations etc.

many

physical

--

remain forever

will

uninstantiated.

There

is

no guarantee

that these missing determinates can be assimilated

to the hrst sort of alien property, the alien

compounds. For

intuitively, the

missing determinates might be simple properties, properties
not compounded of
other properties.^ After

all,

there are

sense presently treat as simple.

And

many
it

properties that science and

would be high-handed

metaphysician to declare a priori that both the
are

wrong about

then

it

seems

this.

that

some

is

of

them might be

seem

and the ordinary person

scientist

special in the relevant

simple properties that are alien

perhaps

at

alien to the actual world.

to entail its necessary instantiation

unacceptable sort of parochialism.

Finally,

for the

And if it is possible for there to be simple properties at all,

of a property does not
the actual world

common

way would be

Maybe

and

to

simplicity

hold that

to subscribe to

an

the missing masses, for instance, are

to the actual

some worlds

The

world.

there are also uninstantiated (simple)

determinates belonging to a determinable none of whose determinates are
instantiated there.

determinables

—

It

seems

that

electrons have

some

particulars

no colour,

do not fall under certain

for instance,

and Cartesian egos have

no mass. And surely there might have been nothing but

electrons, or nothing but

Cartesian egos.
principle.'-

To deny

this

ivould be to

reject,

unacceptably, the recombination

At such electron-only worlds and Cartesian
ego-only worlds no

determinate colours and no determinate
masses respectively are instantiated. The
entire colour or mass determinable
is missing at such worlds.
And once again, if
it IS

possible for there to be such "missing
determinaWcs" at

must accept

that

some determinables

some

worlds,

we

are missing at the actual world on
pain of

parochialism/

4.1.2

Actualism and P roperties that are Alien in the

First

Properties that alien to the actual world in the

umnstantiated

compound

instantiated properties

-

properties that are

raise

no

first

way —

actually

composed from actuaUy

real obstacle to actualist theories of modality,

regardless of whether such theories incorporate SN. For

composed from

Way

if

these properties are

actually existing properties, they can be constructed by
any

theory that has the resources to construct properties by
composition from others.

Indeed, Bricker's examples of p-matter and n-matter are not to be
thought of as
alien to the actual

world in

this

way. For p-matter and ^-matter are stipulated

be qualitatively indiscernible. So
properties, they

4.1.3

if

they are both

would presumably be

the same

compounds

sunple properties?
difficult

construct

If

of actually existing

compound.

Actualism and Properties that are Alien in the Second

But why should some alien properties,

to

e.g.

Wav

w-matter and p-matter, not be

they are, then actualist theories of modality face a more

problem: because they are alien properties, the actualist must somehow

them from

actual materials; but

can they be constructed

at aU.

As we

if

they are simple,

it is

not obvious

how

will see in chapter six, actualist theories that

accept traditional accounts of properties (as Forms, universals or tropes, and so
on, each of

which

is

supposed

to possess its

own

unique nature or quiddity) have

great difficult)’ here.

And

this is ivhere S.\

can offer the actualist some

real help.

For according to SN, the resources of
the property of naturalness and
set-theory
alone, resources both available at
the actual ivorld, are suffiaent to
construct any

actually alien property, even those
that are simple.

To recap
where P
P,

and

briefly,

some subset

is

SN identifies a determinable with a
of the set of particulars, S

is

triple <P, S,

some equivalence

m>

relation

on

m defines some metric on the equivalence classes induced by S on P

(together with the

«P, S, m>,
member,
indicate

[u]x>

[u]x, is

its

empty

set).

where the

And

first

it

identifies determinate properties with
pairs,

member is

a determinable and the second

one of the equivalence classes or the empty

set,

indexed to

position in the space defined by the metric. According
to

SN the

essence of a determinable consists in tw^o things:
the sort of classificational

structure (as encoded

how natural

by m)

that

this classification

is.

it

imposes on the particulars of

Thus determinable

determinable as determinable ET at world v/

naturalness and the

same

iff

its

world, and

D at world w is the same

\y has the same degree of

metrical structure as D.

And

the essence of a

determinate also consists in two things: the identity of the determinable
it

belongs, and a particular location

on

to

which

the "determinable space" as defined by

the determinable's metric. In particular, the essence of a determinate does not
consist in
at

world

[u]x>

extension or in any unique qualitative nature. Thus, determinate d

its

w

is

the

same determinate as determinate

<\y [v]y> such
,

that

determinable as D' and x =

d = <D,

[u]x>, d'

some "matter-determinable"

instantiated.

= <D',

iff

there are pairs <D,

[v]y>,

D is the same

y.

Bricker does not intend n-matter
of

w'

d' at

at least

and p-matter

to

be missing determinates

one of whose determinates

So he does not intend M-matter and p-matter

alien in the second sense. For "matter"

is

to

is

actually

be thought of as

not really a scientifically discoverable

determinable

Rather

at all.

it is

just

an ordmarv- concept intended

whatever physical objects are actually composed

And

of.

to

apply

probably to

it is

to

distort,

or at least to go beyond, our ordinary
thinking to suppose that there actually

is

such a matter-determinable.

SN is

However,

intended to cover ordinary properties as
well as

or fundamental properties.

And

it

entails that roery property'

determinable or a determinate that

SN entails

that matter

must be

falls

under some determinable.

it is

either a

In particular,

either a determinable or a determinate,

ordinary language leaves unsettled which
Bricker's intentions,

must be

instructive to see

is

the case. So even

what

if

scientific

even

if

this contrary to

SN has to say about ii-matter and

p-matter supposing them to be aliens in the second
way: determinates of some
hypothetical matter-determinable one of

whose

deterrninates

is

instantiated (by the physical objects of the actual world).
After

way

natural

to give content to the idea that w-matter

actually

all,

this is a fairly

and p-matter are "kinds

of

matter".

As we saw

in the previous chapter,

actually missing determinates.

They are

the determinable space, pairs of the

a determinable

second

some

member is

of

the

SN entails

identified with the

form

«P, S, m>,

whose determinates

empty

set

indexed

determinable space defined by m.

the actual existence of a//

{

}x>

"empty

locations" on

whose first member

are actually instantiated

is

and whose

to indicate its location in the

And it distinguishes among missing

determinates by their different locations in the determinable space. Moreover,

S\

contains nothing to rule out the possibility that such missing determinates are

simple properties.

So according

M, m>, where
and
is

M

is

to

SN, the putative matter determinable would be a

the matter-similarity relation

(is

the

same kind

triple <P,

of matter as)

m defines the matter-determinable space. Perhaps, the actual kind of matter

«P, M, m>,

{}i>,

^-matter

is

«P, M, m>,

{}i7>,

and p-matter is

«P, M, m>.

1.-S4

Il29>.

Thus,

S\ provides

the .actualist tvith the resources
to construct d.stmct

matter and p-matter cube-avorlds even

if

,,-matter

and ,, -matter are

,,-

alien simple

properties, as long as they are really
"types of matter", actually missing

determinates of the matter determinable.

j.1.4

Actualism and P r operties that are Alien in the
Third VVay

But suppose

finally that the

property of being n-matter and the property of

being p-matter are alien to the actual world in
the most radical way: they are

determinates belonging to determinables none of
whose determinates

Can SN provide

instantiated.

The axioms
form,

<{}, S,

to

them

triples therefore all necessarily,

SN, these

actually

in this case?

of pure set-theory alone entail the existence of

m>. These

And, according

the resources to construct

is

and so

all triples

of the

actually, exist.

triples qualify as sparse determinables.

However,

they constitute a kind of limiting case; for the subset of
particulars that
constitutes the first element in such a determinable

redundant). Such determinables are, in
take the

empty

set for

effect,

is

the

empty

mere geometrical

set (and

S

is

structures (that

each of their points).^

These bare structures" seem
determinables. But there

is

to

be the obvious candidates for the missing

a problem with this suggestion.

SN

tells

us that the

essence of a determinable consists the sort of classificational structure (as

encoded by

its

metric) that

natural this classification
particulars at

all

it

is.

and there

imposes on the particulars of

its

But these bare structures do not

is

no obvious sense

in

which any

world and how

classify
is

any

more or less

natural than any other.

However, although these missing determinables (and

do not actually

exist, if

which they can be

SN is true,

constructed.

actually exist, and, since

some

For

their determinates)

then the actualist does have the materials from
all

the possible bare structures

<{}, S,

m>

actually existing determinables are natural, the

propert>^ of naturalness actually
exists too. But according to

such a determinable consists only
naturalness. So

in a certain structure

the actualist has the resources to

if

SX

and the

the essence of
propert>' of

combine naturalness with any

possible structure, she can construct any
possible sparse determinable (and so
of

course

its

determinates).

In short, the actualist
to construct

who subscnbes

any determinable, even those

to

that

SN has all

the materials necessary

do not actually

exist,

and

all their

determinates.

There

are,

however, several possible ways of interpreting the claim
that

matter and p-matter might belong

SN provides

missing determinables.

the actuahst with sufficient resources to

intuitions Bricker appeals to these
First,

to

need

And

do justice

to see

n-

whether

to the the sort of

be considered separately.

to

consider the possibility that ^-matter and p-matter are distinct

determinates of the same missing determinable. Then they have to occupy
distinct
positions in their determinable-space as defined by the metric. Since

construct this missing determinable and

on it,

it

it

can distinguish the various positions

can provide for the difference between these two properties.

actualist theory that incorporates

SN can

SN can provide

And an

the requisite distinct cube

worlds.

Notice however that SN constructs the relevant missing determinable
entirely

from mathematical materials - the bare structures

<{}, S,

m>. And

it

distinguishes the n-matter and p-matter determinates in entirely mathematical

terms

where

~

they are identified with pairs «{},

the subscripts

n and p

S,

m>,

(}n>

and «{},

S,

m>,

(}p>

indicate the (different) locations of n-matter

matter respectively on the missing determinable

<{}, S,

m>.

In effect, the

and

p-

two

types of matter are distinguished only by the numbers assigned as subscripts.

And

although

this

provides for enough different sets to be the alien properties,

it

may

be argued that

the one hand,

it

provides only an "irrelevant
multiplicih'" of such

we have

the alien properties that need
to be distinguished;

we have different pure sets

other,

But what makes «{},
than the other

S,

m>,

way round?

to play the role of

{}„> ^-matter

Clearly, the

and «{),

in the

way) and

will

it

be able

S,

m>,

problem generalizes:

SN uill

need

distinguished. Rather, each of the

many

many

many

alien properties that

sets is

it

need

may seem

well identify the alien properties with ordinal
numbers!

And

(in the

many
to

ambiguous with respect

properties that need to be recognized. Indeed,

to

sets, differing

numerical indices assigned to their second
members. But the

not tied-up unambiguously with the

the

(}p> p-matter rather

provide infinitely-many pure

to

on

being these alien properties.

provide for infinitely-many properties that
are alien to the actual world
third

On

sets.

this

that

only

sets are

be
to the

SN may as

cannot be

right.

SN provides enough differences but these are not relevant differences.!!
However,

this objection will

thing, the indices are not there

properties.

They do some

real

not worry the structural nominalist. For one

merely

to

provide for the required multiplicity of

work. For collectively they encode the internal

structure of the relevant determinable; they provide for the relations
of similarity

among

the various determinates of the missing determinable

instance,

And

whether w-matter

these relations

among

is

more

similar to p-matter than

-

they

it is to,

tell

us, for

say, s-matte.

determinates of the same determinable really are

partly constitutive of their essences (or so

I

argued in the previous chapter).

SN

does not provide for a mere multiplicity. For another thing, the objection ignores
the fact that each determinable

degree of naturalness. And, as
determinable

is

exhausted

by

and
I

its

its

determinates must also be assigned some

also ai^ued in chapter three, the essence of a

internal structure

and

its

and the essence of a determinate

is

and the position

determinable's space.

{}n>

it

occupies in

n-matter and «{},

S,

m>,

its

degree of naturalness;

exhausted by the determinable

it

belongs to

What makes «{},

{}p> p-matter rather than the other

S,

way round

m>,
is

that the

m

former occupies a certain location
on the determinable space defined
by
and the latter occupies a different location.
So it is
unclear that the ordinal

numbers

if

properties!

assigned a degree of naturalness,
really would be ineligible to
be the

The

structural nominalist will maintain,
in short, that the differences

SN provides are relevant and

that there are

no hirther relevant differences

it

fails

to provide. '2

Next, consider the possibility that ^-matter
and p-matter are determinates

drawn from distinct missing

determinables.t3 in this case

would be wrong

it

think of them as incompatible, and probably
misleading to
matter. But again nothing in our

modal

intuitions

seems

them types

call

to rule

to

of

out the

possibility of cube- worlds of this kind.

Now,

different determinables

of naturalness,

and

differ in either

way, then

the actualist

if

may differ in their structure or their degree

the determinables to

which p-matter and ^-matter belong

SN can provide distinct constructions

who adopts SN can construct distinct worlds

possibility that there

for them.

Hence,

to represent the

be just a single ^-matter cube and the possibility that there

be just a single p-matter cube.t4

But perhaps w-matter and p-matter are simple properties that belong

empty though

distinct determinables

which do not differ at all

structure or their degree of naturalness.

seems that SN

Now,

to

in this case

it is

in just this

one

case,

it

who subscribes

will hold that properties

suggested that

may be identical

this is

to

SN will

possibilities.

unclear whether these possibilities really should

be distinguished. In the previous chapter

I

actualist

provide only a single world to represent both

However,

And

and

in either their

will not enable the actualist to distinguish the n-matter cube- world

from the p-matter cube-world. And even the
be able

finally,

to

I

argued that the structural nominalist

at

some worlds but distinct at

indeed a plausible position. So she

others.

will allow that at

some worlds

the property of being

composed of «-matter and

the properU- of

being composed of p-matter are one and
the same property, even though
others they are distinct. Whether or
not this

laws of the worlds

in question.

And

is

so

at the veiy

is

at

a matter of the (contingent)

simple single cube-world(s)

described by Bricker, this seems extremely
likely to be the case. The structural
nominalist can bite the bullet here.

Does

this violate Bricker's intuition
that

we be able

worlds by stipulating what kinds they contain"?
stipulate that there

dense

iz-matter.

is

And

to “specify other

SN does not deny

that

we

can

a world containing nothing but a single
cube of uniformly

it

does not deny that

we can stipulate

that there

is

a world

containing nothing but a single cube of uniformly
dense p-matter. The only
relevant constraint

can stipulate the

SN places on what we can stipulate is

distinctness of these worlds.

these properties are the

world.

And

throughout

supervene on

its

same

at a

that

it

a matter of the laws of that

is

we have been assuming

that the laws of a

world

distribution of local qualitative matters of fact. This

we cannot stipulate

the laws of the

world and

we

SN whether or not

For according to

given world

denies that

its

means

that

distribution of local qualitative

matters of fact independently of each other on pain of incoherence.

We cannot

stipulate the non-identity of

an n-matter cube-world and a p-matter cube world

that are otherwise identical

any more than we can

world that

is

qualitatively identical to the actual

molecular motion are

stipulate the existence of a

world but

at

which heat and

distinct.

We can of course consider more complicated worlds that contain an nmatter cube or a p-matter cube. But to

show

that there are distinct possibilities

here, these

worlds must be described in such a way

that the lawful identification

of M-matter

and p-matter is ruled out and yet which

are

the actualist.

And

it is

far

from clear

how

this

still

indistinguishable by

could be done.^^
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I

conclude then that

SN

does indeed provide the actualist with

resources to construct the alien properties
required for her to

sufficient

do justice

to

our

intuitions about the various possibilities
involving them.

4.2 Basic Relarions

The version of SN outlined
properties.
relations

However, a

among

particulars.

In extending

methodology as

SN

It is

among
to

a theory of intrinsic

is

adequate of modality must also take into account

fully

characterizes relations

in the previous chapter

the task of this section to extend

SN so that it also

particulars.

cover relations

will

I

adopt the same general

before. First, identify the role that relations play in
our thought

and language. This involves characterizing

the logical relations

Then, using only elements drawn from the

official

among

them.

ontology and ideology,

construct entities suited to play this role.
I

First, I

to say

will also

adopt

parallel restrictions to those

attempt to extend

SN

to characterize

only

adopted in chapter

intrinsic relations;

it

three.

has nothing

about the nature of extrinsic relations (other than that they are not

intrinsic).^^

Second,

it

aims

to characterize

the sense that there are "just

enough

redundancy". This restriction

is

relations (e.g. being both four feet

by simple

Finally,

objects

SN aims

them

supposed

relations (e.g. being either four feet

the theory.

of

only those properties that are basic in
to characterize things

without

to exclude, for instance, disjunctive

from or the same colour as) and conjunctive

from and the same colour

as)

from the scope of

to characterize only those relations that

whether or not they could also be had by complex

excludes, for instance, the relations of having the

same area

vacuous case) and the relation of being the same height
again suppress reference to these restrictions;
'intrinsic, basic relation that

I

as.

can be had

objects. This

as (except in the

In

what follows

will use 'relation' to

could be instantiated by simple

mean

particulars'.

I

shall

140

The Co nceptual Role

4.2.1

The conceptual

We say e.g.

of Relations

role of relations parallels that of
intrinsic properhes.

that there

some relahon

is

Leopold and Wolfgang, or that an individual

way

eternal recurrence shares

that Jakob
at

each epoch in a world of hvo-

relations with

all its

- apparent quantiHcahons over relations.
So in

and Daniel share with

counterparts at every other

its

the absence of

some existentially

innocent paraphrases of such expressions, an
adequate theory of relations ought
to

provide enhties

that

to

name and

quantify over. Relations are also required to be

which explains what certain pairs (and

common when they are said
the pairs <Jakob,

to

triples,

quadruples

be similar in some respect.

Damel> and <Leopold, Wolfgang>

etc.)

have

in

When we say e.g. that

are similar,

we mean they

are similar in virtue o/instantiating the fatherhood relation.
Relations also stand in various logical relations.
instantiate

some determinate

relation determinable.

what

relation

Though in

must

and y are two

fall

feet apart,

it

it

was

seems

it is

determinable, though there

it

is

and y are spatially connected,
two

feet apart, or

...

Third,

no

must

at least that they are fall

no

instantiate

if

some determinate

for instance, then they

must be one

particulars can instantiate

determinate relation from any relation determinable
feet apart

must

if,

for

falls

under

of that
instantiate:

if

foot apart, or

more than one

(at the

and two

But

imder the

something

particular determinate they

can be (simultaneously) both three

that

perhaps not so clear

in the case of properties.

being-some-distance-in-feet-apart determinable. Second,
a relation determinable, then

any particulars

under the corresponding

the case of relations,

the relevant determinables are as

instance, x

also

First,

same

time): nothing

feet apart, for instance.

x
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4.2.2

Constructing Relations

The guiding Idea

is

very straightforward. Relations

among

Identified with intrinsic properties
of 'tuples of particulars.
for instance,

is

A two-place relation,

treated as an intrinsic property of
a pair of particulars, a three-

is

place relation as an intrinsic property
of a
saying, as

particulars are

usual, that e.g. x stands in relation

y> instantiates R

to

emphasize

this.

Indeed,

place relation and that for any particular

and so on. And instead

triple,

x,

R

we

if

to y,

will

1

simply say that <x,

allow that a property

the one-tuple

<x> =

x

is

classification

I

the set of particulars, S

is

is

a

1.

wiU merely outline the key

a determinable property with

of particulars. This

a one-

In

simply a generalization of the account of

properties of the previous chapter. So here

SN identifies

is

itself, this

account subsumes the previous account as the
special case where n =
essence then SN's account of relations

of

triple,

some equivalence

<P,

S,

what

I

called a "partial

m>, where P

relation

on

P,

steps.

and

is

some

subset of

m defines some

metric on the equivalence classes induced by S on

P

together with the

The key step

is

to generalize the notion of a

in generalizing

SN

to

cover relations

empty

set.

partial classification of particulars to a partial classification of 'tuples
of

particulars.

each

n, the

But relations come in

many

and so we

first

define for

notion of a partial ^-classification of particulars, corresponding to

each possible relational polyadicity,

[Dl]

polyadicities

For each

n,

a triple

n:^^

<PA S, m> is a partial

n-classification of particulars

=df.
(1) P*^ is
(2)

S

(3)

m

is

a subset of the set of

is

some

metrical structure

P^ together with the empty

And we collect these

all

n- tuples of particulars.

an equivalence relation that

together:

on

set.i^

is total

on P”

(its field is P").

the partition induced by S

on
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|D2]

[D3]

For each

n, Db" =df. the smallest set that
includes
classifications of n-tuples of particulars.

Db =df.

the union of

Db" for

natural partial n-

all

all n.

Next, just as the original partial classifications
were identified with the

abundant

intrinsic properties,

identified with the

[LCla]

so the partial n-classifications of particulars
are

abundant n-place

relations:

R is a determinable relation
R is a member of Db.

in the

abundant sense of

'relation'

iff

And just as intrinsic property determinates are identified
determinable and one of the

cells

on the

partition induced

with pairs of a

by S on pn so too with

the relation determinates:

[D4]

For each

n,

Dt" =df. the

set of pairs

m> is a member of Db>^ and
[D5]

[LC2a]

[x]s is

«pn,

S,

m>,

[x]s>

the set containing

such that <P«,

all

S,

and only those

n-tuples of particulars such that ySx.
y
Dt =df. the union of
for all n.

R is

a determinate relation in the abundant sense of 'relation'

R

a

is

iff

member of Dt.

Having defined the abundant

relation determinables

and determinates, we

define the sparse relation determinables and determinates by simply selecting

out that small minority that are natural:^^

[LCls]

R is
is

[LC2s]

a

a determinable relation in the sparse sense of 'relation'

member of Db and R

iff

R

is natural?-^

R is a determinate relation in the sparse sense of 'relation' iff R is
a member of Dt and R's first member is a determinable in the
sparse sense of 'relation'.

The

rest of the theorr-

simply repeats the corresponding
parts of the theory

of intrinsic properties of chapter three
with the appropriate substitutions
('relation' for 'property', etc.).

The above account
and (non-modal ideology)

of relations clearly utilizes the

among

entails that

relations exactly parallel those

it

too

intrinsic properties.

It

every determinate relation belongs to some
relation determinable,

every n-determinable under which
they are determinates

draum from

4.3 Intrinsic Properties of

SN identifies
m>,

And

also entails that the logical

It

among

that every n-tuple of particulars instantiates
exactly

S,

actualist ontology

as the account of intrinsic properties.

presupposes only the axioms of impure set-theory.
relations

same

it

falls

the

Complex

and

one determinate

that relations are incompatible

iff

same determinable .22

Particulars

the determinate properties of simple particulars with pairs

[u]x> consisting of a determinable <P, S,

equivalence classes,

relation of

[u]x,

induced by S on

space defined by the metric. In

this

P,

indexed

construction

P

is

m> together with one of the
to indicate its position in the

some subset

of the set of

sunple particulars. So the account covers only the intrinsic properties of simple
particulars.

But obviously complex

intrinsic properties

show how

4.3.1

and stand

to extend

entities,

in various relations. In this section

I

will attempt to

SN to cover the intrinsic properties of complex particulars.^^

Supervenience and the Properties of Complex Particulars
Intuitively, the intrinsic properties of

the

those having proper parts, also have

same treatment as

very surprising

if

complex particulars should receive

the intrinsic properties of simple particulars.

intrinsic properties

depending on whether they are

were of

tu^o

It

would be

fundamentally different sorts

intrinsic properties of

atoms or

intrinsic
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properties of complexes. So the most
natural

ivaj- to

intrinsic properties of

to

classifications,

X

cover the

expand the previous account

its cells

of
too.

as follows:

a partial classification of c-particulars =df. x

is

to

us introduce the notion of a parhal
n-classification of c-particuian

"complex") and one of

[Die]

is

SX

determinables and determinates to cover
complex particulars

First, let

(for

complex particulars

extend

is

triple <P, S,

m> such

that:
(1)

P

is

S

is

some subset

of the set of

all

actual complex particulars.

any equivalence relation that is total on P.
m
is
any metric defined on the partition induced by S on P
(3)
together with the empty set.
(2)

[^2c]

[xjs is

a

cell

of

[x]s is the set

some

partial classification of c-particulars <P, S,

containing

that

ySx

The

rest of the definitions

would follow
complex

for

the

m> =df.

and only those complex particulars such
y
some complex particular x (or the empty set).
all

same pattern

particulars.

-

intrinsic nature, duplication, similarity etc.

-

as before, so that they too can be applied to

A sparse c-determinable, for instance, would be identified

with a natural partial classification of c-particulars, and a sparse determinate with
a sparse determinate together with one of

However, there
something

is

is

a complication with this approach. Intuitively,

the fusion of certain parts, then

the intrinsic properties of

us

call this

its

parts

and

arranged; given their arrangement
it

has the colour

colours,

it

its

the relations in

it

it

it

which they

does because of the way

has to have

this

And

Intuitively, the intrinsic properties

this

seems

to

its

on

stand.^4^5 pet

its

My

parts are

shape rather than any

does because of the colours of

couldn't but be grey.

if

intrinsic properties supervene

the Principle of the Supervenience of Composition [PSCj.

computer, for instance, has the shape

And

its cells.

other.

parts; given their

be true quite generally.

otany complex particular supervene on the

US
intrinsic properties of its parts

generally,

how

and hmv these

parts are arranged

(or,

more

they are externally related). So any
adequate theory of properties

should guarantee these relations of supervenience.

In particular,

S\ should

guarantee these relations.
Notice however that supervenience
it is

impossible for there to

simply added

to

is

a modal notion: x supervenes on
y

be a change in x without a change in

SN as an axiom, SN could

So

if

[PSC] were

not be incorporated into any

metaphysical theory that aims to analyze modality on pain
of

4.3.2

y.

iff

circularity.

A Non-Modal Characterization of Supervenience
Fortunately the content of the principle can be expressed in terms
of

duplication
parts.26

if

we assume

The idea

is

must
is

if

particulars can be

parts

its

any two complex

and the

decomposed
complex

relations in

properties of

computer

parts

its

is

is

that

composed and

duplicates the arrangement of
instantiate all

and only those

The first

step

is

atomic

to

my

to duplicate

it

for

o'

any

for

that

what

each of the parts from which

arrange these duplicates in a

way

that

computer's parts, then the result would

intrinsic properties instantiated

are part-duplicates =df. there

x, if

duplicate of
(ii)

seems

then they

my computer supervene on the

by

is

a

1:1

my computer.^^

function

any of the atomic parts of o' such
an atomic part of o, then f(x) is a

of the atomic parts of o to
(i)

level,

in the

to define 'part-duplication':

[DIO] Particulars o and

any

were

if I

supervene on

which they stand

entities are duplicates at the

that the intrinsic properties of

into atomic

entity

also be duplicates at the macroscopic level. For instance,

meant by saying

my

all

that the intrinsic properties of a

the intrinsic properties of

sense that

that

any

<xi,...,Xn>,

x;

x

is

from

that:

and

relation
if

f

and any n-tuple

R"(xi,...,Xn),

then

of the atomic parts of o,

R'Xf(xi),...,f(x,0) also.

Thus

t;vo

complex particulars qualify

as part-duplicates

iff

their

atomic parts are duplicates and these atomic
parts are related

to

corresponding

each other

in the

same way
With

[PSC]

If

this in

hand we can express

the supervenience of composition as:

any hvo complex particulars are part-duplicates, then
they are
by all intrinsic property c-determinables, i.e. they are

classified alike

intrinsic duplicates.

Since

SN analyzes all

property c-determinable

an axiom

to

the terms involved in [PSC']

etc.

—

in

-

'part-duplicate',

wholly non-modal terms,

it

SN without introducing any modal elements into

can introduce the

new

classifications for

complex

can be added as
the theory. Naa^

particulars. Thus,

we

SN is

straightforu'ardly extended to cover the intrinsic properties of complex
particulars with the guarantee that their properties supervene

properties of

4.3.3

The

and

among

why should

was developed
set-theory.

And

in

[PSC'j be

why

thaP s

it

and Mereology

added

such a way that

intrinsic

their parts.

Principle of Supervenience

But

among

relations

on the

its

as

an axiom? In the previous chapter, SN

axioms include only the axioms of impure

can claim to have explained the logical relations

properties: given the constructions, these relations are simply logical

consequences of axioms

to

which we have an antecedent commitment. But

cover the intrinsic properties of complex particulars,

axiom, [PSC'j, and

this is

to

SN now needs an additional

not reducible to impure set-theory. So

it

seems

that

has failed to explain the properties of complex particulars as adequately as

S\

it

explained those of simple particulars.
It is

seems

to

true that [PSC'] has a different status from the rest of the theor\'. But

me

that this

is

because

it

has to do with mereology quite as

much as

it

it

14

has to do with the nature of properties
and relations. .And mereological truths
like set-theoretical truths are

being presupposed by the theory.

attempt to explain them any more than
theory. In fact, [PSC’I
traditional,
parts.^t
IS

presumably

us that part of what

that the properties of a fusion
parts, that

its

are

its

once the

set-

it

means

is

"nothing over and above"

to say that a fusion "just is"

do not vary independently of

its

parts

its

the properties of

intrinsic properties of the parts of a particular
are fixed, so

the idea that a fusion

If

an axiom and thereby
is

nothing over and above

its

parts

not

is

And some will want to rqect it and maybe

show how SN can be developed

expresses the disputed intuition. So

included

is

they are right, then [PSC] can simply be dropped from
SN.

included [PSC'] only to

4.4

that a fusion

obscure but highly controversial.

even [PSC].

as

attempts to explain the truths of

it

intrinsic properties.

Of course,
just

not

articulates part of the intuition behind
the

though obscure, slogan

It tells

S\ does

in such a

SN is not to be criticized

failing to explain

it.^^

way

I

that

have

it

for including [PSC'j

Whether or not

it

should be

a controversy for mereology.

SN and the Analysis of Modality
Before

moving on

modality a brief

summary

structural nominalism,

The ideology
and

logic

but not

and

chapters,

consists only of the basic notions of set-theory, mereology

is

which applies

to

some

defined.

consists only of actual particulars

set-theoretical constructions
is

two

may be helpful.

Every other notion

The ontology

This

of the account proposed in the last

the single conceptual primitive, naturalness,

all sets.

atoms and

to a consideration of further attempts to analyze

and atoms, fusions

from these atoms and

a very parsimonious ontology. In particular,

it

of such

their fusions.

does not include

properties and relations as basic sui generis entities of any kind. The principal

148

task of chapter three \vas to argue for
a

view of intnnsic properties

of the

mereological atoms as set-theoretic constructions
of a certain kind from these

atoms. In

this

atoms and

way

that

chapter the account was extended to cover
relations

intrinsic properties of

makes

it

clear

and

relations

how we can avoid

among complex

among

entities in

these

such a

violations of the principle of the

supervenience of composition.

The relevance

of this account to the analysis of modality will
fully

only in what follows, but a brief preview

is

emerge

helpful here.

Lewis has argued that the metaphysician

who attempts

to analyze

modality on a purely actualist basis cannot succeed. For any
proposed analysis of

modality

when worked
some modal

implicitly,

Lewis

is right,

Lewis's

out in detail will be seen to involve, either implicitly or
notions.

we seem

And

then the proposal

is

unacceptably circular.

be faced with a choice beUv'een primitive modality and

to

own modal realism.

But in chapter

modal notions

is

six

I

will try to

inevitable only

incompletely analyzed.

And

if

show

and

properties

that

properties

an appeal

and

to

some

primitive

relations are left

unanalyzed or

Lewis's arguments seem compelling only because

previous attempts to analyze modality

fail

to

provide non-modal analyses of

relations in terms of actual entities. In chapters three

have attempted

to

and four

I

provide an analysis of properties and relations that makes no

appeal, either implicit or explicit, to non-actual particulars or to any primitive

modal

notions.

pursued
^

is

P. Bricker,

355.

How such an actualist program for analyzing modality might be

sketched in

6.6.

"Reducing Possible Worlds
is from p. 351.

to

Language",

Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), pp. 331-

The quote

2 Talk of "constructing" properties

properties either just exist or they
the

way we speak or think,
mean anyway?

may seem to involve a metaphysical confusion. Surely
not. And whether they do or not is quite independent of

do

at least in general.

It is

not for us to "construct" them.

What could

that really

However, even if this sort of worry is genuine, it is misplaced here for two reasons.
methodology for explaining certain philosophically troubling entities being
presupposed throughout this dissertation has been as follows. First, characterize the
First,

the

If

149

heoretical role that the entities in
question piny
of the theoretical primitives) some

Then, define using only terms (definable
m
(expression guaranteed to uniquely
pick out) entities
rmitted by the official ontology that are
suited to play exactly that role. fhLe
are
.

erms

the

lXai~s;r.,o:

.he

„.„er

m

Second,
chapter six we will see that what the actualist
aims to construct need not
be construed as the properties themselves.
Rather, the actualist aims to construct
rqrresentatives of these properties. As
we will see there, there must be exactly one such
representative for each property if actualism
is
to

do

justice to

our modal intuitions.

view
of this onerone correspondence, conflating
talk of constructing properties with
talk of
constructing their representatives is harmless.
3 Among these alternative
solutions are those that distinguish the actual
existence of a
property from its being actually instantiated.
As we will soon see, in effect, SN endorses a
version of this approach, though, I believe a
clearer version than that usually advocated.
Until
then, however, will usually talk of a
property "being instantiated at a world" and it
existing at a world" indiscriminately.
^ Lewis uses 'alien'
somewhat differently. He defines an alien property "as one
that is not
instantiated by any part of this world, and that is
not definable as a conjunctive or structural
property built up from constituents that are all instantiated
by parts of this world " In a
footnote he remarks that maybe he "should have added
a third clause: '...and that is not
obtainable by interpolation or extrapolation from a
spectrum of properties that are
instantiated by parts of this world" {Plurality,
p. 91). As I will use 'alien' the properties
excluded by Lewis's second (and third) clause - the structural
properties and those
obtainable by interpolation and extrapolation - do count
as alien.
In

1

My

use proves more

convenient for the subsequent discussion.
5 D.

M. Armstrong discusses these missing determinates in his A Theory
of Unwersals:
& Scientific Realism, Volume //, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
Chapter 22 p.l 16 ff. The solution he advocates there turns essentially on the
Umversals

idea that
properties overlap. In effect, he tries to assimilate missing determinates
to missing
compounds. So he has to declare a priori that there is structure where neither science nor
common-sense yet suspect any. Moreover, he is left with no resources to deal with the
properties that are even more radically alien to be discussed in the next
paragraph.

^ See

1.3.1, 2.2

Indeed,

belong

it

and

5.5 for discussions of this principle.

might be argued that

SN

in particular

ought

to

acknowledge

alien properties that

determinables none of whose determinates are actually instantiated. For SN allows
that it is possible for each determinate of any determinable to be missing. And
it allows for
any number of them to be missing. But if this is possible, should it not also be possible for all
of them to be missing? Although, of course, this type of argument is to be treated with
to

suspicion,

®

It

it is,

1

think, sufficient to shift the

will be recalled that the

the metric space defined by

empty

set but

burden of proof:

only the empty set

if

not,

why

not?

may appear more

than once

in

m on the partition induced by S on P.

^ Moreover, even

if we allow each such bare structure to have some, perhaps arbitrary,
degree of naturalness, SN would still not entail that all empty determinables actually exist.
For determinables may be distinct even if they have the same structure by virtue of differing

in their degrees

instance,

of naturalness.

The

have the same structure

natural than temperature.

(absolute) tempierature

—

that of the real line

And SN entails

—

and the mass determinables, for
is more more

but perhaps mass

such determinables, like determinables that
degree of naturalness is part of its
essence. So, for instance, the mass and temperature determinables would be distinct even at
worlds where the classification of particulars fails to decide between them (perhaps, because
the world in question has no particulars with any mass or temp>erature at all, or perhaps
because at such worlds any particular has mass n iff it has temperature n). But if it is possible
for tiiv such determinables to be empty at the actual world, SN will be unable to provide
distinct constructions. For it can provide only one entity — a bare structure — having a unique
that

differ in structure, are necessarily distinct; a determinable's

150

degree of na ura ness.

In short, S\ cannot distinguish
empK' determinables having the same
structure but differing in their degree of
naturalness. And if the structural nominalist
holds
that a determinables empty or not actually
exist, she would be
1

committed, wrongly to the
vnew that any having the same structure are the
same determinable.
Here have again been simplifying by assuming that
naturalness is an all-or-nothing
matter. But officially it is a property that comes
in degrees. And this complicates
matters For
although certain depees of naturalness are actually
instantiated at the actual world, perhaps
not all are. And perhaps at the actual world only
certain degrees of naturalness are available
I

tor the actualist to construct various
properties.
IS

ooked

at

m much detail.

Thus the actualist still comes up short.
depends on quite w hat naturalness is, an issue have not
seems that the actualist can at least construct representations

so

I

But

it

of

naturalness, perhaps by means of a mathematical
function from sparse determinables to the
positive reals. (Perhaps she identifies the representations
of a sparse determinables with pairs
of an abundant determinable and some positive
real number that measures its degree of
naturalness). And that may be sufficient.

This objection

is

an adaptation of an objection Lewis raises

in

another context (see Plnmlitu
'

n. 157-8).
f:2

Once again

three
1

I

have assumed that the problem of

fn. 28).

"filtering ouL'

can be solved (see chapter
^

n

There are other options here. Perhaps we think of p-matter as itself a
determinable that
determinates. Or perhaps we think of it as a kind of limiting case of a
determinable that has a unique determinate. It does not really matter as the
same sort of
solution can be fashioned whichever way we look at it. Exactly parallel
remarks apply, of

may have many

course, to u-matter.

There is one difficulty here: what about worlds the cardinality of whose stock of
particulars exceeds that of the actual world? Here one strategy would be to identify
particulars with mathematical points thereby affording SN an endless supply of them.

See

and 6.6 for a brief discussion of this. This approach has its problems, though do not
discuss them in any detail because they arise principally in attempting to accommodate de re
possibilities and so fall outside the official scope of this dissertation. For further discussion
see e.g. Lewis's discussion of the Napoleon-worlds Plurality,
p. 157-8, and A. McMichael, "A
Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds", Tlie Philosophical Revmo, XCII No. 1 (1983),
1.3.1, 6.5

I

pp. 49-66.
The reader

is

referred to the fantasy of inverted spectra in 3.6 for further discussion here.

A relation is intrinsic, roughly, whenever its obtaining depends only on the (qualitative)
natures of the relata themselves and their fusion, regardless of the state or existence of any
other thing. Just as an intrinsic property
instantiates
instantiate

is a property that is intrinsic to any individual that
an intrinsic relation is a relation that is intrinsic to the fusion of any relata that
it can be thought of as an intrinsic property of the relata "taken together".

it,

it;

Intuitively, intrinsic relations include being four feet from, preceding, being taller than, being

same shape as, and being oppositely charged from.
As noted in the previous chapter this restriction may be redundant (see Pluralih/ p. 60.
where Lewis claims that such a restriction is already built into our notion of "sparseness").
Perhaps relations among infinitely many particulars should also be permitted. To modify
SN to accommodate such relations, we should also allow infinite sequences of particulars
where SN allows only n-tuples of particulars.
the

Again SN should stay neutral on the question of exactly which type
on the partition.
I

of structure

ignore here the possibility that applying the notion of naturalness to relations

additional difficulties not raised by applying

it

m defines

may

raise

to properties for lack of space.

simplify by assuming a hard-and-fast division of partial n-classifications of
particulars into the natural and the non-natural. I assume that the theory could be easily
refined (and complicated) to allow naturalness to be a property that comes in degrees.

Here again

1

For the theorv'

among

to

be fully adequate, these entailments must
exluwst the logical relations

maybe there are extra logical relations among relation!
that have no
the logical relations among intrinsic
properties. For lack of space will not

relations. But

parallel

m

I

investigate this question here.

23

I

will not discuss explicitly

among complex

how

extend the account so that it also covers
relations
procedure outlined above in section 4.2 seems

to

particulars. But the

straightforwardly general izable.
24 Quite how this is expressed

to be

depends on what the parts are taken to be. If the
complex
of mereological atoms, then its intrinsic
properties supervene on the
intrinsic properties of the atoms and how
these atoms are arranged vis a vis one another.
But
we consider all the particular's parts, then reference to how
they are arranged vis a vis one
another IS redundant. For the arrangement of x and
y will determine the intrinsic properties
o their fusion, and if x and are parts of z, then
their fusion is a part of z. So there is no need
y
to mention the arrangement of x and
y ; it is already covered by the intrinsic properties
of the
^
fusion X + y.
particular

is

composed

1

25 Note that we don't need
to require in addition that the internal relations
among parts also
be duplicated. Since internal relations supervene on
intrinsic properties of the relata, if we
duplicate the parts we automatically duplicate the internal
relations among them.
The account to be developed will apply only to complex entities composed
of atomic parts.
But it is probably preferable for a metaphysical theory of
properties to stay neutral on the
question of whether there are any mereological atoms. Perhaps,
everything has proper parts;
perhaps there is structure all the way down". have omitted a discussion
of this possibility
as It would take us too far afield into mereology.
22 Since this account applies only to
complex entities composed of atomic parts, it does not
apply to "gunk" - complex particulars all of whose parts have proper parts. To
extend SN to
apply to gunk, some way will have to be found to express in non-modal terms the
more
general claim that if complex particulars have duplicate parts, whether or not
these parts are
atoms, and these parts are arranged in duplicate ways, then they must themselves
be
1

duplicates.

Clearly this analysis of duplication subsumes the previous relation of duplication among
atoms themselves as a special case. And notice that the definition of 'part-duplication'

the

involves only notions that have previously been defined in non-modal terms: intrinsic
natures, functions, relations etc.

9Q

Though

part of

this

what

is

is

at best

behind

it

only part of what what

is

behind the slogan. Lewis explains another

as follows:

Mereology is ontologicaUy innocent.. given a priori commitment to cats, say, a
commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing over
and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take them together
or take them separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality either way...(D. K.
Lewis, Parts of Classes,

p. 81).

But this is both controversial and obscure. For one thing, the sentences 'It just is them.' and
'They just ore it/ are barely grammatical. For another, since the fusion of x and y is not in
general identical either to x or to y,

it

remains obscure quite

why

it is

not something "over

and above x and y".
The actualist theory to be developed in 6.6 perhaps throws some additional light on
the sense in which a fusion is nothing over and above its parts. For it entails a version of the
recombination principle. This principle is supposed to express, at least in part, the intuition
that logical space comprehends a plenitude of possibilities or possible worlds. In part what
says is, roughly, that the result of recombining anything with anything else regardless of their
intrinsic natures is itself a possibility, a possible world. (This is very rough and various
constraints are needed. See 1 .3.1, 2.2.1 and 5.5 for brief discussions of some of these
il

constraints.) But the version of the recombination principle entailed by the theory of 6.6

entails that

recombining the fusions generates no “extra"
worlds over and above those
generated by recombining their parts. To
illustrate the idea, consider for
simplicity a world
that contains just three qualitatively
different atomic particulars, a, b and
c. By the^
recombinatorial principle, from this world we
can generate 6 new worlds - one for
each
subset of {a, b, c minus the whole set and the
empty set. But the version of the principle
mvolved in the theory of 6.6, entails that there are
still only 6 recombinatonal
worlds
generatable from the set that contains a, b, ca,td
all their fusions - a.b, b+c and
a+c. For it

entails that a fusion exists at a

world

iff its

recombinatorially redundant" and that

parts do.

It

entails that fusions are

perhaps one sense in which
compose it; one sense in which “it just
is

a fusion
is

are^it"

how |PSC

I

IS

is

"nothing

them and they

just

actualist theory of modality that incorporates
SN. In particular, quite
is left largely open. If it is true, then
presumably it

be guaranteed

to

is

necessarily true, true at every world.

One way to guarantee this would be to develop the
we take the set of atoms and form all the n-classifications,

theory m two stages. In stage one,
n-determinables, n-determinates, intrinsic natures etc. This
should define
the properties of and relations among the atoms.
In stage two

we

all the facts about'
repeat the process for both

simple and complex entities under the additional constraint
[PSC].
It might be objected that this will
entail only that there is no

world containing partguarantees only the supervenience
among coexistent complex particulars. But this does not seem to be the whole
story. For the
intuition behind [PSC] seems to be that part-duplicates
are always themselves duplicates
regardless of where they are in logical space; in particular,
part-duplicates are duplicates,
whether or not they coexist. Yet this approach does not rule out the possibility
that
duplicates that are not themselves duplicates. That

is, it

at

worlds part-duplicates of
others

all

green

my

etc. All that

intrinsic properties,

it

actual

computer are

all

grey, at others they are

all

some

some

blue,' at

guarantees is that part-duplicates within a world share their
does not fix what these intrinsic properties are. So it may seem that

these intrinsic properties

it

may

vary across worlds.

However, the appearance

And

deceptive. For the

that

is

counterintuitive.

the theory guarantees an adequate
version of the recombination principle, then this principle together with the truth
of [PSCj at
every world rules out the existence of any part-duplicates that fail to be duplicates existing
is

if

anywhere in logical space. For suppose that there are; perhaps, there is a part-duplicate of my
computer that is not a duplicate of my computer - maybe it is red rather than grey. Then by
the recombination principle duplicates of these two complex particulars coexist at some
world. Since the intrinsic properties of their parts and how these parts are arranged are

among

their intrinsic properties, these will be preserved

under duplication and the duplicates

be part-duplicates at this new world. And as the colours of things are also intrinsic
properties they too will be preserved at the new world. So this new world will contain partduplicates that fail to be duplicates. And this violates 1F*SC']. In short, any metaphysical
theory of modality that guarantees both the recombination principle and guarantees that
will

still

[PSC'I
logical

true at each world, automatically guarantees that no part-duplicates anywhere
space can fail to be duplicates.

is

in

CHAPTER 5

MAGICAL ERSATZISM
5.1

The

Ersatz Proiert

All the metaphysical theories of modality
discussed in this dissertation

hold that a proposition

possible

is

such quantificational accounts

iff

To play

some world

is

at

way

in fact to

that

Many

which

it is

be, there

is

at

For

true.

right, coUectively their

that for every

way

that things

realist posits a vast plurality of

all

non-

the actual concrete particulars.

some such

realist

holds that for every

concrete particular, actual or

other philosophers also treat modal discourse

quantified over

it is

that way.i

is

quantificational.^

which

true that they are that way.

modal

and above

modality

guarantee a plenitude: the modal

something could

otherwise, that

must be

it

the role of worlds, the

actual concrete particulars over

Enough

some world

is

to get the facts of

worlds must constitute a plenitude:
could be, there

there

So they too must guarantee a

~ worlds -

sufficient

to constitute a plenitude.

as, in essence,

number of entities

But most of them are far

less

sanguine than Lewis about accepting the existence of a vast plurality of nonactual concrete particulars.

donkeys,

cities of cheese,

The most popular

Most think

Lewis

calls

in

alternative

complete

no blue swans, talking

or particulars having weird spatiotemporal structures.
is

abstract entities capable,

world

that there just are

to posit instead

somehow,

detail, as

it is

of representing. ..the entire concrete

or as

it

might have been.^

such an approach, "ersatzism"; and he

calls the abstract

representational entities quantified over, "ersatz worlds". Ersatzism holds, for

1S4
instance, that

it is

possible that there be blue

entities that represent that the actual

for this to

world

swans

-

ersatz worlds

-

there are certain abstract

such that there are blue swans. But

is

be the case, they argue, there need not

abstract entities

iff

really

be any blue swans, only

that represent that the actual ivorld

is

such that

there are.

Lewis argues that the entire ersatz project

is

doomed. Indeed,

constitutes his principal reason for thinking that
modality

must be understood

terms of quantification over a vast plurality of concrete
particulars.
feature of any form ersatzism
ersatz theories

may be classified

represent what they do.
virtue of

is

that its

worlds

this

A defining

represent various things.

according to their accounts of

in

how

And

their

worlds

Magical” ersatzism denies that worlds represent by

any structure they might have.

representational powers of

its

"Pictorial" ersatzism attributes the

worlds in part

to their

having a certain

mereological structure. "Linguistic" or "mathematical" ersatzism's explanation of

how

its

I

his

worlds represent exploits

their set-theoretical structure of

its

worlds.

consider Lewis's arguments against magical ersatzism in this chapter and

arguments against

arguments against

linguistic or

mathematical ersatzism in the next. Since

pictorial ersatzism

seem

to

me quite compelling,

I

his

will not

discuss them.'^

5.2

A Version of Magical Ersatzism. ME
Lewis's arguments against magical ersatzism are directed at a highly

generic version of the theory which

I

will call

"ME".

ME posits certain sui generis "elements". These are abstract entities, that
they are causally inert.
theoretical structure.

And

they are simple, they lack any mereological or

Some but not all

of

them are

is,

set-

"selected" by the actual world;
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^vhlch ones are selected depends

on

^^•hat

goes on

in the actual ^vorld.

One axiom

of the theory entails that collectively
these elements constitute a plenitude:
for
everv- distinct properU' F that the actual

element e such that the actual world

world might

selects e

instantiate, there is

iff it is F.

And some

some

of these

elements imply others:

[Dl]

For any elements and
p
then it also selects q.

Taken under

q,

p

implies

q =df.

this relation of implication, the

necessarily,
"

if

@ selects p

elements collectively constitute a

complete, atomic Boolean algebra. The maximal elements,
or atoms, of
algebra are ME's candidates for the role of

[D2]

X

is

a wovld =df. x

a

is

[D3]

and some modal

ersatz worlds:

maximal element of the algebra

The representational properties
selection

its

this

of elements.

of these worlds are explained in terms of

primitive:

For any property F and element
instantiates F =df. Necessarily,

e represents that the actual world
the actual world selects e, then it

e,

if

instantiates F.^

So

to say, for instance, that

blue swans

among

its

parts

selects e unless the actual

some element
is

to say that

e represents that the actual

it

could not be that the actual world

world has blue swans among

Before considering Lewis's objection to

should be noted.

world has

ME,

a

its

parts.

few points about the theory

T

he

first is

terminological. Clearly,

traditionally played

by “propositions" or

ME's elements play

the role

And

“states of affairs".

the selected

propositions (states of affairs) are simply those
that are actually true (actually
obtain), those

made-true by the way the world actually

is.

We could,

indeed,

simply introduce these more familiar terms by
definition:

[D4]

X

is

[D5]

a proposition or state of affairs =df. x
X makes- true
y =df. x selects y.

[D6]

X

is

actually true =df. x

Similarly, given our

is

selected

modal primitive

is

an element.

by the actual world.

either of representation

definable in terms of the other.^ But Lewis prefers to present

elements
of-affairs",

,

and

selection

rather than the

selects is

ME in terms of

more usual “propositions" or

"makes- true" and "represents". This

replete with philosophical connotations

and

is

and often

because these

is

terms are

pretty obscure ones at that. So

using them runs the risk of obscuring the generic nature of
his objection. Lie thinks that the sensible policy

latter

“states-

to

ME and the scope of

avoid them.

I vvhll,

however,

generally use the notions interchangeably.

Second,

ME is not an ambitious theory. Its elements are not constructed,

but taken to constitute a primitive ontological category.
surrogate for the traditional notion of representation
expressions as primitive; no attempt

assumes the axioms required

to

is

made

to

It

takes 'selection'

- and

certain

analyze them.

-

its

modal

And it simply

guarantee that the elements constitute a

plenitude and that taken under implication they constitute a complete atomic

Boolean algebra.

No attempt is made to reduce them to the axioms of mereologv,

set-theory or anything else. Indeed, Lewis imagines saying to the magical
ersatzer that really

no theory. This is a theory-schema, which any number of diffeamt
theories could fit. Even my own: maybe the elements are the sets of
..this is

orlds the concrete world - or any
concrete world - selects just those
ements that have it as a member, and it is the
case according to an
element that a donkey talks iff each world in
that element has a talking
onkey as a part. Equally, any sort of linguistic
or pictorial ersatzism
could fit your schema.
\\

e

Says he: not so. You have paid attention to
the positive side of mv
and overlooked the details. I denv that the
elements are concrete I
deny that they have structure. I deny that they
have parts or members
hat rules out the interpretations you
mentioned. (Fair enough. But had
the denials been left out my point would
have been well take.)^
theory'

1

The point

of

making

scope of Lewis's objection

an instance

of the

ME so schematic is to bring out quite how wide the

is. If it

ME,

it

thereby refutes any theory that

iVIE in the role

is

an important difference between modal realism

assigned to the actual world. According to modal realism

modality involves implicit quantification over certain concrete
wliich

is

over and
,

is

this

elements

world

is

may prove confusing.

- and

among

confusion on this matter

[D7]

@ =df.

[D8]

p* =df. the

So

is

the

According

it is

what

is

is

quantified

For in the ersatzer's sense of 'world', the
it still

plays an important role in

that selects various propositions.

helpful to introduce

ME:

it

To forestall

some terminology:

the fusion of every concrete particular.*^

maximal element or world

name of

to

world

the actual world, being concrete,

the term 'world' for

not a world.^ Nevertheless

the one concrete actual

But

-

among them. The ersatzer also uses

actual

entities

the actual world. But according to \LE modality involves
quantifying

only over abstract entities
not

is

schema.

Finally, notice that there

and

refutes

ME,

the actual world, or,

it is

selected by @.

more

precisely

its

concrete part.

@ that bears the selection relation to various propositions.

@ is not among the entities eligible for being selected;

it is

not a proposition

and

so,

according

by

selected

to

ME, not

a ^vorld.

and the

Classification of Relations

Clearly the linchpin of

to

an

it is

ME is

illusion, a bit of magic.

be one of

its

-

primitives

argues that there

is

just

For although

And

Lewis

ME itself is

ungraspable, then

an unintelligible theory.

ungraspable only

to

ME -

anyone could have grasped a predicate

'selects' really is

if

ME takes the predicate 'selects'

simply presupposed by

it is

that that

Actually, Lewis concentrates

But

the relation of selection. But Lewis argues

a grasp of

no way

for the selection relation.
literally

proposition

'p*'.

5.3 Selection

that

ME calls the ,vorld or maximal

this is

not

if

that 'selects'

would be

selection belongs to a category of relations he calls "internal".

much of a

be external".

on showing

And

restriction; for

if

selection

is

not internal,

it

would have

according to Lewis this only makes matters worse. For he

argues that the very notion of an external selection relation

is itself

unintelligible.

In short, if the concrete world selects elements by an internal relation,. ..it is
only by magic that 'selects' could be our word for any such relation. If, on
the other hand, the concrete world selects elements by an external relation,
it is

the relation itself that

such a relation

is

is

magical.. .Either way, ersatzism that relies on

justly called 'magical';

and

is

to

be

rqected.^*^

Before this argument can be evaluated Lewis's classification of relations

must be clarified.
First, relations are

intrinsic,

divided into the

roughly, whenever

its

intrinsic

and

the extrinsic.^^

A relation is

obtaining depends only on the (qualitative)

natures of the relata themselves and their fusion, regardless of the state or
existence of any other thing. Just as an intrinsic property
intrinsic to

any individual

that instantiates

it,

an

is

a property that

is

intrinsic relation is a relation
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that

is

intrinsic to the fusion of

any

relata that instantiate

it; it

can be thought of

as an intrinsic propert}' of the relata "taken
together" (in the right order). '2
Intuitively, intrinsic relations include being
four feet from, preceding, being taller

than, being the

same shape

as,

four feet from y or precedes

anything but x and y and

it

how

being oppositely charged from. For whether
x
or

than than

is taller

such

does not depend on

they are vis a vis one another. The state or

existence of anything but x and
y has no bearing
instantiate

it etc.,

is

on whether or not they

relations.

Relations that

do depend, even

other than their relata are

on

in part,

extrinsic. Intuitively,

the state or nature of something

they include being co-owned and

being more popular than. For whether x and stand in either of these
relations
y

depends

who

on whether

in part at least

likes

there

is

someone who owns both x and y and

whom.

The intrinsic

relations themselves are then subdivided into internal

external relations. Internal relations are

determined entirely by the

and

intrinsic

properties of their relata "considered separately". External relations depend, at
least in part,
relata,

on something other than just

the several intrinsic natures of their

though without depending on any third

depend

in part

on how

Intuitively,

their relata are

being

taller than,

thing. Roughly, external relations

"arranged" vis-a-vis one another.

being the same shape as and (probably) being

oppositely charged from are internal relations. Once the intrinsic natures of x and

y have been fixed, their heights, shapes and probably charges have been fixed
since these are intrinsic properties. ^3 gyt then

it is

also fixed

than y or the same shape as y or differently charged from
preceding, being four feet from, being a
external relations. Intuitively, whether x

does not depend in any

way on

y.

whether x

Intuitively,

member of and being
and y stand

in

is taller

a part of are

any of these

things other than the fusion of x and

relations
y.

So these

1()0

are intrinsic relations.

intnnsic nature of x

And

and

yet such relations

still

the intrinsic nature of alone.
y

these relations, individuals having exactly the

could

fail to

do

so.

member of some

One

do not supervene on

electron

may be

same

Even

if

intrinsic natures as x

some

particular

atom and

exactly similar electron not bear any of these relations
to these

and external
duplicates

same

in

and y

yet an

entities.

this division of (binary) relations into extrinsic,
internal

in terms of the notion of duplication. Intuitively, x

iff

and y stand

x

four feet from a particular proton, or a

particular set, or a part of

Lewis expresses

just the

and y are

they are exactly alike, flawless copies or perfect simulacra of
each

other. In chapter

hvo

w'e defined a notion of duplication in terms of (perfectly

natural) intrinsic properties that matches this intuitive notion:

(D9)

X

is

a duplicate of y =df. for any perfectly natural intrinsic property P,

PxiffPy.i4

There

may

or

fundamental

may

not actually be any perfect duplicates, but

particles of physics

seem

to

if

there are the

be the best candidates.

This allows us to formulate the three-w^ay classification more precisely:
(DIO)

A (binary) relation R is intrinsic =df. if xRy,
that: (a) the

and

(b) x' is

then for any x' and y' such
and y' is a duplicate of the fusion of x and y;
duplicate of x and y' is a duplicate of y'; then

fusion of

x'

x'Ry' also.^5 Otherwise,

(Dll)

A (binary) intrinsic relation R is internal =df.
y'

such that

also.

Where

R is extrinsic.

x' is

Otherwise,

a duplicate of x

and

y' is

xRy, then for any x' and
a duplicate of y', then x'Ry'
if

R is external.

the quantifiers range over

all

actual

and possible particulars.

K)1

First then,

Lewis asks the magical ersatzer whether
selection

internal or external.

is

extnnsic,

ME of course takes selection as one of its primitives, and

Lewis concedes that

would be unfair asking the ersatzer to deftne his
primitive. But
demanding definition, only classification. Compare

It

am

not

might well take predicates of distance as primitive;
but primitive or no,

would say
might

I

my own case.
'

that distance relations are external relations
par excellence
weU take some sort of similarity relation as primitive;

I

I

I

but primitive
or no, any sort of similarity is an internal
relation. I can fairly ask the
ersatzer to classify his primitive in the same way.^^

One option can be eliminated
extrinsic

immediately: intuitively, selection could not be

— how could whether or not @ selects

anything other than the fusion of
or external. In the next section
classifying selection as internal

external in

5.4

I

a given proposition
p depend on

@ and p? Selection then must be either internal

will explain

and

I

and evaluate Lewis's

objection to

will consider his objection to classifying

it

as

5.5.

The Argument against Classifying

Selection as Internal

Lewis objects that no-one could grasp any predicate
selection relation.

So

if

for

an internal

ME classifies selection as internal, the theory is literally

unintelligible.

One way

to

grasp the denotation of a predicate

is

by ostension. But

the

range of the selection relation consists of propositions and propositions are
abstract; they are

beyond the

possibility of causal acquaintance. Hence, no-one

can have had causal acquaintance with any instance of the selection

which she might have pointed
Another way
But

this is possible

to

to fix the denotation of 'selects' ostensively.

grasp the denotation of predicate

only

if

the

relation to

number of

instances

is

is

short

by

listing its instanci's.

enough

for us to

list.
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And

clearly the instances of selection

there are infinitely

many

many

would be

too

numerous

for us to

list

-

true propositions. Indeed, there are
probably unlistably

of them.

The only other way
intensionally:

to

grasp the denotation of a predicate

by grasping some defining condition on

its relata.

will involve certain properties or relations
instantiation of

individuals

is

to

grasp

its

come

to

understand

instances, she

'selects'

it

Such a condition

which by various

necessary and sufHcient for them to stand in the relation.
So

ersatzer did not

or by listing

is

by acquaintance with

its

if

the

instances,

must have done so by grasping some condition

of

the form:

[S]

X

selects

where the

y =df. (P^x

& Qiy) or (P2X & Q2y) or.... etc.

P's express properties that

@ does or might have instantiated - ways

it

might be - and the O' s express properties by virtue of instantiating which
propositions represent that
It is

@ is this way or that.

here that the supposition that selection

is

internal enters the picture.

For then the representational properties of the propositions, the Q-properties,

must be

intrinsic. But,

these Q-properties

Lewis notes,

if

ME is to get the facts of modality right,

must be extremely numerous.

..must be rich

enough

Collectively they

permit enormous variation. For there must be
enough [propositions], all with different distinctive natures [i.e. differing
among themselves with respect to which intrinsic Q-properties they
instantiate], to provide a sufficient plenitude of possibilities.

So,

Lewis argues,

to

to

grasp an instance of

[S]

we would have

to

grasp an

enormous number of Q-properties. But we could not have grasped any

of these

Q-properties by causal acquaintance with their propositional instances because the

propositions are abstract and so beyond the
possibiliU' of causal acquaintance.

But nor could

we have grasped

a sufficient

number

of

them by causal

acquaintance with any (non-propositional) concrete
instances they might have.
This

is

because the propositions are abstract

eligible to

be the Q-properties are

abstract simples.

And Lewis

simples.

So the only properties even

intrinsic properties that could be instantiated

points out that, as a matter of

fact,

by

we have causal

acquaintance with instances of very few such properties,
far too few

to

make all

the required differences:

There are not very many candidates [for Q-properties whose
instances we
are actually acquainted with], since they must be
properties capable of
being instantiated by simples. Properties of charge, mass,
quark colour
and flavour, and the like might perhaps do (if they could somehow be
shared by abstract simples. But I don't see why they couldn't be.)
But there
are not nearly
need.i^

enough

of those properties to

make

all

the differences

In short, the ersatzer could not have grasped any instance of

uniquely determines an internal selection relation because
instance she

would have

instantiation

by abstract simples.

to

to

[S]

we

which

grasp such an

grasp vast numbers of intrinsic properties capable of

And

she just could not have grasped enough of

them.
This completes the case against classifying selection as an internal relation:

such a relation could not have been grasped by ostension,

by grasping an instance of
so,

if

But then

it

members, or

could not have been grasped at

all.

And

the magical ersatzer has understood her primitive predicate 'selects' where

this is

taken to express an internal relation, she must have done so by magic.

This argument
is

[Sj.

listing its

is

very difficult and abstract. However, or so

ultimately unsuccessful.

I

will consider three lines of reply.

The

I

will argue,

first is

due

to

it
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jubien and seems to
think

show

that

me

not to get to the heart of the matter.
The other two do

Lewis has

failed to establish that 'selects'

I

would be ungraspable.

Jubien interprets Lewis as arguing that the
ersatzer could not have

grasped the selection relation (except by magic)
because

the causal isolation of propositions
inaccessible to usT‘^

And, according

seems

to

make

their individual natures

to Jubien,

crucial in this argument.. .is the supposition that we
have to
the relevant intrinsic features of the relota in order to

know about

"grasp" an internal

relation.20

But he thinks that

I

think

this

supposition

is

not plausible:

we can and do grasp internal

workings...for example, there

between

my

is

relations without grasping their inner
a certain internal relation that holds

and chunks of molten lava and burning charcoal, the
surfaces of certain furnaces and stoves, and so forth. It is this relation that
accounts for the fact that if 1 have the misfortune to find my fingers too
close to such things, 1 will suffer pain and perhaps serious injury as well.
VVe may call this the propensity to be burned by relation. With the world the
way it is, we need to grasp this relation and fortunately most of us do.
This, of course, is not to deny that a " complete" or "scientific")
understanding of the relation would require understanding a certain
amount of the molecular theory of heat. The point is only that what it
seems reasonable to require for the grasping of this relation falls far short
fingers

of this analytical level of understanding.^^

Jubien seems to
Clearly
water, salt

me

to misinterpret Lewis's

we can and do grasp

— without a grasp of

argument

the properties of

many

here.

substances

—

brass,

their "inner workings", the chemical structures

on which these properties supervene. And

the graspability of Jubien's propensity

to

be burned by relation

without a grasp of the

shows

that

we

can also grasp certain internal relations

intrinsic features of their relata.

But these are special cases.

We can grasp them because ive have causal

acquaintance with their

effects, or, as

manifestations". This

how we seem

brass,

water and

salt.

is

—

to grasp, for instance, the properties
of

by causal acquaintance with

of

an internal selection

propositions. Propositions are abstract

outward manifestations. And

this

propensity to be burned by relation

outward manifestations
ostensively (or at least

[S]-like

And

thaP s

is

is

Because

its

we

are acquainted with the

we can name it

cannot be

there

is

just

no other

its

instances

relata.

must be grasped by grasping

ostensively by causal acquaintance with

by

is

a

must be grasped by

But Lewis argues only that an

the intrinsic properties of

listing its instances.

For

i.e.

alternative.

propensity to be burned by relation

to this claim.

ostensively by

must be grasped intensionally

to the claim that all internal relations

counterexample

named

instances or their effects. So, since

[S];

summary, Jubien's

'selects'

cannot be grasped ostensively or by

not a

they can have no

how we grasp it without a grasp of an instance of some

grasping the intrinsic properties of their

if it

inert;

we can name it by some combination of description and

grasping some instance of

internal relation

outward

however, consists entirely of

and so causally

crucial.

listed, the selection relation

counterexample

relation,

of Jubien's relation, in a sense,

causal acquaintance with

In

its

his

disanalogy between selection and Jubien's

schema. But the denotation of

cannot be

elsewhere, their "outward

heat, for instance.

The range

ostension).

it

And, as Jubien himself acknowledges, we grasp

propensity to be burned by relation

manifestations

Jubien puts

its relata,

And Jubien's relation

we can grasp Jubien's relation
its effects.

worried by Jubien’s purported counterexample.22

Thus, Lewis need not be

!()(>

A second

line of reply to l.ewis

number of properties we grasp

would be

to reject his

argument

that are eligible to be Q-properties

properties capable of instantiation by abstract
simples

-

is

-

that the

intrinsic

too small to encode

all

the required differences.

Lewis admits that

we grasp mass properties and

may

that these

be eligible

candidates for the Q-properties referred to in the
specification of the denotation
of selects

from

Yet there are non-denumerably

.

clear that

the differences

and

we need."

yet,

Just

perhaps

it is

more than

even

this.

is still

at a conservative estimate, there

not enough to

we can claim

far

make all

For there are only continuum-many mass

to

if

must be

we grant a grasp of all

make all

unlikely that there will be

properties that

it is

how many do we need?

the-continuum-many worlds.23 So even
properties this

So

properties.

there are not nearly enough... [eligible Q-properties] to

Unfortunately,
properties

many mass

some

we

the differences

at least 2-to-

the

mass

need.

And

set of properties eligible to

be the Q-

have a grasp of whose cardinality exceeds

that of

the masses. 34

This reply does, however, suggest a

many

mass properties are not

of the

the predicates that express

if

actually instantiated, yet

them anyway. So

it

just

we grasp them and

does not seem to be true

we have causal acquaintance with some of its

arch empiricist like

Hume admits

that

And

the

same goes

for

many

it

in

that expresses

instances. Indeed, even an

someone could

idea of that particular shade [of blue], tho'
senses.. .".35

For notice that

line.

we grasp a property, and so understand a predicate

general that

only

more promising

"raise

up

never be conveyed

to himself the
to

him by

his

other "missing" physical values.

Moreover, the account of properties in chapters three and four suggests an

it,

explanation of quite hou-

Roughly

the idea

is this:

certain metric space

Hume s

e

manage

u e grasp

to

grasp actually uninstantiated properties.

the determinable to

partially constitutive of

is

exploiting this metric

li

we can

which they belong; a

each determinable; and by

"triangulate" onto the missing values. So to
grasp

missing shade of blue or the infinitely-many actual
instantiated physical

values even without causal acquaintance with their
instances, perhaps
to

suffices

grasp the colour and mass determinables.
In short,

even

if

we have causal

acquaintance with instances of very few

properties capable of instantiation by abstract simples,

grasp very few such properties.
all

it

it

does not follow that

A grasp of the relevant kind may suffice to grasp

the properties of that kind. In particular, a grasp of the
Q-property kind

determinable together with

its

- may

metric

determinate Q-properties themselves. So
properties "to

make

all

we

the differences

--

the

suffice for a grasp of all the

we may after all grasp enough Q-

we need"

as long as

we grasp

intrinsic representational properties capable of instantiation by abstract

the kind

simplest

Lewis's argument against supposing that an internal selection relation

could be grasped by grasping an instance of
uniquely determining instance of
predicates for the Q-properties.

[S] will

For

if

have

this is

seems

[S]

to

to

presuppose that any

involve a vast

not the case, then the

grasp very few properties eligible for Q-hood, does not tend

could not grasp such an instance. The
magical ersatzer

is to reject this

Consider the duplication

and

clearly

with

its

we grasp

it.

But

to

fact that

show

and most promising

that

we
we

tack for the

assumption.
relation. This is

we probably

actual instances or by

actual pairs of duplicates.

final

number of

means

of a

an

internal relation par excellence

did not grasp
list.

For

it

it

may

by causal acquaintance
well be that there are no

And even if there are — perhaps some fundamental

l

particles are duplicates
to

them.

need not

It

- and

duplication were grasped ostensively by
reference

be. Surely

we would

world where there are no duplicates.

some

finite

still

grasp the duplication relation

We must have grasped

it

then,

in a

by grasping

defining condition formulated in terms that
involve only properties

of or relations

among

its relata.

Presumably,

this

condition

was along

the lines of

(D5):

(D5)

X

is

a duplicate of y -df. for any perfectly natural intrinsic
propertv
t'
f y P^

PxiffPy.

But notice that
variables.

condition involves no predicates at

this

Indeed,

it

clearly could not

all,

only predicate-

have been the case that duplication was

grasped on the basis of a grasp of a condition involving such predicates,

i.e.

a

condition of the form,

[D]

X

where

the

is

a duplicate of y =df. (P^x

P s and O' s are predicates for (perfectly natural) intrinsic properties, or

perhaps complete
of [D]

would have

intrinsic natures.

to involve

intrinsic properties.

So even
[i.e.

And

if "...at

the Q-properties]

follow that

supposed

& Qiy) or (P2 X & Q2y) or.. ..etc.

an

For any such uniquely determining instance

infinitely

so grasping

it

long disjunction of combinations of

would be beyond our powers.

least the great majority of the 'representational properties'

must

lie

entirely outside

our acquaintance"

"how anyone could have understood

to express

propertiesj"

is

an

it

does not

the predicate ['selects'] which

internal relation that involves these properties [the

is

Q-

a mystery. For, as the case of duplication shows, a grasp of an

internal relation

R by means of some uniquely

defining condition on

its

instances

does not in general presuppose a grasp of the denotation of predicates for a

()8

number

sutficient

of intrinsic properties to distinguish

R from

other eligible

all

candidates. Indeed, such a condition

may

involve no predicates at

propert\^ variables. For the condition

may

"involve" these properties by

all,

only

quantifying over them rather than by containing
predicates that express them.
Since a grasp of the defining condition for
'selects' need not presuppose a grasp
of any Q-predicate at

And so

property.
that

we

all,

a grasp of

it

does not presuppose the grasp of any Q-

the paucity of our grasp of Q-properties does
not tend to

could not grasp

'selects'.

show

Since Lewis does not explicitly consider this

possibility, his case against the ersatzer classifying
selection as internal

is

incomplete.

Perhaps, how^ever, Lewis's case against classifying selection as internal

could be completed. For perhaps even such a quantificational condition
could not

have been grasped. To see w^hether

this is so, let

us briefly consider w^hat such a

quantificational defining condition for 'selects' w^ould have to be

The ersatzer supposes

The

first,

the

world could

P

s,

contains

instantiate.

the property’ of having

all

that there are tw'o collections of intrinsic properties.

and only those

They

entities.

entities,

The second,

intrinsic properties that the actual

will include the property of having certain laws,

donkeys among

spatiotemporal framew'ork, and so on.

by complex

like.

its

parts, the property’ of

Some

of

them could only be

and perhaps some could only be
the O' s, contains

all

having a certain

instantiated

and only those

instantiated

by concrete

intrinsic properties in

virtue of instantiation of w’hich something represents the actual w’orld as being a
certain way.

They

v\dll

include the property of representing that the actual w^orld

has certain laws, the property of representing that the actual world has donkeys

among

its

parts, or a certain spatiotemporal

must be capable

of instantiation

framework, and so on. All them

by abstract simples.
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There are also

ver>'

many

u'ays of correlating these hvo collections;
one-one

functions from the P's to the Q's.
“f"

-

And among them

will

be one function -

call

it

that correlates the P-property of having
certain laws with the Q-propert>' of

representing that the actual world has these laws,
the P-propert>^ of having

donkeys among

its

parts with the Q-property of representing that
the actual

world has donkeys among

its

parts,

and so

or correlation between the Ps and O'
s,

f,

on. That

such that for

the Q-property of representing that the actual world

Now,

if

the ersatzer can grasp

straightforwardly defined in terms of

[Q]

f,

there

is,

she can grasp

all

a one-one function

is

P-properties, P, f(P)

=

is P.

'selects'.

For

'selects'

can be

it:

X selects y =df. for every intrinsic property P, Px

iff

f(P)y.

(Notice that [Q] parallels the definition of 'duplication', [D5], Indeed, to

transform [Q] into [D5] just
collection of

So
grasped

is

all

be the identity function and

let

P be

the

intrinsic properties.)

there

f? If

let f

any reason

there

is,

to think that the ersatzer

then perhaps Lewis

is

could not even have

right after all to argue that the

ersatzer could not grasp an internal selection relation (except by magic).

Notice

first

terms of which

that a grasp of

it is

f

requires a grasp of the range of properties in

defined; in particular,

representational property (that could

it

requires a grasp of the kind intrinsic

be instantiated by abstract simples). Yet Lewis

strongly suggests that the ersatzer could not or at least

Not a

thing has been said about

what

representational property] might

be...

do not grasp such

a kind:

sort of a property [an intrinsic

We have not the slightest idea of

what "representational properties" are; except that they are properties
whereby a vast flock of abstract simples differ one from another.

Do ue grasp even
property?

a single instance of a single intrinsic
representational

A representational property
how would

property. Just

that

intrirmc

is

"reach out" to that which

it,

But the magical ersatzer need not be moved by

suppose

that selection

is

internal just

to

is

suppose

representational properties. So to object that
representational property

grounds
to

is

to object to the

that

it

a weird

represents?

this.

For one thing,

to

that there are indeed intrinsic

we do not grasp

the kind intrinsic

supposition that selection

of unintelligibility right off the bat. This

any theory

would indeed be

is

internal

on

would equaUy be an objection

assumes a primitive grasp of such a kind. The objection has

nothing specifically to do with selection. Indeed, a parallel objection
would apply
to

any theory

that posits

some form of

For another, to appeal

to the intuitive

representational properties as intrinsic

what sorts

intrinsic intentionality.

is

"weirdness" of classifying

implicitly to appeal to intuitions about

of properties intrinsic properties are. But

much of

the

burden

of

chapter three was to argue that appeals to our intuitions about the "nature" of
intrinsic properties are

misguided.

A second reason to doubt that the ersatzer could have grasped f is as
follows.

The

collection of P's

are infinitely

many

are infinitely

many one-one

and

the collection of Q's are both infinite. So there

possibilities for correlating

'selects' the ersatzer

would have had

to

been able

this infinity of eligible candidates.

there

just

no

And

manner; there

to pick out a specific

since

basis for doing so; there are just too

indistinguishable to us from which to choose.

But

in a one-one

functions from the P's to the Q's. Yet to have grasped

among
is

them

this objection is inconclusive.

we grasp

one from

so few of the Q's,

many eligible candidates

Ke^lv:
relations.

the

A

parallel situation obtains in the case of

Although perhaps a

same colour

little

confusing,

as relation as defined

we

property

C such
an

correlations,

that

Cx and

infinite

pick out just one from

do grasp

f(P)y; x

iff

is

on the basis

f(C)y. In

the

of a one-one correlation

among

The reason

same colour as relation

And we already

is

values for

f.

there

is

infinite

if

for all

iff

some colour

number

we do manage

Yet

the infinite correlations that exist

all

that

we grasp

possess the

means

of

to

they do;

the duplication relation or the
is

we

having donkeys among

parts. But, as

its

having proper parts

correlation cannot be identity.

Reply The problem of
:

the eligible candidates,

And

e.g.

we already know,

intrinsic properties capable of instantiation

the

in the case of

of the P-properties

the property of

all

the Q-properties

by abstract

simples.

So the

nothing else springs to mind.

how we pick out a single correlation from among

how

'selects'

succeeds in referring,

much more general epistemological

predicates,

However,

must be more complicated. For some
entities

is

simply the identity function.

for referring to this.

can be instantiated only by

of a

iff

each case there are an

that the relevant function

selection, the correlation

all

a duplicate of
y

these relations.

Objection:

must be

is

same colour as y

number of possible

other internal

can also think of duplication or

function between infinite sets of intrinsic properties:
x
intnnsic properties P, Px

many

is

really

an instance

problem. The vast majority of our

whether they are predicates expressing

intrinsic properties, extrinsic

properties, internal relations, external relations or whatever raise parallel

epistemological worries. In different

ways

Wittgenstein,

Goodman, Quine,

Kripke, Putnam^^ and others have pointed out that the information available to

us

— whether information about

mental

facts

— underdetermines

underdetermination

verbal behaviour, dispositions, naturalistic

facts,

the reference of our predicates. Indeed, this

afflicts 'identity'

quite as

much

as 'selects'.

So the ersatzer

may concede
correlation

that she lacks sufficient information
to enable to pick out

between the

P's

candidates that would exist

not be urged against

and
if f

Q's,

f,

from among the

does. But this

in particular.

And

is

infinity of available

everybody's problem;

since

we

any one

really

should

it

do genuinely

refer to

various properties and relations, this problem
must have a solution. Whatever
this solution

and so how

may be,

the ersatzer can appeal to

'selects' is

In fact,

defined in a

slack: to refer just
all

that

is

to explain

is

may be

we do

assume

most natural

to refer to the

the information

to

fact

about

to reject the idea that

picked out

to these

problems

that nature itself takes

the

is

up

of

the

most natural candidate

is

a

reality.

Perhaps then the best way for the magical ersatzer
be

f is

of the candidates not eliminated

have, where which

mind- and language-independent

how

graspable.

Lewis himself suggests that the only solution

semantic underdetermination

by

way

it

any way of correlating the

to reply to

Lewis would

intrinsic properties of the

actual world with the non-structure-entailing intrinsic representational

properties of the propositions

way

of correlating

them

is

as

is

more

good

as

any

natural than

other.

any

She might hold that one

other.

Then a specification

of

the denotation of 'selects' might run:

X selects y

iff

for every intrinsic property P,

Px

iff

f(P)x,

where

f is

the

most natural total one-one function from the set of intrinsic Pproperties to the set of non-structure-, (non-concreteness-)entailing
intrinsic Q-properties.

This appeal to naturalness to single out one from

candidates for being the denotation of 'selection'
the very least

Lewis himself

is

in

no position

is

among a range of eligible

highly controversial, but at

to reject

it.
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conclude that the case against

I

be established. Selection

is

inaccessible propositions.

propositions but

fails to

predicate to express

it,

The

bear

actual

it

to

'selects',

has failed to establish that

may be specified

'selects'

a relation

we

ME

classifying selection as internal has
not

whose range
world bears

very

consists entirely of causal

this relation to

many more. We could

by ostension or by

infinity of

not have grasped a

listing its instances.

could not have grasped

intensionally as long as

an

it is

it

intensionally. For

legitimate to claim to grasp

the kind intrinsic property capable
of instantiation by abstract simples and

legitimate to appeal to the notion of the

But Lewis

it is

most natural correlation betw^een such

properties and intrinsic properties that the actual world
might instantiate. In
particular,

such a intensional condition could be framed

presuppose a grasp of a vast number of predicates

in terms that

do not

for intrinsic representational

properties capable of instantiation by abstract simples. Indeed, such
a condition

may merely

involve quantityting over such properties, and so

it

need not

presuppose a grasp of any such predicates.

5.5

The Argument
There

to

have

is

against Classifying Selection as External

no doubt however

to claim a

grasp of the kind

instantiation by abstract simples, a
let

that

it is

very

awkward

for the magical ersatzer

intrinsic representational properties capable of

grasp of the notion of intrinsic intentionality. So

us turn next to consider the putative difficulty with supposing that selection

external.

Lewis argues that classifying selection as an external relation would
introduce a

new and

"especially repugnant" type of primitive modality into the

theory. Indeed, he argues that such a relation w^ould simply be unintelligible or

magical and should be rejected.
This conclusion

is

supposed

to

be the consequence of two

facts.

is

The

concerns the nature of the selection relation

first

ME, each proposition

represents

how

It

@ as having certain properties.

representation

is

to

way

is

to say at least that

being a certain

be understood,

selects certain propositions

among

its

parts, then

blue swans

and so

among

it

and

proposiHons represent

@ cmiMi,

have certain properties unless

'f

fails to select certain others; if

it

must

fail

to select or

make

@ as

@ has donkeys
if it

has no

false certain others,

on.

having donkeys among
representational
select or
it

Irrespective of

to say that

Notice in particular that some of these properties,

then

.According to

must select or make true certain propositions,

parts then

its

itself.

make

must

is

to

its

say in part that

if

So

to say that propositions are

and

if it

lacks certain intrinsic properties,

or makes false certain others.

Inwagen argues, amount

it is

and yet have borne

propositions whatsoever. But this
betw'een...[@]...and

p

is

To deny

is

this,

would, van

@

to the supposition that

have been just as

property of

@ has certain intrinsic properties, it must

true certain propositions,

fail to select

...might

parts, are intrinsic.

e.g. the

selects to

any

clearly absurd,... whether

determined partly by the

set of

it

holds

intrinsic features

of...[@].3t>

This feature of selection can be characterized most perspicuously in terms
of duplicates. Selection satisfies the following schema: for

[M]

If

xRy, then for any possible duplicate of

Van Inwagen calls

relatum.

x*Ry

also.^^

relations that satisfy [M] "range-internal" .^2

fact that selection satisfies [M],

sometimes says

x, x*,

all y,

that

it

Lewis sometimes

calls

it

Jq express

the

a "modal" relation and

"corresponds rigidly" to the intrinsic properties of

its first

17 ()

The second
argues that

it is

fact

concerns the nature of external relations
generally. Lewis

of the nature of external relations quite
generally to "var>'

independently of the intrinsic natures of their

relata". This principle

is,

he says,

akin to our Humean principle of recombination
which requires that
anything can coexist with anything, and which thereby
prohibits a
necessary connection betu^een the intrinsic character of
a thing and the
^ritrinsic

characters of distinct things with which

coexists.

it

Later he adds that he

understand [s] these principles of independent variation

in terms of

duplicate individuals in different possible worlds.^^

This strongly suggests that external relations

all

"vary independently of

the intrinsic natures of their relata" in the sense that they

all satisfy

the following

"Principle of Independent Variation":

[PIV]

a world at which xRy, then there is a single world at which there
exists both a duplicate of x and a duplicate of
y but at which the duplicate
of x does not bear R to the duplicate of y.
If

there

It

should be emphasized that here Lewis making a claim only about

is

natural external relations;
'relation' that

[PrV]

is

it is

he thinks must

clearly false of

some

only the external relations in the sparse sense of
satisfy [PIV]

on pain of unintelligibility. Indeed,

external relations in the abundant sense of 'relation'.

Otherwise, satisfaction of [PIV] would have to follow from the definition of
'externality' alone,

but

it

doesn't. In fact all that follows

following weak version of [PFV]:

is

that they satisfy the

lU’eak PIV]

If there is a ^vorld at tvhich
Kx_v, then there is
u orld at hich
there exists a duplicate of x and there is
some world at which there exists a
duplicate of y and the duplicate of x does not
bear R to the duplicate of y.

And

satisfaction of

[Weak PIV] by some

satisfaction of
it

fails

that

it fail

some
fails

among

[Weak PIV] does not

among

[PIV];

it

its relata.

y,

whereas

and

of x

Then

it

is

is

satisfaction of [PIV] requires

And

y.

would

relation that

Indeed, there

that x bears to
y requires only that

entities at distinct

coexistent duplicates.

would be an external

nature of

and

among coexistent duplicates
among

R

relation

possible duplicates of x

relation never holds

entail satisfaction of [PIV]. For

it

may be,

for instance, that

worlds even though

satisfy

it

never

[Weak PIV] but not

not strongly independent of the

an obvious example of such a (non-natural)

external relation of this kind: coexistence!

(And

if

MR were right in identifying

coexistence with spatiotemporal connectedness, spatiotemporal connectedness

would

also be a counterexample.

Now the problem for ME is clear:
relation to satisfy both [PFV]
to

make

and

it is

logically impossible for

[M]. So since selection

must

satisfy

any natural
[M]

sense of the idea that the ersatz worlds are representational),

ersatzer insists

on

classifying selection as external, then she

existence of a quite unprecedented sort of external relation

vary independently of the natures of
according to Lewis,

this is just

its relata,

unacceptable

one

is

if

(in

order

the

committed

to the

- one which does

that violates [PFV']-

— such a relation

is

not

And,

simply

"unintelligible" or "magical":

be one fact that somewhere within @, a donkey talks; and an
entirely independent fact that @ enters into a certain external relation with
this proposition and not with that. What stops it from going the other
way?. ..What spell constrains it to correspond rigidly to the goings-on in
It

seems

to

the concrete world?^^
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This argument perhaps has

some

magical ersatzer need not be worried by
really a fact at

all:

there

is

just

initial

it.

appeal, but

no good reason

I

find Lewis s discussion here a

what he
in

then does Lewis think there

intends.

However,

what he writes and

it

I

to think that

know

of

it

really

fact is
is

not

of the

[PFV'].

is?

little

obscure, and

The

to

I

cannot be sure exactly

be worth considering each regardless of which

first

consists in

an invitation

intuitions about the nature of spatiotemporal relations.

...we

argue that the

think three connected justifications can be discerned

seems

best represents his views.

^vill

For the second putative

nature of external relations quite generally to
satisfy

Why

I

no external

to generalize

Lewis points out

our
first

that

relations except the (strictly or analogically)

spatiotemporal ones. ..37

And
It is

spatiotemporal relations, he notes, intuitively could not

just unintelligible that there

fail to satisfy

[PIV].

should be

a necessary connection between the intrinsic character of a thing and its
[spatiotemporal] relations to other things. It cannot be.. .that there is an

absolutely necessary connection... whereby every charged particle must be
exactly a certain distance from another particle. It’s one thing for a particle
to

be charged, another thing for two particles to at a certain distance - the
involvement of the same particle is not enough to make the

common

alleged connection intelligible.. .spatiotemporal arrangement may var\'
independently of the intrinsic nature of the things arranged .3^

But

know

of

if

spatiotemporal relations are the only natural external relations

and these

all satisfy

Once we suppose

[PIV] then.

that there are further external relations [than

spatiotemporal relations], for instance the one by which the concrete

we

I7<)

u-wld allegedly selects abstract simple
propositions, then our prmdple
independence |i.e. the pnndple that all spatiotemporal
relations satisfy
IPIV II needs to be generalised...|But this
generalizahon is

of

'

lustitied

No matter what novel external

because]

relations there may be, it remains
unintelligible that the intrinsic nature of a thing
should constrain the
external relations in which it stands.^‘^

Thus,

all

natural external relations satisfy [PW].

This

is

an argument from analogy:

all

spatiotemporal relations satisfy

[PIV], these are the only (natural) external relations

we know of,

suppose there are more, then they must be analogous

and so we must suppose

that, like

Arguments from analogy
particularly
First,

weak

for

Lewis

is

two

we

spatiotemporal relations

spatiotemporal relations, they too satisfy [PIV].

reasons.

trying to establish a claim about natural external relations

spatiotemporal relations.
all

if

are notoriously difficult to assess. But this seems

quite generally, but he holds that

generalize to

to

so,

And

we have only

this is

a single

model

of such relations

an extremely skimpy basis from which

and probably

necessarily existent entity, a proposition.

perfectly natural selection relation,

it

from spatiotemporal

would

clearly

relations.

And

have

to

is

an

But spatiotemporal

relations take only concrete contingent particulars as their relata. So

kind of relation

to

external relations.

Second, notice that the second relatum of a putative external selection
abstract

if

there

were a

be a quite different

this greatly

diminishes the

force of the analogy.

The second connected
relations quite generally

sort of justification for holding that external

would have

to satisfy [PIV] consists in

recombination principle. The recombination principle has two

which

-

an appeal

to the

parts, the first of
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requires that anything can coexist with anything,
and which thereby
prohibits a necessary connection between the
intrinsic character of a thine
and the intrinsic character of distinct things with
which it coexistsd«

The second, roughly,

prohibits a necessary connection betw^een the
intrinsic

character of a thing and the intrinsic character of
distinct things with which
to coexist; roughly,

it fiiils

guarantees that a duplicate of anything can coexist with a

it

duplicate of anything elseT^

The recombination
of modality can

principle

is

very plausible and no metaphysical theory

do without something

like

it.

But the principle

explicitly

concerns only two relations: the relations of coexisting with and the relation
of
failing to coexist with.

So neither part of the recombination principle

actually guarantees that external relations

must

itself

satisfy [PIV] quite generally.

"Nevertheless" Lewis writes,

...I

take

it

that

we are dealing with something akin

to our.. .principle of

recombination. ..We equally need a companion principle which prohibits a
necessary connection between the intrinsic character of a thing and its
external relations to other things.. .42

But the

fact that selection relates concrete particulars to abstract, necessarily

existent entities rather

than other concrete particulars also undermines

to generalize the recombination principle. For

need such a companion principle

among

their relata.

Any

to

it

seems

that

we do

this

appeal

not equally

cover relations that take necessary

entities

metaphysical theory, like ]VIR or ME, that adopts a

quantification theory of modality "needs"

some form

in

order to guarantee a plenitude of worlds.

to

do justice

And

of recombination principle

the plenitude

to the pre- theoretical data of modality.

is

But the data

needed

in order

in question

consist only of intuitions concerning distinct concrete, contingent particulars.
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Roughly, any such particulars could exist or

fail

to coexist

with any other. But the

range of the selection relation consists entirely
of abstract, necessanly existent
entiHes

-

propositions.

recombination of

no need

And we just have no

corresponding intuitions about the

entities that are either abstract or necessarily
existent.

for a theory to incorporate a principle
to express them.

necessarily, then there

is

no sense

in

which

it

can

fail to

If

an

So there

is

entity exists

coexist \vith anything.

At

best the recombination principle requires
generalizing to cover only external
relations

among

concrete contingent particulars.

Like the appeal to analogy to with spatiotemporal
relations, the appeal to
the recombination principle cannot be taken to establish
that a relation like
selection that takes abstract
to satisfy [PFV']

on pain

But perhaps
writes. Often

existent relata

would have

of unintelligibility.

we can also discern a

he seems

to

third sort of justification in

be making a straightforw'ard appeal

about the nature of external

What makes

and probably necessarily

to

what Lewis

our intuitions

relations:

a relation external,

I

would have thought,

holds independently of the natures of the hvo

exactly

is

that

it

relata.^^

No matter what novel external

relations there may be, it remains
unintelligible that the intrinsic nature of a thing should constrain the
external relations in which it stands.*^

how can these connections be necessary?

seems to be one fact that
somewhere within @, a donkey talks; and an entirely independent fact that
@ enters into a certain external relation with this proposition and not udth
that. What stops it from going the other way?^^
I

ask:

It

Perhaps then, even

about recombination are
external relation should

One way

to

if

parallels with spatiotemporal relations

rejected,

fail to

respond

argued that the claim that

if

all

just plain unintelligible that

intuitions

an

[PR1.

would be

to dismiss

it

as rhetorical.

I

have

external relations satisfy [PFV^] does not follo\v
from

and so

Lewis

only natural external relations
to bare intuitions

satisfy

to this

the definition of 'externality'

abundant sense. Now,

it is still

and

that

it is

false

if

'relation' is

taken in the

right that spatiotemporal relations really are
the

is

we know of,

then

it is

hard

to see

how

this

appeal

could be anything but a mere rhetorical flourish to the

argument from analogy. For what other source

for intuitions

external relations could there possibly be than meditation

spatiotemporal relations

A second way

to

about the nature of

on the "nature"

of

spatiotemporal relations have a nature)

(if

respond would be

natural external selection relation

to

argue that in trying

we should be guided

to envisage a

not by our intuitions

about the nature of spatiotemporal relations but by our intuitions about external
relations that take abstract, non-contingent entities

not as natural as

we are supposing

our typical spatiotemporal
they take the

However,
is

same type

it is

far

from clear that these do

relations, this relation takes as

relation.

be and perhaps not as natural as

satisfy [PFV].

number one. Like

its first

(whatever they might

do with

be).'^^

selection

that

relations, this

seems

to

stick s

and spatiotemporal
entity.

And,

be an external

in meters o/relation to

the intrinsic properties of the
like selection

some

meters 0/ relation.

relatum a contingent concrete

For whether or not x bears the has a length
to

Suppose

Now consider the has a length in

and spatiotemporal

number n has nothing

These are

of relata as the putative external selection relation.

stick bears this relation to the

also like selection

their relata.

relations. But, unlike spatiotemporal relations, at least

exactly one meter in length.

The

selection to

among

number n

but unlike spatiotemporal

some
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relations, this relation takes as
entity.

But

fails to satisf\'

it

its

second relatum a non-contingent abstract

[PW]. Like selection

rigidly" to the intnnsic properties of

its first

one

is

of

its

intrinsic properties

"corresponds

relatum: any duplicate of

world whatsoever must also bear the relation
of a thing

this relation

to the

number one. For

and so does not

var>'

s at

any

the length

among

duplicates.

In conclusion then, neither appeals to the
analogy with spatiotemporal
relations,

nor appeals to something "akin"

even appeals
have

to

to the

recombination principle, nor

bare intuitions about external relations establish that they
would

to satisfy [PIV].

This

is

principally because selection

concrete particulars and abstract, necessarily existent
different kind

from spatiotemporal

relations

is

a relation between

entities.

So

it is

of a quite

and there just are no corresponding

recombinatorial intuitions to justify extending the recombination principle.
Lewis

has failed to
fail to satisfy

make

do with

some

if

there

is

a mystery here,

it

the nature of abstract entities

particulars.

of

unintelligible

it is

how an external

seems

and

to

be a quite general one having

their relations to concrete

Every plausible metaphysical theory of modality posits the existence

abstract entities, e.g. sets, universals, propositions

relation that concrete particulars bear to these entities e.g.
instantiation, selection etc.

not

all

And

etc.,

together with a

membership,

in all cases this relation is differential:

some but

concrete particulars bear the relation to a given abstract entity. But

these relations are

modal

in

some sense

plausible form of recombination.
sets

relation could

[PIV].

In fact,
to

his case that

have

their

members

If

x

essentially.

is

or other; they
a

And

member of y,
if

violate

then

some

initially

this is necessarily so;

x instantiates universal U, then so

must any duplicate of x; universals correspond
properties.

all

all

When abstract entities are involved

to perfectly natural intrinsic
it is

just not the case that
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"anything can coexist with or

Inwagen points out^,
hardly reject the
classical

is

intelligibility of

Lewis himself. For he can
of rejecting both

MR and

Lewis replies that the necessity involved

not quite the same as that involved in selection
or instantiation:
rigidly" to the identities of

its relata,

whereas selection

instantiation "correspond rigidly" to the qualitative
natures of their relata.

Lewis concedes,

But, as
less

for

membership on pain

unintelligible.

membership "corresponds
and

coexist with anything else." .And as
van

even poses a problem

this

mathematics as

membership

fail to

this

type of necessary connection seems to be scarcely

mysterious. 49

Nor, of course,

and

abstract entities
relations to

be

is

there

much prospect of gaining

a better understanding of

their relations to concrete particulars

internal.

by supposing these

For then the differential membership of concrete

particulars in sets, or their differential instantiation of universals,

be in part a matter of the

how could

the relations

would have

intrinsic properties of the sets or the universals.

depend on

that?

For one thing, no-one seems

to

to

But

have any

idea what the intrinsic properties of abstract entities really are (Plato's Forms are
self-predicating but
thing,

it is

hard

Moore denounced such a view

to see

how abstract

any other)

(or

intrinsically intentional in the required

these abstract entities are simple
entities believe that

some are

entities really

Finally,

if

Lewis

is

could be
right

—

these relations

failed to give us a

external relations that violate [PFV]

is

common

if

one relatum

is

in abstract

compelling reason to think an

would be magical. Moreover,

may be an example.

of

would be unnameable.

external relation that violates [PIV]

meters 0/ relation

and some

— and most philosophers who believe

simple^^

To summarize: Lewis has

way.

as absurd).^^^ For another

not unprecedented

-

Indeed, such relations

the existence of

the has a length in

may

well be quite

concrete and the other abstract. Finally,

if

there

is

really

IS

a

mysten- here,

it is

eveiyone's mysterj-. Similar difficulties
seem

to beset

metaphysical theory that posits abstract entities
differenhally related
particulars,

even Lewis's

be wielded against

own modal

realism.

dilemma

establish a compelling case for rejecting
it

the

concrete

problem cannot legitimately

ME in particular.

Since both horns of Lewis's

whichever way

So

to

any

are inconclusive, he has failed to

ME on grounds of unintelligibility

classifies its primitive relation of selection.

See chapter two for details.
Indeed there are some interesting and prima facie plausible
arguments to the effect that
such an analysis is compulsory; there is no adequate
altemahve to explaining the effect of
modalization other than as altering the domains of the
quantifiers in some way. For a
discussion of these arguments and some possible responses
see P. Bricker, "Quantified Modal
Logic and the Plural De Re", in MtdWest Studies in Philosophy
XIV: Contemporary Perspectives in
the Philosophy of Lmgua^e II, Peter A. French,
Theodore Uehling, Howard K. Wettstein (eds.),
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1

^

and Modality",

1989), pp. 372-94; C. Parsons, "Sets

Mathematics in Philosophy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), pp.
298-341; A.P. Hazen, "Against Pluralism", in Australasian journal
of Philosophy, vol. 71 No. 2
in his

(1993), pp. 132-44; and others.
^ D. K. Lewis, Plurality
p. 137.

Lewis adds that "not only the entire concrete world, but lesser
concrete individuals as well, have abstract representations: these are ersatz
individuals.." But,
as stipulated in chapter one, 1 am ignoring the part of metaphysical
theories of modality that
has to do with possibilities for individuals where this is distinct from possibilities
that have to
do with entire worlds.
'^See Plurality 3.2 Linguistic Ersatzism
pp. 142-165
174.
5

^

and

Pluraliti/ 3.3 Pictorial

Ersatzism pp. 163-

Here of course 'the actual world' is not to be construed as a rigid designator.
The definition of 'selection' would run roughly as follows: For any property F and

proposition
F,

where p

the actual world selects or makes-true =df.
p
p represents that the actual world
the (unique) element necessarily selected iff the actual world really is F.

p,

is

is

^Plurality, p. 175. This quote is actually a little misleading. For MB's denial that the elements
are concrete does not clearly rule out either
or the other forms of ersatzism. For, as 1
mentioned above, in saying that its elements are abstract all that the magical ersatzer is
committing himself to is their causal inertness. And all the other theories also agree that

MR

worlds are causally inert or at least causally isolated. It is the magical ersatzer's denial that
her elements have any structure that rules out these other interpretations. Indeed, even this

may

overstate the case. For MB's

sets of worlds.

And

then

if

we

maximal elements

worlds — correspond to MR's unit
mean 'membership', then MR is ruled

-- its

interpret 'selection' to

out as an instance of MB only because MB calls 'worlds', what MR would call 'unit-sets of
worlds'. So the reader should consider whether when the adjustments are made for this
difference, Lewis's objection to magical ersatzer can be recast as an argument against his own

MR!
^

Lewis objects

to this usage:

18 ()

vvou d be wrong tor the ersatzer
be caUed worlds, unless they say

It

to

narne...\ot a

good position

tor

to

say

m general

that abstract representat.ons
are

even when there ,s a concrete claimant
the would-be triends of common
sense!
,t

to the

{Plnml.h/

p

ut of course the ersatzer is not m the
business of quibbling about names; for her
'world' is a
term of art that refers to whatever it is that
is implicitly quantified over
in modal discourse
She IS certainly not denying that @ exists. Nor
need she deny that it deserves to be called a'
world she could easily accept some sort of
terminological
;

accommodate

However, she

this.

revision to her theory to

denying the modal realist's claim that @ is one of
the
entities implicitly quant^ied over
m ordinary modal discourse and she is denying the modal
eahst's claim that in order to analyze
modalization we need to suppose that there is more
than one maximal fusion of spatiotemporally
interconnected particulars. She also holds that
what pts quantified over m modal talk are actual
entities, albeit abstract ones, a thesis the
modal realist denies. Such differences with the modal
realist presumably need to be marked
termmologically somehow,
^ This definition

is

common

sense notwithstanding.

justified by the mereological axioms set
out in chapter two. For as Lewis
points out these axioms justify us in talking of
"the fusion oP', and relying on it to be a
unctor defined for any plural argument whatsoever.
See D. K. Lewis, Parts of Classes p 74
r
is

'

Pluralih/, p. ]82.

’1 In

what follows

consider only binary relations. This simplifies the
discussion and
is all that is needed.
The parenthetical remark is required to avoid conflating the distinct
possibilities aRb and
bRa when the relation is asymmetrical.
^ The reticence about charges
is due to the fact that charges may be
relational rather than
intrinsic properties. For more on this issue see chapter
four above.
Again I should note that if duplication thus defined is to hold among
complexes as well as
simples, it needs to be assumed that some structural properties
are perfectly natural
Here clause (b) is required to guarantee that the account gets the order of
since selection

is

I

will

clearly a binary relation this

the relata right so

as to cover asymmetric relations

(cf. fn. 12).

Plnralitif, p. 176.

l^P/z/m/ih/, p. 177.
Plnralih/, p. 178.

M. jubien, "Could
M. Jubien, "Could
M. jubien, "Could
Jubien recognizes

this

this
this
this

be Magic?", Philosophical Revieiu, 100 (1991), pp. 249-67.
be Magic?", pp. 254-5.
be Magic?", pp. 254-5.
point but dismisses

it:

What is true of solubility and burning ought to be true of selection as well. TTiere is
indeed a fundamental difference between the former relations and selection. It is that
we are necessarily isolated from the intrinsic features of propositions, whereas we are
not so isolated from those of material things. But if we agree that grasping can take
place without a knowledge of these intrinsic features, then this difference, though
fundamental, is inessential. ("Could this be Magic?", p. 255) [Jubien calls selection
"makes-true", but

1

have restored Lewis's original term.|

Surely the reply is that a knowledge of these features is essential unless we have
knowledge of their outward manifestations. This we have in the case of Jubien's propensity to
be burned by relation, but not in the case of the selection relation.
Here is an argument to show that there are at least two-to-the-continuum-many worlds.
There are continuum-many space-time points at the actual world. Each may be occupied by
some matter or be vacant. And whether or not any point is occupied or vacant is logically
independent of whether any other point is occupied or vacant. So any pattern of occupancy

18

cyid

xacancv

is

a

way

that the

world

might have been and so is a wav some
world is There
two-the-contmuum-many such patterns and so at least
that many worlds
There are enough mathematical properties
of course. And it seems that we
can legitimately
aim to grasp them, and that they are capable
of instantiation by abstract entities
But it is
unclear whether these properties are capable
of instantiation by simples. Perhaps
these are all
^
properties of sets and (many) sets have internal
structure
are

'

'

Clarendon

1978^1.6.""'"'
2^

But even

to

claim that

we

grasp

coun as (sparse) determinables
pi
?7 l-’lurality,

this

in the

Press,

kind is problematic. It ,s far from clear
that they would
sense explained in chapter three. However
since it is a

postpone consideration of

^

p.\7S.

it.

Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford,

New York: Basil Blackwell
Fourth Edition, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Ln.vers.ty l^ress 1^983) esp. chapter 4; W. V. O.
Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, MA:
IT Pre'ss 1960), S. A. Knpke,Wiri^eiisf(’m on
Rides and Private Language, (Cambridge MAHarvard University Press, 1982); H. Putnam, “Models
and Reality", repnnted in his Realism
and Reason, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1-25.
1983),
953), N.

Goodman,

Fact, Fiction

and

Forecast,

pp.

"Potnam's Paradox", Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 62 (1984) pp.
'

'

221-36.

P. van Inwagen, 'Two concepts of Possible
Worlds", in MidWest Studies in Philosophy XI
Studies in Essentiahsm, Peter A. French, Theodore
E. Uehlingjr. and Howard K. Wettstein
(eds.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1986), pp. 185-213. The quote is from
p
^
T
70A
It might be wondered whether this
condition is trivially sahsfied by selection: does
hold that that there is just one concrete world,
@, and that @ has no

duplicates?

It is

ME not

correct

that there is a single concrete world @ according to
ME. And that there is a single world that
represents things exactly as they are, p*, one actualized world.
But ME also aims to analyze

Iterated modalities and the modality involved in restricted
quantification. Eor, as I pointed
out in 2.2.2 one of the great advantages of an analysis of
modality in terms of quantification
over worlds is that it subsumes a great many apparently disparate idioms,
e.g. ethical

contexts, scientific contexts by treating

them as involving restricted quantification over
worlds. And restricted quantification and contexts involving iterated
modalities must be
understood as involving implicit reference to the actual world. And that is why sense
must be
made of worlds representing duplicates of the actual world.
^2 p. van Inwagen, 'Two concepts
of Possible Worlds".
Plurality, p. 181.

Plurality, p. 181.

^^This discussion does however bring out an odd feature of Lewis's use of 'naturalness'. He
uses in two ways corresponding to the two traditional roles that properties (and relations) are
called on to play ~ a semantic role and a metaphysical role. On the one hand, Lewis suggests
that if the denotation of a predicate cannot be fixed by listing the instances of the property or
relation

it

expresses, then that property or relation must have a certain degree of naturalness.
it just would not be nameable at all (see e.g. D. K. Lewis, "Putnam's Paradox"). By

Otherwise,

this criterion, coexistence

natural. For

we have

coexistence because

and spatiotemporal connectedness cannot be completely non-

predicates for them.

(It

may be objected

that

we have

a predicate of

defined in terms of parthood (and spatiotemporal connectedness).
But the same objection applies to parthood: we can name it, even though its instances are as
miscellaneous as can be.) On the other hand, the naturalness of a property or relation is
it is

supposed to be a measure how objectively similar its instances are. By this criterion,
coexistence and spatiotemporal connectedness are non-natural. For the recombination
rinciple guarantees that their instances are about as miscellaneous as can be.

S

’

Plurality, p. 180.
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P/
p. 181 Here he means that there are
no mtnral external relations other
than these
This eaves open the possibility that the
argument might be circumvented by classifying
selecbon as external but non-natural. But this
is not a promising line
to take: Below we will
onsider an arg^ument against the supposition
that selection could be an internal
relation
ewis argues that in that case it is only by
magic that 'selects' could be our word for
such a
relation, it would be entirely out of
reach of our thought and language".
will suggest that
^ argument, but only if we can
appeal to the naturalness of
seller
election. Since this argument would
also seem to go through even if the
relation were
external we had better allow that selection
is a natural relation. For if it
is not, then ME falls
to Lewis s objection that we could
not grasp it.

'

1

V

Pliiralitif, p.

181.

Plurality, p. 180.

Moreover, the principle

not

quite right as
stands. For x and
y may be duplicates. And
2
then at any world at which x exists, so does a
duplicate of
is

it

y.

because coexistence
entities.

f^rom y,

And

if

even

if

we

is

reflexive yet clearly

Lewis has

in

restrict the principle to distinct entities,

they are duplicates, then a duplicate of x

But this problem arises only

mind
it

may

relations

seems
fail

among distinct

correct.

If

x

is

to coexist with

duplicate of y.

because

we

are ignoring the "size

abovIT^'^'

and shape permitting" proviso

distinct

any
^

distinct

(see chapter

two

Plurality, p. 181.
Plurality, p. 180.
Plurality, p. 181.
Plurality, p. 180.

Moreover, Lewis does say that if selection is external, we may as
well suppose that the
elements ''lack any intrinsic nature". Many might doubt that the notion
of something lacking
in any intrinsic nature really makes sense. Though, as
Lewis points out, perhaps the
spatiotemporal relations provide us with a precedent. But this supposition
only seems to
strengthen the case for saying that Lewis's appeals to intuitions about the
unintelligibility of
an external selection relation derive any force they have from analogy with
spatiotemporal
relations.

were internal, an adaptation of Lewis's argument would commit him
unnameable, which it clearly is not.
van Inwagen, 'Two Concepts of Possible Worlds", pp. 207ff.

For
that
P.

it

if it

to

holding

is

See his Parts of Classes, 2.2.
30 See e.g. Plato, Parmenides, in

Plato: The Collected Dialogues, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns
Princeton University Press, 1989), especially Part 1, and G. E. Moore,
Pnncipia Etliica, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 7ff.
Lewis thinks that singletons are simple (see Parts of Classes, chapter two).

(eds.), (Princeton, NJ:

CHAPTER SIX

MATHEMATICAL ERSATZISM
The
wQl
the

call

But

it

metaphysical theory

to

be examined in

this dissertation,

statuses of propositions:

Possibly

aims

p

iff

there

is

where p

I

some world

at

anv proposition,

is

which p

is true.

to define or logically construct all the notions

this analysis

-

propositions, worlds

resources of impure set-theory.

And

analyses and logical constructions,

and
it

all

and

the true-at relation

aims

to

do so

-

in such a

entities

modality to impure

set theory, in

mathematics

to

pure

wav

that given the

the data of modality are seen to be logical

much

the

same sense

it

that Russell

aims

to reduce

showed how

set theory.

In section 6.1.1 a naive version of mathematical ersatzism

presented.

involved in

using only the

consequences of the axioms of impure set-theory alone.i In short,

to reduce

what

mathematical" ersatzism, also endorses the
quantificational account of

modal

(Al)

final

- "NT" -

is

NT is very crude: many of its faults are glaringly obvious and no

author has or would have seriously endorsed

it.

Nevertheless, focusing

on

it

permits a clear view of the advantages and disadvantages of NT's guiding
philosophical ideas.
three of the
6.5.

Some of

these advantages are discussed in section 6.1.2,

more important disadvantages

are discussed in sections

6.3, 6.4

and

and

In the final section, 6.6, a version of mathematical ersatzism that incorporates

Structural

Nominalism

is

taken up. Achieving a complete and satisfactory

reduction of modality to impure set-theory

is

a very

tall

order and

this

version

still falls

considerably short.

which the mathematical

6.1

A

It

does however point

ersatz project

Consider

actual

NT

Analyses, Logical Constructions
first

our positive modal

space comprehends a plenitude of
Lewis, that a

in

might be pursued.

Naive Mathemarical Ersatz Theoryf

6.1.1 Definitio ns,

promising direction

to a

first

intuitions, those that

possibilities. In 1.3

I

tell

us that logical

suggested, following

step in characterizing these intuitions consists in thinking
of the

world as articulated

in a certain

way.

Specifically,

it is

to

be thought of as

consisting of four elements: a stock of individuals or point-instants,
a system of
external relations

among

them, a stock of perfectly natural properties, and an

instantiation relation that determines

among

how

the intrinsic properties are distributed

the individuals. All else supervenes

on this.

Roughly, the instantiation relation determines

how the various elements

world —

and

that constitute the actual

properties

-

its

framework,

are "combined" to determine

all

its

individuals,

the facts about

however, the way these elements are actually combined

many. Actually

is

it.

just

its

Intuitively,

one way among

my car is red and my computer grey, but an alternative

combination of the very same elements would have

my

car instantiating greyness

and

my computer redness. And intuitively the plenitude of logical space requires

that

it

comprehend

all

such alternative combinations.

NT aims to characterize these intuitions set-theoretically. The first step is
to define the notion of a 'combination' or 'possible fact':

(Dl)

a combination or a possible fact =df. x is an (n-t-l)-tuple of an n-place
relation followed by n individuals (a property is taken to be a one-place
X

is

relation).

191

Possible facts can be thought of as encoding
or "representing"

are

combined with properties and

(D2)

Possible fact

f

my car is

red,

computer
latter

is

fact

and <redness,

red.

individuals

relations:

represents that xi,...,Xn instantiate

For instance, the possible

how

<redness,

f is

<R,

xi,...,Xn>.

my car> may be taken to represent that

my computer> may be

The former happens

R =df.

taken

to

represent that

my

to represent things as they actually are; the

only as they might be.
All quantificational accounts of modality appeal to the
notion of a possible

world.
will

If

such theories are

have

to

to get the facts of

modality

right,

many

possible facts

be true at a given world, so worlds are identified not with individual

possible facts, but with collections of them:

(D3)

X

is

a world =df. x

is

a class of possible

A characteristic feature of ersatzism is that
representational entities. So
possible facts that

(D4)

it

takes worlds themselves to be

NT just takes a world to represent all and only those

contains:

A world w represents that so-and-so =df. there is a possible fact f that
represents that so-and-so and

To relate
modality, (Al),

this

f is

a

member of w.

account of worlds and what they represent

to its analysis of

NT follows MR in identifying propositions with classes of worlds

and the

truth-at relation with

(LCl) X

is

(D5)

it

facts.

a proposition

iff

x

is

membership:

a class of worlds.^

A proposition p is true at a world w =df. w is a member of p.^
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As

stands, this version of mathematical ersatzer

it

is still silent

cruaal question of the nature of properties and
relations. In order
the

bounds

of

impure

XT simply

set theor>',

on the

to stay

within

adopts MR's set-theoretical

constructions of properties and relations:^

(LC2a)

F

is

a property in the

abundant sense of 'property'

iff

F

is

a class

of individuals.

(LC2s)

F

a property in the sparse sense of 'property'
individuals and F is perfectly natural.
is

R

(LC3s)

is

an n-place

relation in the

This completes NT.^
Nevertheless,

it

a class of

its

As I mentioned above

flaws,

Some Advantages
Modal realism

and R

is

of

it is

iff

iff

R

R is

is

a

perfectly natural.

it is

a very crude theory.

number of significant advantages over modal

has a

before considering

realism.

And

instructive briefly to consider these advantages.

NT over MR

identifies its

worlds with maximal spatiotemporally

interconnected fusions of concrete particulars.

one

is

sparse sense of 'relation'

class of n-tuples of individuals

(Al),

F

R is an n-place relation in the abundant sense of 'relation'
a class of n-tuples of individuals.

(LC3a)

6.1.2

iff

And

to

guarantee the adequacy of

MR posits the non-actual existence of a vast plurality of such particulars:

for each

way

that, intuitively, the actual

world might have been. But the

existence of such a vast plurality does not follow from any principles to which

we

are already committed e.g. the axioms of set-theory, mereology or principles

about the existence of ordinary concrete particulars.
existential

commitments.

And many

implausible. Furthermore,

think these additional commitments wildly

by identifying worlds with maxmal spatiotemporally

interconnected fusions of concrete particulars,
a priori

commitment

MR requires additional

MR thereby incurs an implausible

to the impossibility of "island universes",

worlds whose
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spatiotemporal structure

spatiotemporally disconnected. For no fusion of

is

concrete particulars having such a structure

By

contrast, x\T identifies

sets are not

prima

facie

its

is

maximal.^

worlds with

sets of a certain kind. Since these

deftned by reference to spatiotemporal connectedness,
there
reason to think that

NT will entah

is

just

no

the impossibility of island

universes.

Prima

facie,

both committed

NT is now also more economical than MR. NT and MR are

to the

axioms

of

impure

set-theory,

mereology and

to the

existence of actual concrete particulars. But the axioms of impure set
theory

already guarantee a plenitude of

plenitude NT, unlike

sets.

So

to

guarantee that

MR, needs no additional

its

worlds constitute a

existential axioms.

And, of course,

NT thereby avoids precisely those of MR's existential commitments that
provoked so many incredulous
people

NT's

you and me,

just like

existential
xA third

stares:

cities of

commitments are

NT is

advantage of

modality better than

MR.

If

a commitment to countless infinities of

cheese and purple cows. In Lewis's words,

"safe
that

and sane".

it

seems

to explain the positive data of

a metaphysical theory

is

genuinely

to

explain the

positive data of modality, this data should follow from the theory. In particular,
if

modality

is

to

enough simply
exists a

world

be understood in terms of quantification over worlds,
that for every

that is that

way

that the actual

way; the theory should

it is

not

world might have been, there
entail the existence of

aU these

worlds. For the modal realist this requires framing additional axioms to those of
set-theory

and mereology. Thus, according

to

MR would have to regard modal

reasoning as constituting an additional and autonomous subject-matter.^

Moreover,

it is

hard to see

how

such axioms without appeal

have

to

the

modal

modal

realist

could even manage to frame

notions. But even

to assert the existence of causally isolated,

if

she could, they would

mind-independent, concrete
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And

particulars.

could have come

knowledge

By

hard

it is

to see

know them

to

how we came
a priori.

contrast, since

axioms

to

impure

in

its

to the

And modal

axioms (indeed that

And

reasoning

pre-theoretical

is

thereby

commitment;

its

a priori status are then

although

priori status of the

this too is problematic, that

we know them a priori) is

not in dispute.

we know

everyone's problem, including of course the modal

Unfortunately, despite NT's

epistemological attractiveness

The Problem
Since

instances,

it

coextensive.

it

immense

simply

these

is

realist's.

theoretical

fails to

axioms

How the origin and

a priori status of the theorems of impure set-theory are to be explained

6.2

it is

subject-matter. Moreover, any problems about

problems of explaining the origin and a

set-theory.

to

set theory alone then entail the
plurality of

explaining the origin of our modal knowledge or

impure

^ve

For given the analyses and logical

this data.

which we already have a

no longer autonomous

of

how

MR would render the origin of modal

worlds required for the analysis of modality.

reduced

them, especially

NT identifies worlds with impure sets, it can claim

constructions, the axioms of

to

know

mysterious.*^

have genuinely explained

reduced

to

economy and

its

get the facts of modality right.

of Accidentally Coextensive Properties

NT identifies properhes and relations with sets of their actual
entails the identity of

Hence

it is

coextensive properties.

any

prop>erties or relations that are actually

susceptible to the famous problem of accidentally
It

entails for instance that the properties of having a heart

and having kidneys are one and

the

same property, and so

that there are

worlds where something has a heart but lacks kidneys or vice

no

versa. Since,

however, these are genuine
are

some genuine
To

possibilities, (Al) as

possibilities

axiom

is

axiom

of extensionality

the defining characteristic of sets.

ersatzism worthy of the

NT is

which are not represented by any

reject the set-theoretical

specious; this

understood by

name can

and

of

still

its

false:

there

worlds.

use set-talk

And no form

is

of

accept the existence of non-actual entities. Nor,

given NT's actualism, can properties be identified
with mereological fusions as
that

would

sets,

fusions are identical

still

entail the identity of accidentally coextensive
properties. For, like

the mereological

axiom

whenever constituted by the same

of the uniqueness of composition saysj.^o

that the only real option for

coextensive properties

entities (this is

is

amending

It

what

seems then

NT to deal vvdth the problem of

to reject the identification of properties

with

sets of their

instances.

Consequently, most philosophers

who have discussed forms of

mathematical ersatzism seem to have despaired of trying

to

provide logical

constructions of properties on the basis of set-theory and mereology alone. They

have simply assumed an additional ontological category

above those of particulars and

on

exactly

still

sets.^i

of properties over

and

And although these philosophers disagree

what properties are hke - some take them

others universals of various varieties

-

all

mathematical ersatzism, properties are taken

to

be Forms, others

tropes,

agree that for the purposes of

to

be sui generis

entities,

not

reducible to sets or sums.
This, however,

is

not an attractive line to take.

For one thing, the ontology-cum-ideology of mathematical ersatzism

would then be
have

to

less

parsimonious than that of modal realism. The ontology would

be expanded

relations.

to include

an additional category of properties and

And since instantiation can no longer be identified with membership.

1

the ideology

may

also need to be

expanded

to include

some

additional primitive

relation that entities bear to properties.'^

For another, any claim
clearly

to a pre- theoretical

more questionable than

grasp of these

new elements

a claim to grasp the old elements

-

is

witness the

long history of dispute over the nature of properties
and instantiation and the

number

of

widely divergent accounts proposed in the current

In short,

properties

and

NT abandons

if

the attempt to set-theoretically construct

relations in terms of actual particulars in response to the

of accidentally coextensive properties,

6.3

The Problem
All of

literature.

it is

no longer

clearly preferable to

MR.

of Implicit Representation

NT's possible

facts are

ordered (n+l)-tuples of a n-place relation

followed by n concrete particulars. They are

any "molecular"

problem

facts.

all

atomic in form. So none represents

These include "existential"

facts

are flying pigs, "conjunctive" facts such as the fact that

are red, "negative" facts such as the fact that

such as the

fact that there

my computer and my car

my car is not red, and so on. Notice

also that the possible facts concern only concrete particulars

and the

relations

and

properties they instantiate. So none represents any facts about abstract entities.

These include mathematical
facts (e.g. that the

worlds of

facts (e.g. that 2

NT itself constitute a plenitude, that no two
may be coinstantiated, and

determinates of a determinable

Now, since NT's worlds
and, by (Al), something
incorrectly entails that

is

all

+ 2 =4) and certain metaphysical

represent only those possible facts

possible only

if

represented by

these molecular, mathematical

are impossible. (Either that or

so on).

it

it

contains,

some world,

NT

and metaphysical

must renounce the attempt

to explain the

facts

modal

%
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statuses oiall propositions. But then

it

match

fails to

to the theoretical

po\ver of

MR.)

Lewis suggests two strategies

for

amending

NT in response to this

difficulty.

6.3.1 Strategy 1:

Redefining 'Representation'

Intuitively,

something

is

red,

if

it

my car were red,
would have

to

then

be that

a sense, any world that represents that

it

would

also

have

to

be that

my car is red or blue, and so on. So, in

my car is red,

represents the "molecular" facts that something

is

already thereby

red

etc.

And

this is the case

quite generally: since, intuitively, the molecular facts aU supervene
facts,

worlds that represent the atomic

corresponding molecular

facts.

facts,

by any

The first strategy
explicitly

(D6)

facts

we may stipulate

that they are

whatsoever.

what it thereby

what a world

implicitly represents:

A world w explicitly represents that so-and-so =df. there is a possible
fact

(D7)

the atomic

Moreover, since the mathematical and

exploits this insight. First, distinguish

represents from

on

thereby implicitly represent the

metaphysical truths are true come what may,
implicitly represented

implicitly

f

that represents that so-and-so

and

f is

a

member of w.

A world w implicitly represents that so-and-so =df. there is a possible
fact f that

w explicitly represents and

f

implies that so-and-so.

Then, simply redefine 'representation' to cover implicit as well as

explicit

representation:

(D4')

A world w represents that so-and-so =df. either w explicitly represents
that so-and-so or w implicitly represents that so-and-so.
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\\ ith this

amendment

in place,

XT's worlds

now represent

troublesome molecular, mathematical and metaphysical

my

explicitly represents that

implies

—

that

something

since, intuitively, the
fact

is

car

is

red,

red, that

it

facts.

Since

some world

also implicitly represents whatever this

my car is either blue or red, and so on. And

mathematical and metaphysical truths are implied by any

whatsoever, these are represented by every world.

Lewis argues,

But,

this strategy

cannot succeed. For the above definition of

'implicit representation' appeals to the relation of implication.
this is a fnodal notion; to
is

the

to say that

terms of
(Al).

it:

With

entirely

is

a

is to

modal

say that

it

it

fails to

of representation

notion;

than tinkering with

it is

red

be that 2 + 2 =

4.

And

if

NT fails

to

so, ultimately,

account for modality in

provide a reductive analysis.

it

notion of a possible

and invoking

fact.

form <R,

employed by

The idea

is

the implicitly

modal notion

to redefine 'possible facF so as to include all

Xn> where the

an

xi,...,

Xn's

and the R's are abstract

existential quantifier

an n-place sentence hmctor and

X 2 », <not, <F, XI », etc.^3

of implidt

NT might attempt instead to expand the

their relations; all pairs of

<3, F>; all tuples of

NT as originally formulated, is

simply the membership relation of set-theory. So rather

representation, Lewis suggests that

and

is

Redefining 'Possible FacF

The notion

entities

coiddn't but

'representation' thus redefined,

modal

something

notion, then so, implidtly, are those notions defined in

non-modal terms,

facts of the

that

implidt representation, representation, true-at and

6.3.2 Strategy 2:

not a

my car' s being red implies

my car couldn't be red unless something is red; to say that anything

implies that 2 + 2 = 4

implication

say that

And prima fade

Thus redefined, possible

n-facts,

and a property,

< &, <F,

facts will

xi>, <F',

indude what

are

intuitively

nil

the possible facts

about abstract

- molecular as

entities as well as facts

are sets of possible facts

facts will also

implicit representation

is

something be red, that

my car be red

effect, all

representation

about concrete

and they represent

molecular and abstract

well as atomic facts, and facts

all

entities.

Now,

since worlds

those facts that they contain, these

be represented by various worlds. Thus,

avoided without having

deny

to

or blue, or that

it is

that

it is

possible that

possible that 2 + 2 =

4.

In

is explicit.

There are a number of different ways in which such a redefinition
might
be carried out and different approaches encounter different technical
difficulties. 14
First,

g^t Lewis again argues that

some worlds

Intuitively,

will

doomed.i^

now contain too Jmv facts.

not possible that

it is

this entire strategy is

my car be red unless it is also the case

that

it is

that

my car be either red or green unless it is also the case that it is red or it is the

case that

either red or green,

it is

green;

case that either
is

it is

something

red,

and so

on.

And it is not possible

not possible that something be red unless

it is

also the

my car is red, or my computer is red, or the Empire State Building

red, or.. .Roughly, a

world should contain certain atomic facts only

also the molecular facts that supervene

molecular facts

is

it

on them; and

if it

should also contain some of the atomic

supervene. But cmi/ set of possible

facts

contains

if it

contains certain
facts

whatsoever qualifies

on which they

as a world. In

particular, there is nothing in the definition of a 'world' to guarantee that a

will contain

an atomic

molecular

facts that

molecular

facts e.g.

fact e.g. <redness,

supervene on

«redness,

requisite atomic facts

it

my car> only if it also contains

e.g. <3,

redness>. So

some

world

those

will contain

my car>, or, <greenness, my car» without the

— either <redness, my car> or <greenness, my car>. Nor is

there anything in the definition to guarantee that any world contains the
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mathematical and metaphysical

facts.

So some worlds

will not contain

some

of

them. But mathematical and metaphysical truths are
necessarily true and so they

should be true

at all worlds. In short, this strategy fails to respect
the very facts

about supervenience that motivated the

first

strategy.

Moreover, Lewis even argues that some of the metaphysical truths the
truths about the worlds themselves

So the problems of

explicitly represented.

avoided

entirely.

and what they represent -

just

could not be

implicit representation cannot be

Consider for instance any world E of NT.

represents that the concrete world is as E says it is, and not as any
other ersatz world says it is; and thereby E implicitly represents that it
...E

alone succeeds in correctly representing the concrete world, therefore, that
it alone is actualised. This is a special case, because
here it seems that the
representation almost has to be implicit. How could an ersatz world
explicitly represent its

own success and the others'

to explicitly represent the concrete world,

and

failures?

would have

It

itself correctly

representing

world and countless other ersatz worlds incorrectly
representing the concrete world. But each ersatz world thus represented
must itself represent, inter alia, all of the ersatz worlds. It is as if we had a
library, and every book in the library describes fully - say, by unabridged
direct quotation -- every book in the library.
the concrete

Second, again because NT's world are identified with any set of possible
facts

whatsoever, some will

facts of

modality

right,

it

now also contain too many facts.

should entail that

metaphysical truths are necessarily

NT. But
at

(<or,

<A, B>}

true even

logical truths are true at every

mathematical and

So

though none

it is

at

every world of

NT entails the existence of a world
of

its

disjimcts

one of NT's worlds. {<=, <+,

world even though

NT is to get the

So they should be true

qualifies as a world.

which a disjunction is

qualifies as a

true.

logical,

If

2,

is.

Thus, not

2>, 5>} also

a mathematical truth that 2 + 2

also fails to guarantee that mathematical truths are true at

all

all

worlds.

5.

So

NT

And

{<redness, a>, <blueness, a>} and {<Redness, a>, <redness, b>, <blueness, a + b>|
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also qualih- as worlds
instantiate

even though

two determinates

truth that the colour of a

Thus

of the

it is

a metaphysical truth that nothing can

same determinable, and

complex particular supervenes on

NT fails to guarantee that metaphysical

facts

each of these represents a
been;

all

parts.

worlds.

and worlds which represent too many

way

its

amended, there are now worlds

that, intuitively, the actual

facts.

world could

worlds are thus, in some broad sense of the term,

its

a metaphysical

the colour of

truths are true at

In short, this strategy fails because, thus

which represent too few

it is

inconsistent.

not

And
have

Nor will

it

help to supplement this strategy by also redefining 'world' to require that worlds

be consistent. For clearly consistency,

world

consistent

is

In

iff it

represents only

summary, the problem

modal

do.

They must represent molecular

represent

statuses of

all

all

propositions,

the necessary truths

what is

—

its

notion: a

possible.

of implicit represent

the

modal

like implication, is also a

is this. If

NT is to explain

worlds must represent more than they

as well as atomic facts,
logical truths,

and they must

mathematical truths and

metaphysical truths. But the mathematical ersatzer

is

faced with a dilemma:

if

she attempts to expand what her worlds represent by redefining 'representation',
she must find some

way

of doing so in

non-modal terms on pain of abandoning

the reductive enterprise. In particular, she

implication.

If,

on

'possible facf , she

must avoid

the other hand, she attempts to expand the definition of

must somehow guarantee

inconsistent, that

none represents what

since consistency

is

a

modal

that

none

of her worlds are

are, intuitively, impossibilities.

notion, she cannot simply adopt

pain of abandoning the reductive enterprise. (Al)

As Lewis

a primitive notion of

points out, really

is

it

And again

as a primitive

either false or circular.

on
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matters

It

little

whether

vve...[take the latter option]

and

face a

problem

of

saying which... [worlds] are consistent, or whether instead
we take...[the
former option] and face the problem of saying what.. .[the possible
facts]
imply. 1

But,

he also points out that there

is

a natural response to the above

argument;

way

Either

the

same remedy comes

to mind: we could replace our
primitive modality by a syntactic surrogate. We define consistency or
implication in terms of formal deduction, and we define our ersatz worlds

or their implicit representation from that.^^

we must think of NT as a language of some kind in order to make

First,

sense of references to

its

"syntax".

But the idea

is

pretty straightforward

(though there are some formidable technical details

Lnt be

worked out in

full).20

Let

the following language: each individual (and each abstract entity, each

set) is its

of Lnt;

if

own name in L; each property and

and

the existential quantifiers

relation

and other

is

a self-expressing predicate

logical devices, are also self-

expressing existential quantifiers and other logical devices of Lnt- In the same

way we

also

add any

variables

atomic sentence of Lnt
followed by n names.

It

is

and punctuation marks

that are required.

An

any n+1 tuple consisting of an n-place predicate

means

that the individuals

named

(i.e.

the

names

themselves) instantiate the property or relation expressed by the predicate
the predicate

way from

itself).

The other sentences

the atomic sentences.

And

of

their

Lnt are defined

in the usual recursive

meanings are specified

composition from the meanings of their parts. The upshot of
of

weU-formed sentences

of LNrji^st

as to include the molecular facts

and

is

(i.e.

in terms of

all this is

the set of possible facts of

that the set

NT expanded so

the facts about abstract entities. For
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instance,

means

any possible

fact of the form,

that <xi,.., Xn> instantiates R.

either as a possible fact of
fact represents.

NT and

So

<R,

xi,...,

Xp>

now we can

is

also a sentence of

that

think of each tuple in this set

NT or as a sentence of Lnj which means just what the

VVe can henceforth speak indiscriminately
of the possible facts of

the sentences of

Next,

we define what it is

for a set of sentences to

be maximal and

consistent, or

we define what it is

ways

from our study of formal languages.22 These

familiar

for

one

set of sentences to

imply another, in

definitions are

couched in terms only of si/ntactic features of the sentences of
Lnt; they involve

no reference

either expUcitly or implicitly to

mathematical ersatzer can after

all

any modal notions. So the

follow the

first

strategy

and define

'implicit

representation in non-modal terms by exploiting the (purely syntactic)
notion of
implication.

Or perhaps she could

follow the second strategy and expand the

notion of a possible fact as before, but redefine instead the notion of a world
as a

maximal and consistent set of sentences

of Lnj.

So perhaps,

after

all,

the

mathematical ersatzer can analyze modality.

Unfortunately, this syntactic approach

is

bound

to fall short of a full

solution to the problem.
First

because purely syntactical methods cannot guarantee that that every

mathematical truth

is

represented by every world and that no violation of any

mathematical truth

is

represented by any world. For purely syntactical methods

cannot suffice to characterize

all

the mathematical truths;

this,

of course,

is

one

the great lessons of twentieth-century logic.

Moreover, certain metaphysical truths are also bound

to

elude

characterization in syntactic terms. Lewis mentions three categories of

metaphysical truth.

First, there

are the facts about logical space as a whole such
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as the ones

among
of the

mentioned above. Second, there are

about the inter-relations

properties such as the fact that nothing can
instantiate hvo determinates

same determinable and

determinate also
facts

facts

falls

the fact that anything that instantiates
a

under the corresponding determinable.

Finally, there are

about the supervenience of properties of complex
particulars on the

properties of

and

car supervenes

sentences of

relations

among

on the colour of

Lnt

their parts e.g. the fact that the colour of

its

that suggests that

or that they violate

some

parts. Clearly, there is

what they express

true metaphysical principle.

we must look elsewhere

logical necessities,

is

my

nothing in the syntax of

a metaphysical necessity

To

characterize these non-

than to the syntax of the sentences in

terms of which they are expressed.

However,

syntactic

methods are not

mathematical ersatzer. All that

some way

is

required

of specifying the mathematical

the only tool available to the

is

that the mathematical ersatzer find

and metaphysical

truths in

non-modal

terms. Following Roper23, Lewis points out that the mathematical truths can be
specified as that set of sentences of the mathematical portion of the language (a

portion that can defined syntactically) which are true on the standard models of
arithmetic. This

is

specification but

acceptable.

Now,

a semantic or model-theoretic rather than syntactic

it

does not seem to involve any modal terms and so

the mathematical ersatzer can stipulate in his definition of a

world or of representation
true

on

is

that worlds represent mathematical claims

iff

they are

the standard models.

But

this still leaves the

metaphysical truths. Lewis again suggests a

method:

specify that certain sentences of the world-making language [i.e. Lnt] -are
axiomatic: then... logical consistency can take us the rest of the way.^'^
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One way

to specify a set is intensionally, in terms of

some condition

that

is

necessary and sufficient for membership. But having ruled
out syntactic

methods, the prospects for specifying the axiom
to

a

modality look bleak. There seems to be

non-modal condition

little

that characterizes all

That would be tantamount

set intensionally

point in simply casting around for

and only the metaphysical

to trying to guess at

But nor can the axiom set be specified

an analysis

extensionalli/,

truths.

of modality!

by

For the required metaphysical axioms will be probably be

some may

without appeal

listing its

infinite in

members.

number and

well be infinite in length.

To guarantee,
category, the axioms
instantiates

for instance, all the metaphysical truths in the second

must

entail,

two incompatible

explicitly or implicitly

among

properties.

other things, that no particular

But no axiom can appeal

modal notion on pain

to

any

of renouncing the reductive

enterprise. That rules out primitive reference to incompatzM/fy or to a

determina/7 /e.

It

seems

that the only option

is

to include

something

is

red, then

it is

not blue;

something

is

red, then

it is

not yellow... etc; and

is

not negatively charged; and

clearly there will

And
axiom

to

be

infinitely

guarantee

set will also

between global

have

facts

all

if

if

something

something

is

red, then

if it is

is Ig,

each of the following:
it

is

not green;

if

if

positively charged, then

then

it is

it

not 2g; and so on. But

many of these.25

the metaphysical truths in the third category, the

to include sufficient

and the

local facts

axioms

to

cover

all

the connections

on which they supervene;

for instance,

axioms about the connection between the arrangements and properties of
particles

with global

Each such an axiom

facts

will

about the existence and

intrinsic properties

presumably be some kind of

donkeys.

conditional to the effect that if - here follows a
ver\^ long, perhaps
infimtan', description of the arrangement and
properties of the pointparticles - then there is a talking donkey

But even

many

if

the mathematical ersatzer did have the ability
to

things, to define the

know exactly which axioms

axiom

set

by an

to include.

explicit

'if

she would

She would need

omniscience. For instance, she would need to
of the form,

list

a sort of

that

if

still

infinitely

have

to

modal

know precisely which conditionals

point-particles are arranged in such-and-such a

such-and-such properties, then there's a talking donkey' are

seems

list

way and have

true.

And

it

just

a theory requires this kind of omniscience in order to
complete

analysis of modality, then that theory

is

its

misguided. Lewis:

In fact, before [the mathematical ersatzer] could finish with modality,
he
had to complete a wholesale analysis of the global in terms of the local!

Why should the analysis of modality have to wait on that? Surely it ought
to be possible to take 'talking donkey' or whatnot as primitive when
are analyzing modality, whatever other project we might care to

we

undertake on another day.^7

In short,

even

if

NT were amended so that its worlds are identified with

maximal consistent sets of sentences

would
and

still

that

that include all the mathematical truths, this

not guarantee that every world represents every metaphysical truth

none represents the

world also contain some

violation of

set of

any such

axioms that

truth.

The suggestion

entail all the metaphysical truths

not seem promising. For the completion of the theory would

axiom

6.4

set

be defined in non-modal terms.

The Problem of

that each

And

it is

hard

still

to see

requires that the

how to do

this.

'^Aliens"

Intuitively, the actual stock of individuals or point-instants is just

instance of the kind possible stock of individuals of which there are

does

many

one

other

20

instances. Similarly, the stock of perfectly
natural intrinsic properties that are

actually instantiated

is,

one possible stock among many,

intuitively, just

instance of the kind possible stock of perfectly natural
intrinsic properties?-^
logical space

must comprehend each instance

of each of these kinds

just

one

And

if it is

to

constitute a plenitude.

But

it

seems

that there

might have been more or other individuals than

there actually are, “alien individuals";
individuals

comprehends instances

actual stock.

And

it

also

it

seems

that the kind possible stock of

that are “augmentations" in

seems possible

for there to

some sense

have been instances of

properties which are not actually instantiated, “alien properties"

Hume's missing shade of blue, perhaps some “missing

some

different properties entirely

And
theory:

it

this

beyond our

all

the entities

modality solely in terms of actual

ken.29

all

of the

form <R,

xl,...,xn>

where

class of actual n- tuples of particulars,

in

its

analysis of

resources are thus, in Bricker's

words, “imprisoned within the actual world".
are

NT is an actualist

and notions involved

entities. Its

- perhaps

physical value", perhaps

generates a difficult problem for NT. For

attempts to define

of the

In particular,

its

possible facts

xl,...,xn are actual particulars

an actually

instantiated relation.

and R

is

a

Among

these possible facts will be non-actual combinations of these actual particulars

and actually

instantiated relations. But

none

of

them

will involve non-actual

particulars or actually uninstantiated properties, so-called alien particulars
relations.

And given the definition of 'representation',

NT's worlds
relations.
justice to

will represent

Hence

any

this

means

that

and

none of

possibilities involving alien particulars

and

NT fails to provide for a sufficient plenitude of worlds to do

our intuitions about

aliens.
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6.4.1

Aliens and Doxastic Possibilitv

These intuitions cannot be denied, but maybe they can be reinterpreted.

And

this gives

NT a way

to

draw

Metaphysical possibility
possibility.

mean

When we say

that this

is

is

the sting from this objection.
easily confused with episteinic or doxastic

'There might have been talking donkeys'

a metaphysical possibility'^ but

when we

we

say 'There might have

been someone

who memorized all of Shakespeare' we probably mean

we

might have been such a person,

knoio, there

And

these are not the

same

thing;

that this

is

necessarily true.

We don't know this and

ignorance by saying that

mean is
and

that this

that' s

is

it is

it is

doxastically possible, not that

On the other hand

it is

it

might be

it is

it is

false.

What we

metaphysically possible;

possibly

many before

thought that space couldn't but be Euclidean but
is

Suppose

false,

even

if it is

there are metaphysical possibilities that are

doxastically impossible. For instance,

and probably

all

perfectly in order to express our

possibly false or that

why we speak truly when we say

necessarily true.

all

something might be epistemically possible yet

either necessarily true or necessarily false.

is

that /or

doxastically possible.

metaphysically impossible, or vice versa. Goldbach's conjecture like

mathematical claims

probably

the nineteenth century

we now know

that

it

non-Euclidean. So a non-Euclidean spatial framework

might be
is

metaphysically possible, despite being doxastically impossible for those before
the nineteenth century.

Part of the project of mathematical ersatzism

notion of a world that

is

adequate

to the analysis of

is

to

show how

to define the

metaphysical possibility;

it is

not to be assumed that these worlds can also be used to analyze doxastic

when we

say 'There might have been more or other

possibility.

And

particulars

and properties than there

perhaps

not a metaphysical possibility. Prima

actually are'
facie,

it

we are expressing a doxastic

seems metaphysically possible for
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such individuals and properties
modalitv^

we

realize that really

to exist,

it is

not.

not genuinely metaphysical intuitions at
to

accommodate

And

we study

the analysis of

So perhaps our intuitions about aliens are
all

and

NT is

not to be faulted for failing

them.^i

This reply does not seem to
reasons.

but once

me

to

be convincing for several connected

although none of these reasons

that this sort of reply to the

is

conclusive, they

do show,

problem of aliens should be endorsed only

if

I

think,

none

better can be found.
First, if

respect, then

the doxastic possibilities outstrip NT's possible worlds in this

it

will

analysis of belief.

modal

prove very

And

this surely

NT to provide a possible worlds

diminishes the theoretical

utility of

NT vis a vis

realism.^2

Second,

we seem

to

perfectly straightforward

discussed below).

And

does not seem

to trade

of 'possibility'

is

be able

and simple terms

what

(see, e.g.,

BrickeTs cube-worlds to be

the cogency of the descriptions of such possibilities just

on our ignorance. Even when

is

it

is

pointed out that our use

we still have no inclination to classify them

metaphysically impossible but doxastically possible.

that this is not the case with

Conjecture: once the distinction
Finally,

to describe possibilities that involve aliens in

sometimes doxastic,

as descriptions of

Note

difficult for

is

our paradigm doxastic
pointed out,

its

and perhaps most fundamentally,

possibility,

Goldbach's

classification is easy.

to

hold that

it

really is

metaphysically impossible that there should have been more or other particulars

than there actually are,

is

to

metaphysically possible in
But, as

I

mentioned

hold that the actual world

its

is

as rich as

stock of particulars and instantiated properties.

in 1.3.1, this

seems arbitrary and parochial: everyone accepts

210
there could have been fe^ver particulars

and

properties, so ^vhy not morei>

should the actual world occupy so privileged a position
Indeed, to deny the possibility of aliens
of

modal thought. For modal reasoning seems

we know

is

may

Why

in logical space?

well be to distort the nature

to involve generalizing

from what

possible, perhaps according to principles of the
kind set out in 2.2.4.2.

For example, in

2.2.4.4

argued, following Bricker, that a geometry^

I

metaphysically possible

world might have been

way

if it is

a

is

that the spatiotemporal structure of the actual

a natural generalization of the actual geometry'; one

with more or fewer points, or more or fewer dimensions, or a different
curvature,

and so
to

on.

Now,

the possibilities generated by these principles just

be doxastic but genuinely metaphysical, yet they seem

possibilities involving aliens.

At

least

it

seems

seems just as natural

to

be a natural generalization of the actual

to generalize the facts

stock of particulars to generate stocks that contain

those that contain fewer (stocks that

both cases seems

to

maintain that

ways

about the actual

particulars as

to

commitment

be no

possibilities.

to theories like

And what

of generalizing the actual stock of particulars?

might have been more seems ad

remarks apply to the case of alien properties:
at

to

NT, could we have

we speak of metaphysical possibility when we say

that there

does

tnathematical basis

have been fewer particulars and properties, but of mere doxastic

we say

it

NT does recognize). The generalization in

one as generating metaphysical

other grounds, independent of a
to distinguish these

more

be mathematical yet there seems

for distinguishing just

to entail the existence of

For a stock of particulars that contains more

particulars than the actual stock
stock.

do not seem

hoc.^^

by reasoning from general principles which

it

there might
possibility

And exactly

their possibility

seems

seems arbitrary

To

when

parallel

to

be arrived

to restrict.

6.4.2 Distinguishin the Existence of a
g

Property from

Instantiation

its

Perhaps, instead of exploiting the distinction
between metaphysical and
doxastic possibility, the advocate of
for a property to exist

from what

XT might attempt to distinguish what

it is

for

one

to

be

instantiated.

prospect of a solution to the problem of alien properties
at

Some

properties, such as being blue,

actually instantiated; while

mass

many

of exactly 3g, are not. But,

properties

others,

it

naming

least.

and being positively-charged,

argued, this

do not actually exist. There is a long

whether or not they are

This offers the

are

such as being a unicorn, and having a

may be

Plato, that holds that properties, like

it is

all,

not to say that the latter

tradition, inspired

mathematical

instantiated. After

is

perhaps by

entities, all necessarily exist,

we seem

to

have no trouble

actually uninstantiated properties.

NT is not after all susceptible to the problem of alien properties. All

So

properties actually exist and so

NT's worlds do
although,

appear in the possible

NT. Thus,

more

NT still manages

to

properties than there

NT can hold that this intuition is about which properties are

actually instantiated, not

some

facts of

even alien properties. And

speaking, there are no alien properties,

the intuition that there might have

actually are. For

there are

will

after all represent facts involving

strictly

accommodate

all

which properties

actually exist.

And NT does entail that

properties that are not actually instantiated.

Perhaps intuitions about alien properties

really are just too

vague

to

be

sure they are intuitions about which properties actually exist rather than which
are actually instantiated.

And

to this extent the reply

may

well succeed. But

it is

pyrrhic victory.

The aim
there

is

of

no need

all

forms of ersatzism

is

to

show, contra modal realism,

to posit the existence of non-actual entities to explain

any

that

of our

a
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modal
merely

intuitions.
to the

But unless

much more

exchange of one problem

is

and the

above solution amounts

for another: the

apparently concern non-actual properties
of a property

said, the

is

instantiation relation

mystery of intuitions

dispelled only by

it

making

that

the notion

bears to concrete particulars

correspondingly more mysterious.
If

properties were classes of their instances, then their identity
conditions

would be

clear.

And

since philosophers are not entitled to reject the primitive

ontology and ideology of the mathematicians, their existence and a
grasp of the
relation of instantiation,

intuitively, sets exist only
exist.

as

membership, would be beyond dispute. But

i.e.

if

their

members

do,

no

alien properties

would

And NT would be unable to account for intuitions about aliens.

we have already seen,

since,

actually

Moreover,

identifying properties with classes of their instances

commits the ersatzer wrongly

to the identity of accidentally coextensive

properties.

Maybe
Aristotle,

the ersatzer

might do better

and regard properties

This avoids a

commitment

to follow the tradition, inspired

as sui generis entities that exist

iff

by

instantiated.

to the identity of accidentally coextensive properties.

But only at the cost of leaving mysterious quite what the identity conditions of
properties really are.

And although this move does perhaps

traditional intuition that properties
particulars,

we surely

have some kind of ontological dependence on

cannot maintain that

relation of instantiation as

respect the

we did on

the

we have as firm a grasp on the

membership

relation.

Moreover,

it still

leaves the problem of aliens unsolved.
Finally, there is the option

under consideration — properties are

sui

generis entities that necessarily exist regardless of whether they are instantiated.

Now their identity conditions are unclear, their ontological dependence on
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particulars

and

is lost,

Lewis levelled

at

the relation of instantiation

is

open

magical ersatzism's selection relation:

if

to the difficulties that

instantiation

is

an internal relation,... it is only by magic that..['instantiates']
could be our
word for any such relation. If, on the other hand, the concrete..
.[particulars
instantiate properties] by an external relation, it is the
relation itself that is
magical. ..Either way, ersatzism that relies on such a relation
is justly called
'magical'; and is to be rejected.

And

it is

hard

to resist the

suspicion that the distinction between necessarily

existent but actually uninstantiated properties

alien properties

more properly

In short,

some entities,

is

a

mere terminological

and the modal

sleight of hand.

realist's

genuinely

Why are the former

called "actual" than merely "possible"

even though most philosophers admit the necessary existence of

e.g.

mathematical ones, the ersatzer cannot legitimately claim

to

have explained our intuitions about aliens in actualist terms by merely
distinguishing the existence of a property from
is

said about the nature of properties

mathematical

entities of

intuitions about aliens

of properties

6.4.3 Aliens

is

and

by a

loss in

and the primitive notion

instantiation. For unless

more

relations, e.g. that they are

some kind, any gain
offset

its

in

our understanding of the

our grasp of the ontological category

of instantiation.

and Ramsey Sentences

Skyrms

offers the

accommodating

mathematical ersatzer a third response

to the

problem

intuitions about aliens:

we must

think of possibilities analogically. There
might be other things that play the role of our objects; other things that

To cash

these intuitions

play the role of our

relations...

of
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The idea seems
actually exist, this

to

be

Its

Although

shows shows only

anything about them. Yet
that

this.

that

alien particulars

none

we have already

of

NT's atomic

seen that

but which

be the

facts will

fact that represents there is

not identical to

is

identical to...(and so

possible fact

is

my car, and not identical

on through

all

facts represents

NT needs

set of possible facts also includes molecular
facts.

molecular

and properties do not

be modified so

to

And among

some
to

these

particular that

is

F

my front door, and not

actual particulars). For this (molecular)

constructed entirely from actual materials, materials available
to

the ersatzer: the existential quantifier, variables, the
property F, the non-identity
relation

and

that there

is

sentential connectives.^^

some

particular that

is

Such molecular

facts represent, in effect,

other than every actual particular.

So they can

act as surrogates for representing the information about aliens not
representable

by atomic

facts.

does after

all entail

Since

some such

facts will

be members

the existence of worlds at

individuals than there actually are. In

effect,

of various

worlds

NT

which there are more or other

including molecular facts enables

NT to represent facts about aliens by quantification.
Thinking once more of the possible
point linguistically.

sentences because

them by

it

Lnj cannot speak

of aliens

lacks the relevant

quantification, as that

which

facts as sentences,

by means

names and

is

could put the

of subject-predicate

predicates, but

other than

has such-and-such properties. In Skyrms's words,

we

all

can speak of

it

the actual particulars

"...a

and

kind of Ramsey sentence

(on the level of models) approach to the 'new' elements prevails. "3^

And
facts of

similar remarks apply to properties:

NT there will be existential facts

property that

and not

is

among

the (molecular) possible

that represent that there

is

some

not identical to redness, and not identical to being three grams,

identical

to.. .(and

so on through aU actually instantiated properties). In

21

short, there

^vill

be possible facts that represent that there

other than every actually instantiated
property. Since

members

of various worlds,

NT does after all entail

which there are actually uninstantiated

some

some such

propert>- that

facts will

is

be

the existence of worlds at

And

properties.

is

there will be worlds that

represent that such properties are instantiated. Lewis
puts the point
linguistically:

...some. ..ersatz

worlds. ..say by cjuantification, if not by name, that there are
extra nameless properties, alien to our world, which have
instances
distributed in so-and-so way and which play such-and-such

nomological

role.

Then we have

properties. Thereby

ersatz worlds according to

we acknowledge

which there are

extra, alien

their possibility.^^

Unfortunately, this "Ramsey-sentence" approach has two unacceptable

consequences.

The

first is

that the molecular facts about aliens will

the worlds that contain them.
intuitively, impossible.

Intuitively,
is

it

And such worlds

To appreciate

cannot be the case that

represents that

will thereby represent

this difficulty

that

something which

is F. It

is

F unless

it is

cannot be that something

particular thing that

something red,
Existential facts

atomic

fact

it is

first

what

at

is,

disjunctions.

the case that

A or

it

A or B unless it also

A or it represents that B, on pain of representing what is

impossible. Similarly, for existentials: intuitively,
is

consider

A or B unless either

no world should represent

the case that B. So

go "unwitnessed"

it

is itself

red.

is

it

also the case of

cannot be the case that there

some

thing in particular that

red, for instance, unless there

And

so

if

some

a world represents that there

cannot also represent of each particular,

must be "witnessed"; none can be

from which

is

that existential fact follows

x,

that x

is

is

not red.

true at a world unless
is

also true there.

some

it
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Now consider one of the existential
to

provide the corresponding atomic

facts

because they would have

alien particulars or properties. Preciseli/ because

XT is unable

facts,

to

provide witnesses for these

no thing

in particular that

to

involve

lacks the corresponding atomic

it

it is F.

Worlds which

existentials.

contain such existential facts will represent that something
will represent of

XT is unable

possible facts for which

XT entails that

Thus,

possible for certain unwitnessed existentials to be true.

even though they

is F,

And

it is

this is just as

unacceptable as the corresponding doctrine about disjunctions.'^^

The second consequence

is

that

XT will be unable to provide distinct

worlds for each of the possible ways that the molecular
realized. Thus,
fail

it

facts

about aliens

will conflate intuitively distinct possibilities,

and

its

may be

worlds will

to constitute a plenitude.

Consider disjunctions again.
because
are both
facts

it

the case that A, but

ways

of realizing

may be similarly

because

it is

that X

F

is

x that

it

If it is

may be because

but

it

maybe

it is

may be quite different from

the fact that something

is

something

tell

is F,

doesn't

it is

then this

the case that B;

may be

A and

that

B

A or B. And these may be quite different. Existential

"multiply realized":

is F,

A or B,

the case that

F

is

made

if

something

because

it is

y,

is F,

or

z.

then

by

all

of them. Merely

us which particular something

this is

Yet the possibility

the possibility that y or z

true

maybe

it is

is,

even though

knowing

that

that

is F.

Now consider again one of NT's existential facts about aliens. Those of
NT's worlds that contain such
again, precisely because

it

facts will represent that

something

lacks the corresponding atomic facts,

is F.

Once

NT is unable to

distinguish possibilities that differ in which particulars or properties realize these
existential facts.

which

NT cannot provide distinct worlds for the different ways in

existential facts

may be realized

if

these facts concern aliens (though

it

can

l\

if

they concern actual particulars and relations!).

And

this too is just as

unacceptable as the corresponding doctrine about disjunctions.

However,

if

two

possibilities differ only in

whether alien

individual a or

alien individual b plays a certain role, but are otherwise
exactly alike, then

unclear that they really do need to be distinguished.

between possible worlds

that

do not

differ

Is

it is

there a genuine difference

with respect

to their geometr\' (that

is,

their spatiotemporal structure), the cardinality of their sets
of particulars,

properties

and

relations existing or being instantiated there, or with respect to the

distribution of these properties
differ only

in

with respect

and

relations about this structure?

to which individuals exist there

any other way? Maybe then with respect

shows only

they really

- whether a or b - but not

to alien particulars, this objection

that the mathematical ersatzer fails to recognize a distinction that

maybe makes no
deny

Can

difference.

that she conflates

Here the ersatzer can simply stand her ground and

any genuinely

distinct possibilities (such a position

is

often called "anti-haecceitism")-'^^. Lewis agrees:

VVe omit no information if we fail to say, by name, who is who. The
information we could give only by naming. ..[alien]. ..individuals is no

genuine information

at

However, an exactly

parallel situation also arises with respect to alien

properties

and here

quidditism"

all.'^^

the ersatzer's denial

~ is less convincing.

most

clearly

what properties

a position might be called "anti-

Lewis: “Here what correspond to haecceitistic

differences are genuine differences in
differences in

-

how

things might be; for they are

things might have.""^^

by considering an example from

The problem can be seen

Bricker:

Consider a world that contains two kinds of uniformly dense matter, and
suppose that the two kinds of matter have all of their qualitative
properties in common. However, they are distinguished relative to one

Z18
another by the
of the

fact that

matter of different kinds mutually attracts,
matter
repels. Call one of the kinds of matter p
-matter

same kind mutually

and the other kind

iz-matter. Consider the possibilih’ that there
exists
nothing but a single cube of -matter, and the possibility
p
that there exists
nothing but a single cube of n -matter. I claim that these
are distinct
possibilities. ..to deny it would be to hold. ..that
we cannot specify other
worlds by stipulating what kinds they contain. Such an
extreme form of

anti-[cjuidditism]

These two cube

is

strongly at variance with modal intuitions.'^

possibilities are qualitatively indistinguishable; they
differ

only in the w^ay that matter and anti-matter differ
properties of repulsion

and

attraction. Yet

if

— with

respect to their

both kinds of matter are

actual world, neither property appears in any of NT's possible facts,

simply lacks the resources

None of its atomic
molecular

to distinguish p-matter

facts contain

facts that is true at

wwlds from

such properties; and any of

one world

forced to identify these possibilities.

is

And

its

alien to the

and

n-matter worlds.
existential or other

also true at the other. Thus,

this,

Bricker argues,

NT

is "is

NT is

strongly at

variance wdth modal intuitions".

Skyrms responds
just plain different

our reasoning about

from our reasoning about

of actual particulars

We

that

and

possibilities involving aliens is

possibilities involving

combinations

actually instantiated properties;

think about possible facts and possible worlds in two quite different

ways. For possible worlds whose objects and relations are subsets of this
w'orld our possibilities are essentially comfzznflfoni?/... Wittgenstein believes
that this is the only conception of possibility... I regard this restriction.. .as
rather unfortunate.. .To cash.. .intuitions [about the 'new' elements]

we

must think of possibilities analogically.^^

Skyrms here simply abandons
modal reasoning,

the attempt to provide a uniform account of

in particular combinatorial reasoning, as

possibilities involving aliens. But, in the
this

asymmetry

is

it

applies to

absence of an independent argument,

implausible; prima facie, combinatorial reasoning about aliens

IV)
does not seem

terribly different

Moreover,

barely intelligible that something should be
F unless

some

it is

thing in particular that

only in one way.
different

And

from such reasoning involving actual

it is

simply

F or that

to declare

possibility of existentials that are
in

more than one way seems

quantification.

it is

true of

could be the case that something

it

modal reasoning involving

from combinatorial reasoning or

consequence analogical" does nothing

things.

to call

F

aliens

reasoning that has such a

At the very

to help.

is

least, to

allow the

unwitnessed and which could not be made true

to involve a

non-standard understanding of

(And presumably he would

have

also

to

allow the corresponding

claim about disjunctions!)

To summarize:

to

guarantee the positive intuitions about modality some of

NT's worlds must represent
exist,

and properties

facts contains

facts

about aliens

~

particulars that

that are not actually instantiated

no atomic

facts

about

aliens.

And

-

do not

actually

yet NT's set of possible

the need for atomic facts to

represent facts about aliens cannot be bypassed by appealing to existential facts
to

do

the

same work. For

the need for the original atomic facts simply reappears

as the need for witnesses or alternative realizations for the existential facts.

6.5

Mathemarical Ersatzism and

The theory
four,

of properties

SN, has a number of

SN

and

relations

attractive features.

properties that are not actually instantiated,

developed in chapters three and
It

it

entails the actual existence of

entails certain metaphysical

principles about the inter-relations of properties,

and

of complexes supervene

on

so without positing any

new or mysterious

the properties

and

it

entails that the properties

relations of their parts.

And it does

primitive ontological categories,

concepts or axioms. Properties and relations are constructed using only the

220
resources of actualist impure set-theory
constructions from them
properties.

the

And

-

yet

-

SN avoids

concTete particulars and set-theoretical
the conflation of actually coextensive

analyses and constructions are framed in such a

its

above consequences follow from the axioms of set-theory
alone.

about properties and relations
mathematical

are, in effect,

facts. In this final section

I

reduced

way

that

all

All facts

to set- theoretical or

will sketch a version of

mathematical

ersatzism that attempts to exploit these features of structural
nominalism in order
to

avoid the problem of accidentally coextensive properties, the
problem of

implicit representation

Unfortunately

no attempt

more

will

be

and

this

made

the

problem of

account will be importantly incomplete; in particular,

to construct

worlds that represent

particulars than there actually are.

limitations

on which modal

intuitions must,

I

aliens.

believe, be

And

this

induces certain other

intuitions the theory can

accommodated

possibilities involving

accommodate. TTiese

in a fully adequate account of

modality, so the most that can be claimed for the account

is

promising begirming.

how

modal

will also not

intuitions concerning

particulars (though

mainly

6.5.1

I

to

I

go into the

complex particulars and

will indicate

how

to

to

it

represents a

accommodate

certain relations

among

proceed in the footnotes). This

keep the exposition as simple as

Formulating a Version of Mathematical Ersatzism that Incorporates

actually

is;

go back once again
According

to

be alternatives

other instances of the kind of which the

one instance. So

to

is

possible.

Other possible worlds are supposed

just

details of

that

way

to the

way

SN

the world

the world actually

is is

in order to construct the mathematical ersatz worlds, let us

to

Lewis's characterization of the

Lewis the actual world

is

way

the actual world

is.

21 \
...a

vast mosaic of local matters of particular

then another.. .And that

This suggests that one
to construct its

is all. ..All

way

to

else

fact, just

supervenes on

one

little

thin^ and

that."^

develop mathematical ersatzism would be

worlds in tw^o stages. In the

a collection of entities

first,

is

constructed to characterize the “vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact" on

which

all

the other facts about the world supervene.

I

will call these entities

“world-bases". Then, in the second stage, a corresponding
collection of worlds
constructed and a relation of representation defined in such a

world represents

all

the facts characterized by

way

some world base,

is

that each

together with

all

the relevant supervenient facts.

6.5.1. 1

Stage One: Constructing the World-Bases

Lewis describes the “vast mosaic of

which

all

local matters of particular fact"

on

the other facts about the world supervene as follows;

We have a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal
distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe pointsized bits of matter or aether or fields, or maybe both. And at those points
we have local qualities:

perfectly natural intrinsic properties

nothing bigger than a point

at

which

to

which need
we have

be instantiated. For short:

arrangement of qualities.

This suggests that to specify the world-base of the actual world,
specify four elements:

its

collection of concrete individuals,

its

it

suffices to

system of external

relations, its collection of perfectly natural intrinsic properties, and, finally,

the properties are actually distributed

among

suggests that to specify any other world-base
relations, properties

and

distribution.

the individuals.
it

And

suffices to specify

how

this in turn

its

individuals,
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So

let

us identify a world-base with any quadruple

<1, R, P,

D>, where

a possible collection of (simple) concrete individuals
or spacetime points,
possible system of external relations

among

of perfectly natural intrinsic properties,

properties

among

and

these points,

P

a possible collection

D is a possible distribution of these

to

provide a reductive analysis of modality

and

it

in a

world-base ~ a collection of individuals, a collection of properties

to

Ra

these individuals.

Mathematical ersatzism aims

aims

1 is

do so

in entirely actualist terms.

So each of the elements involved
etc.

— must

be characterized in entirely non-modal terms using only materials available

at the

actual world. Let us consider each of these four elements in turn.

6.5.1. 1.1

Possible Collections of Individuals.

Intuitively, the properties of

intrinsic properties of,

and

I

complex individuals supervene on the

relations

among, the simple individuals

of

which they

are composed. So complex particulars should not appear in a world-base. Rather
I

should consist only of simple (concrete) individuals. The simplest approach

characterizing possible collections of simple Individuals

suggestion and identify them with spacetime points

account then identifies the
individuals, with

6.5. 1.1. 2

any

The System

The notion
defined on

first

to follow Lewis's

their locations. This

world-base,

its

collection of such

subset of the set of actual spacetime points.

of External Relations,

of a possible

members

member of a

-

is

to

of

I.

R

system of external relations

The idea here

characterize a possible geometry,

is

that taken together

some way

the actual world to have been. In 2.2.4.4

1

is

to

I

be thought of as

and R should

for the spatiotemporal

framework

of

argued, following BrickeP s lead, that

any natural generalization of the actual geometry should qualify as a possible

geometn'. However,
not

attempt

to define

in

developing

what

it is

of the actual geometry. This

metaphysician. Rather,

it is

is

this

version of mathematical ersatzism

some geometry'

for

be a natural generalization

to

because, intuitively, this

the physicists' job to

not a job for the

is

us which possible geometry

tell

accurately characterizes the actual spatiotemporal framework,
and

mathematicians' job to

supposed

6.5. 1.1. 3

tell

us what a natural generalization of some geometry'

The Collection

of Perfectly Natural Intrinsic Properties,

than a point at which to be instantiated"

One

convenient

the construction of

element

C is

some subset of

classes

P

is

way

to exploit

is

-

that

itself

of

the picture.47

a quadruple <C, N, D*, d*>.^

all classifications

members

a characterization of

which need nothing bigger

SN enters

three, that a classification

the set of

P

SN's ideas about the nature of properties

P as

to think of

the collection of

from chapter

on r and

P-

in defining the third element in a world-base,

the collection of "perfectly natural intrinsic properties

recalled

the

it is

to be.

It is

first

will

I

I,

S

is

is

of the

members

a triple <F,

S,

of

I.

It

The

will be

m> where

some equivalence relation

in

that

is

I'

is total

m is some metric defined on the set that consists of the equivalence

induced by S on T together with the empty

an assignment of "naturalness"
the collection of classifications

set.

to the classifications.

The second element, N,

It is

any

total function

is

from

C to the positive reals. The third element, D*, is

the collection of those classifications that are assigned a "sufficiently high

degree" of naturalness by N. The
first

of

final

element, d*,

member of which is some sufficiently

D* — and

indicate

its

the second

is

is

the collection of pairs the

natural classification

some equivalence

class

on

— some member

that classification indexed to

position in internal structure of the classification defined by

its

metric.
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The idea

that

is

if

SX

high degree of naturalness yasf
of

is

a sparse determinable properh'd*^

any sparse determinable and one

indicate

its

metric /Hsf

then any classification with a sufficiently

right,

is

of

is

a sparse determinate property. So,

- D* and

collections of the sparse determinables

6.5. 1.1. 4

world

to

set)

indexed

to

- can be thought of

d*

Among

supposed

is

right, the final

two

as the
that

would

world-base.

this

of the Properties

distribution relation, D,

SN is

if

and determinates respectively

be constructed from

The Distribution

The

empty

(or the

pair

location in the determinable space defined by
the determinable's

elements of P of a given world-base

exist at the

its cells

And any

the Individuals.

to characterize

D

how

the perfectly

natural intrinsic properties characterized by

P are arranged or distributed within

spatiotemporal framework characterized by

I

the "local matters of particular fact".

which individuals

Now,

if

SN

fall

R;

D is supposed to specify all

D should contain all the facts about

under, or instantiate, which properties.

then fixing which sets are to be the determinables and

is right,

their determinates of a

So

and

given world-base already

which individuals

fixes

under, or instantiate, which properties, the "local matters of particular
exploit this idea, let us define

fall

fact".

So

to

D simply as follows:

D is the collection of pairs of the form <F, x> such that either:
F is a classification <F, S, m> that is a member of D* and x is a
(i)

member of T;
(ii)

is

The idea

a

F

is

or
a classification-equivalence class pair «!',

member of d* and x

is this.

According

a sparse determinable and x

then F

is

falls

a sparse determinate

to

is

SN,

under

and x

a

member of

if (i) is

F,

instantiates F.

m>, [u]p

that

[u]j.

true of

And if (ii)

S,

is

So

some

pair <F, x>, then F

true of

if

SN is

some pair <F,

x>,

right, collectively

is

these pairs

under or

i.e.

D suffice

is

a

determine

which properties

instantiate

To summarize

X

to

all

the facts about

which individuals

fall

at the w'orld-base in question.

the account of a world-base:

— df. x is a quadruple, <1, R, P, 0> vv'here:
any subset of the set of actual spacetime points;
R is any geometry dehned on I that is a natural generalization

ivovlcl-bcisd

(1)

(2)

I is

of the

actual geometry;
(3)

P

a quintuple, <1, C, N, D*, d*> where:
C is the collection of classifications definable

is

(i)

on 1 (i.e. the
abundant determinables, if SN is correct);
(ii) N is any total function from C to the
positive reals;
(iii) D* is the collection of classifications
having a sufficiently high
degree of naturalness
correct);

d*

(i.e.

the sparse determinables,

if

SN is

and

the collection of pairs of a member of D* and one of
cells (or the empty set) (i.e. the sparse determinates, if SN is
(iv)

is

its

correct).
(4)

D is the collection of pairs of the form <F, x> such that either:
F is a classification <F, S, m> that is a member of D* and x is a
(i)

member of F

(i.e.

the facts about

which

particulars

fall

under which

sparse determinables, if SN is right); or
(ii) F is a classification-equivalence class pair «F, S, m>, [u]p that
is a member of d* and x is a member of [u]j (i.e. the facts about

which

particulars instantiate

which sparse determinates,

if

SN is

right).

Next

what they

I

will

move on to

represent.

defining the mathematical ersatzePs worlds and

However,

in

going straight

to this part of the theory, h\^o

important elements will have been omitted: some account of the fundamental
intrinsic properties of the

some account of
their fusions).

complex

particulars, the fusions of

the fundamental intrinsic relations

Any

announced above,

fully
I

among

members

the

members

adequate theory must accommodate these

have ignored them

of

I;

of

and
I

(and

facts. But, as

for simplicity of exposition.^o

6.5.1 .2 Sta.^e

Two: Worlds and What They Represent

The idea here

is to

world represents only

define world and 'represents' in such a

that set of facts

iff it is

To guarantee

that

something

represented by some such world, the theory' needs also

guarantee that ever}' world explicitly represents

And

metaphysical truths.

it

needs

to

that each

encoded by some particular world-base

together with the facts that supervene on them.
possible

w ay

all logical,

is

to

mathematical and

guarantee that none represents any violation

of these truths.

We saw in the previous sections the essentials of how this might be
achieved, so again

I

will not

go

into the details. Roughly,

we

language L using the "Lagadonian" method. This allows us
possible facts determined by any world-base

(i.e.

we

relative to the syntax

find

some way

collection of mathematical truths

this

of

and

language. Finally,

we define the

M model-theoretically (as those sentences of the

are in a position to define the worlds

X

is

a world =df. x

is

these facts

'consistency'

mathematical part of L that are true in the standard models). With

[W]

a

its final

mean just what

to define 'maximality'

and semantics of

first

to think of the

members

the

element, D) as atomic sentences of this language that
represent.^! Then,

define

and what they

this

done we

represent:

a maximal, consistent extension of

some

D that

includes M, where;
(a)

D is

(b)

M =df. the set of theorems in the mathematical portion of L

the distribution relation of

some world-base; and

that are true in the standard models;^^

[R]

A world w represents that so-and-so (i.e.

w contains some

that so-and-so

is true

L-sentence that means that so-and-so.^3

at w)=df.

6.5.2

Evaluatine the Theon^
This version of mathematical ersatzism

is

sophisticated version of NT. The principal difference

world with any
version

we

first

make

sure that

we are guided by

we extend

way

we have a set of facts

that things

this

theory can

elements that actually

P and

exist:

I

it is

in

doing

this

Only then do

worlds represent the

logical,

facts.

still

legitimately claim

NT has over MR discussed above.

R,

might have been. And

this collection so that the resulting

However,

and

NT identifies a

that encodes the

the account of properties proposed by SN.

mathematical and supervenient

that

where

that

is

a

set of possible facts (atomic sentences) whatsoever,
in this

determining features of a
that

no more than

really

many

of the advantages

In particular, a world-base consists only of

consists only of actually existent spacetime points;

D consist only of subsets of these spacetime points and set-

theoretical constructions

from them. So the mathematical ersatzer can

legitimately refer to world-bases in her constructions of worlds without stepping

beyond

the

boimds

of actualism.

And

notice that this

is

achieved without

introducing any modal notions into the definitions the "worlds" and what they
"represent".

This version of mathematical ersatzism can also claim several advantages

over NT.

Many

of these advantages are

due

to the fact that

has been developed

SN was developed in such a

so as to incorporate the ideas developed in SN. For

way

it

guarantee the various logical relations

among

properties. So, unlike

NT,

version of mathematical ersatzism guarantees, for instance, that even
positively charged

and 3kg

worlds where they are
of

and

as to avoid the identification of accidentally coextensive properties

any particular

that

it

not.

in

mass are coextensive

And it guarantees

instantiates

that

at

some world,

if

to

this

being

there are

still

none of its worlds represents

two determinates

of the

same determinable.
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or that

it

instantiates

any determinate without also

corresponding determinable, and so on. Moreover,
requiring the ability to

list

infinitely

omniscience. The theory entails,

two determinates
require that

iff

no

e.g., that

to list all possible

e.g.,

it

or

achieves

some

particular at

these are determinates of the

we be able

we know whether,

many axioms

under

falling

the

without

all this

sort of

modal

any world

instantiates

same determinable.

It

does not

combinations of determinates or that

being positively- and being negatively-charged are

indeed determinates of the same determinable.
In short, unlike

ideas of

SN

into

NT,

this

version of mathematical, by incorporating the

constructions, avoids the general identification of accidentally

its

coextensive properties, and guarantees that none of

its

worlds represents any

violation of the first category of metaphysical principles
relations of inclusion

and entailment among

Notice also that each of
contains a sentence that

include the set of facts
set of facts is

and every

this theory's

means just

that.

explicitly represent

all

it

drawn from

fall

under.

—

will also

be

explicitly represented.

last

-

even naturalness

contains <F, x> for every property F

under

F,

according to the

which properties and

since each world

facts

—

is

of worlds

— and

its

relations

maximal,

all

its

the

existential facts, disjunctive facts

Moreover, each world also includes M,

and ideology employ only mathematical
is

any world

element, D. Each such

so each represents every mathematical truth. Finally, notice that
primitive ontology

in

iff it

SN.^^ So intuitively each world will

And

molecular facts that supervene on these

that so-and-so

The sentences contained

the atomic facts about

particulars instantiate or

etc.

worlds represents

particular x such that x instantiates or falls

definitions of those notions

those concerning the

properties.^'^

drawn from some world-base's

complete in the sense that

-

this theory's

entities

and notions

identified with a mathematical function in the construction

only axioms in addition to the logical constructions and

-
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analyses (including those of SX) are those of

and mereology.
short

list

of

truths. So,

In effect,

the truths about logical space over

all

if

we add SN's

and above those

analyses and constructions to each world, since each

explicitli/

represents

all

even those that Lewis claimed could not be
is

set-theory

axioms specifying the analyses and constructions are mathematical

world contains M, each

theory

some standard impure

the truths about logical space,

explicitly represented. Thus, the

not susceptible to the problem of implicit representation. All

representation

is

explicit

and yet no world

is

logically,

mathematically or

metaphysically inconsistent.
Finally, let us consider

df worlds to

do justice

to

whether

this

theory generates a sufficient plenitude

our positive modal

intuitions.

Inspection of the constructions reveals that there will be

some world

that

represents that the actual world has a certain collection of (simple) individuals
there

And

is

some world-base whose

first

element consists of

iff

just those individuals.

these collections of individuals include any that are subsets of the set of

actual spacetime points. Since, intuitively, there actually are

such points,

continuum-many

their subsets will include those containing only finitely-many

individuals, those containing only

denumerably-many individuals and those

containing continuum-many individuals. Thus, there are world-bases whose
collections of individuals

I

are "contractions" in a straightforw^ard sense of the

collection of those at the actual world.

So the theory

actual stock of particulars, then any contraction of

I

entails
is

roughly that

if I is

the

also a possible stock of

individuals.

However, the
any

collections of individuals at the world-bases

that are "augmentations" of this stock.

intuition that there
this is

The account thus

might have been more individuals than

an important respect

in

which the account

is

do not include

fails to

explain the

that actually are.

incomplete with respect

And

to

explaining our positive modal intuitions.
until

some way

of

removing

And

this limitation

it

cannot be accounted adequate

has been found.

Inspection of the constructions also reveals that there will be
that represents that the actual

there

is

world has a certain spatiotemporal structure

some world-base whose

of such a structure.

And

first

two elements I and R encodes

this includes

current physics

If

is right,

iff

the geometr\'

any "natural generalizations of the actual

geometry" that are definable over some subset of the
points.

some world

set of actual spacetime

then the actual geometry

is

a non-Euclidean,

four-dimensional geometry defined over continuum-many points and having a
certain curvature. Probably,

or

five, fifty

its

natural generalizations include geometries having

maybe even infinitely-many dimensions.

those having

many

Probably, they include

different sorts of curvature. Probably they include geometries

defined over finitely-many, denumerably-many and continuum-many points.

And

if

here

we defer to

so,

then there will be

some world-base

the mathematicians to

tell

for

each such geometry. Notice that

us whether or not natural

generalizations of the actual geometry include "island universe" geometries and

so whether or not there are worlds that represent the actual world as having such
a structure.

They are neither ruled

in

nor out a

priori. This

seems

to

be another

advantage that the theory has over MR.
It

should be noted also that

R

is

not defined independently of

I.

This

is

simply because a system of external relations must be a system of relations among

some

things. This guarantees that

impossible because
relations.

it

no world-base

lacks a sufficient

However, because R

is

will contain a

number of points

defined only after

I

for its

geometry which

system of external

has been specified and

because, as mentioned above, the world-bases thus constructed do not,
intuitively,

exhaust

all

is

possible stocks of individuals, the possible geometries

represented by the \vorld-bases will not exhaust
particular,

no world-base

all

will contain elements that represent geometries
defined

over more than continuum-many points.

And

again the theor\' cannot be

accounted adequate until some way of removing

The possible stocks
line

this limitation

of instantiated properties

has been found.

P have been constructed

with SN, so whether or not the theory guarantees that for every

possible stock of properties, there
instantiated properties,
that

possible geometries either. In

it is,

depends

is

some world having P

in part

as

its

intuitively

stock of

SN is

on whether or not

in

true.

Assuming

then the theory entails the existence of worlds whose stock of

instantiated properties include those that are alien to actuality in each of the three

ways

of being alien discussed in chapter four.56 in particular,

it

even

entails the

existence of worlds representing facts involving actually "missing"

determinables, determinables none of

This

is

due roughly

whose determinates

is

actually instantiated.

to the liberality of the definition of a "world-base", in

particular the second element of

its

second member

P, the collection of

properties. For notice that the definition of a "classification" does not exclude any
triple

<P,

S,

m> on the basis of what sort of internal structure

m) from qualifying

as a

member of C.

So,

by the axioms

of

it

has (as defined by

impure

set-theory, for

every sort of internal structure, there will be some world-base whose P contains a
classification

having that structure in

its

second element.

And

notice also that the

definition of the naturalness function does not exclude any function from
classifications to the

naturalness

among

numbers from appearing

in

some

P.

So every permutation

the classifications will be represented at

some world-base

of

or

other.

For example, consider just the perfectly natural determinables at the actual
world. Presumably these comprise a pretty short

list

—

the masses, the charges.

IM
and so on. And presumably among them are represented
rather

a small

number

of possible internal structures. Clearly, there are other
internal structures

definable on subsets of the actual particulars.
natural at

some world

And

all

these will be perfectly

or other. So, given SN's account of the transworld

identities of properties,

such worlds will represent

facts involving properties that

are alien to the actual world in the most radical sense: they belong
to

determinables none of whose determinates are actually instantiated. Indeed,

some worlds

many more

will also represent facts involving

perfectly natural

determinables of any given internal structure than those that are actually
instantiated.

So

many

this

version of mathematical ersatzism seems to accommodate at least

of the intuitions concerning alien properties that proved so problematic for

NT. Notice also

that the theory thereby

manages

accommodate

to

these intuitions

without jettisoning the unobjectionable pre- theoretical grasp on the nature of
properties or the relation of instantiation that goes with any form of class

nominalism. For properties are identified with set-theoretical constructions from
actual concrete spacetime points
also guarantees that
realization.

The

all existentials

Though again

particulars, this

is

and

until

their fusions.

(And

notice that the theory

are witnessed and capable of multiple

it is

developed so as also

to

cover alien

a perhaps a rather hollow boast.)

final collection of positive intuitions

about modality concern the

plenitude of recombination or arrangements of spatiotemporal structures,
individuals,

and

properties.

Here

it

may seem

that the theory runs into problems.

For given SN's definitions and constructions, once the collection of individuals
that exists at a world-base

and

I

the degree of naturalness of each classification of

these individuals has been fixed, so have

all

the facts about

which individuals

instantiate or

tall

So the required

under which

perfectly natural intrinsic properties at the world.

variet\' of distributions of properties

among

a given collection of

individuals within a given framework can be guaranteed only
by varying N.

And

this, it

may

be argued,

just will not generate

enough recombinations.

For altering the degree of naturalness of any classification can

alter only

natural a given classification

sparse or

abundant.

It

cannot

will not cause

alter

is,

which

roughly whether a property

is

particulars are classified with

any sparse property

to

which

how

others; so

it

be differently distributed among these

individuals.

But

this

would be

to ignore

SN's account of the transworld identity

conditions of properties. According to SN, the identity of particulars across

worlds

is

irrelevant to the identities of properties across worlds.

identity of properties across worlds goes instead

and

by

SN entails

their degrees of naturalness

their internal structures. Fixing the individuals that exist at a

indeed

fix

which

classifications exist there.

internal structure they

world does

And it does indeed fix which sorts of

have (though the axioms of set-theory

will guarantee that

every possible sort of internal structure definable on these individuals
represented

among

the

these classifications). But

it is

is

because the identity of

properties goes by their naturalness, not their extensions, that varying the
distribution of naturalness

among

these classifications will suffice to generate

possible redistributions of properties. Consider h\'o worlds having the
particulars

worlds.

same

and

the

same geometry.

Exactly the

same

classifications exist at both

Now consider two classifications C and C' at the first world that have the

internal structure but partition the particulars differently

degrees of naturalness

— n and

n' respectively.

world the degrees of naturalness of these two
at the

same

all

second world,

C has

and have

different

Now suppose that at the second

classifications

have been swapped;

naturalness n' and C' has naturalness

n.

According

to

S.\,

C

first

at the first

world

the ver\'

the

is

same

world

is

the

same determinable

same determinable

as

C at

as C' at the second,

the second. Since

C and

C at the

and

C

partition

pariticulars differently, allowing the degree of naturalness to
vary'

has the effect of "exchanging" the extensions of properties across worlds.
In
effect,

it

amount

does

to "redistributing" the properties.

In this section,

have, of course merely sketched one direction in which to

I

search for a fully adequate version of mathematical ersatzism. But

approach mathematical ersatzism by attempting

that to

perhaps along the

lines indicated, at least holds out the

more troublesome

difficulties

limitations having to
this

do with

may be
the

number

much

of the positive data of modality.

the difficulties that beset
properties, the

NT —

problem of

the

promise

that

to

me

some

and geometries,

and so genuinely

And yet it seems

of the

announced

of possible individuals
entail,

seems

incorporate SN,

solved. For, subject to the

version of mathematical ersatzism seems to

explain,

to

it

to

to

many

avoid

problem of accidentally coextensive

implicit properties and, perhaps, the

problem

of alien

properties.

^

Throughout

criterion of

I

will rely

when

on

a notion

intuitions to

is

modal

is

tell

us

when

a given notion

is

modal, no

official

given.

and A.N. Whitehead, Pnnctpia tvlathematica, Three Volumes, (Cambridge,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
^This account of propositions is presented as a logical construction rather than a definition
because the notion of a proposition is supposed to be antecedently familiar from the
literature, and MR's propositions are supposed to be suitable entities to play the roles
traditionally assigned to propositions. Often, however, quite what roles they are supposed to
play is not spelled out as fully as one would like. And it is even unclear whether there really

^See

B. Russell

our purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is propositions that are the
bearers of the modal statuses; whether or not propositions thus constructed are also suited to
play the various other philosophical roles they are assigned, e.g. being that towards which we
bear propositional attitudes, is left open. The literature on the nature and role of propositions
is

a unified role. For

is

vast.

^To

See

Plitralihj,

illustrate

section 1.4 for discussion

how NT explains

the

modal

and

(the beginning of a chain of) references.

statuses of propositions, consider the proposition

iff there is some world at which it is true. But by
which, by (D5), is true at every one of its
worlds
of
a
class
simply
(LCl) a proposition is
non-empty; i.e. iff there is a world which
it
is
possible
iff
members. So the proposition is
world?
(LC2) identifies greyness with a class of
a
there
such
represents that my car is grey. Is

that

my

car

is

grey. By (Al) this

is

of

possible

particulars; intuitively,

actually grey, the

all and only those particulars that are
grey. Since my computer is
axioms of impure set-theor\ entail the existence of greyness. I hese
axioms

also entail the existence of the pair <greyness, my car> and
its singleton, {<greyness, my
car>}. By (Dl), the former is a possible fact - call it "f" - and
by (D3) the latter'is a possible
world - call it “w". By (D2), f represents that my car is grey and by
(D4) so does any world
such as
which contains it. Thus, there is a world that represents that my car is grey.
So the
proposition that my car is grey is non-empty and .\T correctly entails that
it is possible that
my car be grey. It thereby accounts tor the truth of modalizations of

w

proposition

Here

I

-

possible that

my

'My car might be
have suppressed complications having to do with the fact
'It is

car be grey',

sentences expressing this
and so on.

grey'

that naturalness comes
degrees. See above chapters three and four for further discussion and
clarification.
6 A few terminological remarks may be helpful
here. NT analyzes modality in terms of
quantification over objects that represent various ways things might have been,
rather than
over things that are that way. So, in Lewis's terminology, it is a form of ersatzism.
And

in

because NT identifies these representational objects with mathematical objects of a certain
kind - sets ~ have called it mathenmtical ersatzism. The literature, however, contains
at least
two other terms for such forms of ersatzism.
Any theory of modality that takes its cue from the above sort of reasoning and
1

...traces

the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations
— of given, actual elements...

- all

the

combinations

Armstrong

calls "combinatorialisr (D. M. Armstrong, A Cotnbimtorml Theory
of Possibility,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.37). Combinatorialist theories of
possibility have been articulated, though not necessarily endorsed, by a number of
philosophers including Quine, Cresswell, Skyrms, Armstrong, and Wittgenstein. See W. V. O.
Quine, "Propositional Objects", in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York:

Columbia University

Press, 1969), pp. 139-60; M. J. Cresswell, 'The World is Everything that
the Case", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50 (1972), pp. 1-13; B. Skyrms, 'Tractarian
Nominalism", Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 199-206; and L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus
is

and B.F. McGuinness), (London: Routledge & Kegan
form of combinatorialism.
Lewis prefers to calls theories like NT forms of "linguistic" ersatzism. The reason for
this is that we can define a language L in such a way that the possible facts of NT qualify as
atomic sentences of L and NT's worlds as sets of such sentences. And NT can thereby be
assimilated to popular attempts to analyze modality in terms of quantification over sets of
sentences, or "world-books". The guiding idea, which seems both plausible and natural, is to
think of worlds as "stories" about how things might be.
1 will stick with the term "mathematical ersatzism" in order to emphasize the aim of
reducing modality to (impure) set-theory and because it seems to me that combination is at
best only half the story. Moreover, the most attractive forms of mathematical ersatzism can be
Logico- Philosophic us, (Trans. D.F. Pears

Paul, 1961). Clearly

NT qualifies as a

construed as hnguistic only in a very attenuated and not very helpful sense of "language".
^See above chapter two for a discussion of these commitments of MR.
^The point here is not simply that according to MR modal reasoning concerns a separate
domain from reasoning about the concrete part of the actual world. Indeed, that may be an
advantage — modal reasoning is, after all, reasoning about alternatives to actuality. Rather the
point is this: we are (nearly) all — the modal realist included — already committed to a

domain other than

the

domain containing

actual concrete particulars, viz. the abstract part of

actuality that contains mathematical entities.

domain.

MR

reasoning to about entities

in this

actual concrete entities for

modal reasoning

disadvantage.

And

to

the mathematical ersatzer construes

modal

however, requires an additional domain of nonAnd that does seem to be a

be about.

\1R is a metaphysical theor\ not an epistemological theor\ so it need not itsell explain
the
origin of such knowledge. Nevertheless, it should not render such an
explanation impossible.
,

A metaphysical theory can legitimately be rejected on the grounds that
our knowledge inexplicable.
See above 2.1.2 for this axiom.
^ ^

As

will

become

it

makes

the origin of

clear,
think this is overhasty. That properties cannot be taken to be sets of
does not show that they cannot be taken to be sets at all. It shows at best that if
properties are to be identified with sets, then they should be identified with sets having
more
internal structure. In particular, as argued in chapters three and four, the most
promising
route seems to be to take each determinate property to be a pair «P, S, m>, |xj> consisting
of
a triple <P, S, m> called a "determinable" (where P is some set of particulars, S is an
equivalence relation over P and m is some metric defined on the partition induced by S on P)
and |x| is equivalence class from the partition induced by S on P. But for now let us explore
the consequences for mathematical ersatzism of giving up on the attempt to logically
1

their instances

1

construct properties.

Armstrong, in his A Theory of Universals, Volume IT. Universals and Scientific Realism,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), identifies this relation with the inverse of the
parthood relation: x instantiates P iff P is a part of x. In later work, however, (Universals: An
Opinionated Introduction, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989), esp. chapter V) he too rejects
this position and takes instantiation to be primitive.

One of the principal reasons
make the "etc." here precise.
1^

for thinking of

NT in

linguistic

terms

is

that

it

gives a

way

to

In deciding what pairs, triples etc. to include as possible facts, we must be careful not to
look simply to the forms that natural languages happen to exploit. We want our set to include

every possible fact to which a modal status might be assigned, not just those facts that natural
languages happen to have expressions for. For instance, most if not all natural languages
contain expressions for negative

connectives

(e.g.

facts,

do not usually contain expressions
Pliiraliti/, p.

but there are also three other one-place propositional

the truth functor that always has the value True) which natural languages
for.

And

these too must be included.

150ff.

Plurality, p. 151.

Plurality, p. 152.
Pluralitif, p. 152.

This
2*^^

justifies

One problem

Lewis's choice of the

concerns the

name

fact that the

'linguistic

names

ersatzism' for theories of this kind.

of Lfvjj will include all the sets. This leads to

complicated issues having to do with proper classes and the set-theoretic paradoxes. Another
concerns the fact that Lnj will need the resources of infinitary connectives. I ignore these
complications and assume that there are ways to work out the idea satisfactorily. (See P.
Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language", Philosophical Studies, 52 (1987), pp. 331355.)
21

Lewis

22

A tmxirrud set of sentences is one

calls

negation,
negation.

and
It is

such a language "Lagadonian".
a consistent set of sentences

well

known how

language or its
one that does not include both a sentence and

that includes every sentence of the
is

to define these notions

and how

its

to construct a collection of

And

even possible to
define a purely syntactic relation among sentences of implication. There is, however, a
complication: to the work required of it, L[sjx will probably have to have the resources of

maximal consistent

sets of sentences in purely syntactic terms.

it is

then syntactic means will not suffice to define the
relevant notions of consistency etc. Nevertheless, there are model-theoretic, i.e. semantic,
ersatzer can
for defining these notions. And, as I mention below, the mathematical
infinitary connectives (see fn. 20).

And

methods

also appeal to these model-theoretic notions without introducing (implicitly) any
notions.

modal

A. Roper,

"Toward an Eliminative Reduction

Quarterly, 32 {\9S2),pp. 45-59.

of Possible Worlds", The Philo'^ovhual
'
^

Pluralitij, p. 153.

In effect, as

infinitely

1

w ill argue below

(6.5),

SN

incorporates a finite characterization of these

axioms.

Plurality, pp. 155-6.
Pluralih/, pp. 155-6.

Roughly, the perfectly natural properties are those that features
of particulars that
correspond to some genuine objective similarities among them; the

intrinsic properties are
those features of particulars that they have regardless of the state
or existence of any distinct
particular. Quite what it really is for a property to be perfectiv
natural or for it to be intrinsic
was discussed in chapter three.

Though as w ill become clear below, some, e.g. Armstrong, deny
Combuuitorml Theon/ of Possibility, pp. 54-7.
P. Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language".

^is response is advocated
See above

by D.M. Armstrong

2.2.2 for a brief discussion of this

in his

matter

this.

A Combmatorml

in relation to

See his

T

Theory of Possibility,

MR.

mentioned above that these reasons for rejecting this response are not conclusive. In part
however, this is because too much depends on what position is taken on the nature of
properties and relations in response to the problem of accidentally coextensive properties.
Armstrong, for instance, holds that properties are sui generis universal which may overlap
or even have other universals as parts. And by exploiting this structure, he suggest a way to
1

the possibility of some alien properties - those "missing determinates" that
belong to determinables some of which are actually instantiated. am sceptical about this
general approach, but even if Armstrong is correct, this would still only provide a partial
solution. First, it still does nothing to accommodate possibilities involving alien determinates
belonging to determinables none of whose determinates is actually instantiated. But

accommodate

1

generalization on the actual stock of properties seems to entail their possibility: if we allow
missing determinates of a determinable some of whose determinates are instantiated, then

drawn from determinables none of whose determinates
are instantiated. Nothing in the principles of plenitude seems to rule out these
generalizations. And it seems ad hoc for Armstrong to deny them. Indeed, Armstrong

surely there could be determinates

own where no determinates
why not recognize worlds

recognizes the possibility of worlds more impoverished than our
of

some

actually instantiated determinables are instantiated. So

richer than our

of

own

that contain instances of determinates belonging to a determinable

whose determinates

are actually instantiated? Second, this

missing determinates of a determinable

w ill work

way

of

accommodating

none

the

the determinable consists o( complex
could not the physical magnitudes
or Bricker's cube-prop>erties (see below) be simple?Armstrong seems to hold that if properties
are incompatible, then ipso facto they are not simple; they can't be simple because they're

only

determinates; simple properties do not overlap. But

if

why

incompatible. 1 considered and rejected this response in chapter four (section 4.1.3 above).
34 Plurality, p. 182.
33 Here I discuss only the attempt to accommodate intuitions about alien properties, by

reconstruing what
the problem of

it is

for a property to exist. But

accommodating

if

anything, extending this idea to deal with

intuitions about alien particulars

is

even more problematic.

For it will probably involve subscribing to the existence of actually existent but uninstantiated
"haecceities". And the idea that these are properly called "actual" rather than merely
"possible" is even harder to swallow. For a very interesting discussion of this matter see the

debate between Plantinga and Fine (A. Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds", in M. J.
Loux, The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, (Ithaca, London:
Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 253-73; K. Fine, "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist
Discourse", in

J.

E.

Tomberlin and

P.

van Inwagen

(eds.),

Alvin Plantinga, (Dordrecht: Reidel,

198r'), pp. 145 186; A. Plantinga, "Replies to my
Colleagues" in Alvin Plantin^a, pp. 334tf. See
also A. McMichael, "A Problem for Actualism about
Possible

Worlds", Plulosovliiad Rernnv

XCll No.
B.

1,

(1983), pp. 49-66.

Skyrms, 'Tractarian Nominalism", Philosophical Studies, AO
(1981), pp. 199-206.
that F is an actual property. The problem of alien
properties will be

Assuming

dealt with

below.

Skyrms, 'Tractarian Nominalism",
Lewis,

A

p.

202.

Pliiralih/, p. 162.

care

must be taken

how

NT of this Skymsian variety entails
and it entails that some of them will be
unw itnessed at some of these worlds. It does not, however, entail that there is any
world at
which it is true that some existentials are unwitnessed. So NT does not entail that:
possibly,
little

in

this

is

expressed.

that there are existentials that are true at a world,

'

some

existentials are unwitnessed. Nevertheless, the position
seems to me.

This medieval term was revived by D. Kaplan,

"How

is still

to Russell a

problematic, or so

it

Frege-Church", Journal of

Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp. 716-29.
J.7

Lewis, Plurality,

p. 159. Though notice that for worlds that involve recombinations of some
of fhe acfual particulars, the mathematical ersatzer of the Skyrmsian variety
is not a
haecceitist. So there is again an asymmetry in her account, an asymmetry delineated
by the
actual world. And although Skyrms endorses this, the asymmetry itself and the fact that

or

all

it

assigns a special role to the actual world

may

both be thought objectionable. However,
relatively simple adjustments to ME could eradicate the haecceitism from the combinatorial
worlds. For instance, by identifying worlds with equivalence classes of worlds under mere
haecceitistic differences, or representatives from those classes.

^

Plurality, p. 159.

"Reducing Possible Worlds to Language",
Skyrms, 'Tractarian Nominalism", p. 202.

P. Bricker,
B.

D. K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol

II

(Oxford,

New

p. 351.

York: Oxford University Press, 1986),

pp. ix-x.

To

some of the key features of SN. In chapter three, a distinction was drawn
and an abundant sense of "property". According to SN, every property is either
a determinable or a determinate. SN identifies an abundant determinable property with a triple
<r, S, m> (called a "classification") where I' is some subset of the set of particulars, S is some
equivalence relation on V, and m defines some metric on the equivalence classes induced by S on
r (together with the empty set). And it identifies abundant determinate properties with pairs,
«r, S, m>, [u|x> where the first member is a classification and the second member, [u)x, is one of
briefly recap

between

a sparse

the equivalence classes or the

empty

the metric. Each classification

is

set, indexed to indicate its position in the space defined by
thought of as possessing some unique degree of naturalness at
each world which is also "inherited" by every determinate of that determinable. The sparse
properties are simply those that have a sufficiently high degree of naturalness.
SN also included the following transworld identity conditions for properties. A
determinable at one world is the same determinable as a determinable at another iff they

have the same degrees of naturalness

at their respective

worlds and the same sort of internal

structure as defined by their metrics. Determinates at distinct worlds are the

same

determinate iff they belong to the same determinable and they occupy the same position
their determinable's space as defined by its metric.

As with

set-theoretical constructions generally, there are

defining the relevant constructions. So talk of convenience

many

is

equally adequate

ways

in

of

not out of place here.

Although nothing has been said about how high a degree of naturalness this should be.
This is a complicated matter that would require much further discussion. Notice that once the
naturalness of the various classifications have been fixed at each world, the transworld

identity conditions for properties outlined in 3.4 determine
the various worlds.

which properties are which across

SN was developed only to account for the fundamental intrinsic properties,
chapter four this account was generalized so as also to cover relations.
Roughly, this
generalization went as follows: an abundant n-place relation determinable
was identified wdh
In

chapter three

fowever,

f

in

a

triple (called

an "n-classification")

particulars, S

were

<1''^, S,

m> where

1'^ is

some subset

of the set of n-tiiples of

some equivalence relation on 1'^, and so on. And n-place relation determinates
with pairs, «l'n S, m>, |<ui,..., Urplp where the first member is an n-place

is

identified

relation determinable

and the second member,

one of the equivalence classes or
space defined by the metric.
An extension of the construction of a world-base so that it also covers relations among its
simple particulars would run roughly as follows. In the construction of P, let C be the collection
of
the

empty

indexed

set,

n-i lassifications

of

n-classification;

members

and

x],...,

Xp are

relation determinable)

of P; extend

N so that

D* and d* be the resulting

let

determinates respectively.

Xn> such that

|<ui,..., Un>lj, is

to indicate its position in the

collections of relation determinables

In the construction of D, let

members

and

determinate) and

also assigns a degree of naturalness to each

it

xi,...,

and

of

D contain all

and

tuples of the form <R, xi,.„,

R is a member of D* (i.e. R is a sparse
R is a member of d* (i.e. R is a sparse relation

either

x^fall under R, or

Xninstantkite R.

Unfortunately, this extension would also introduce certain technical problems. In
particular, some way would have to found of harmonizing the geometry of the world-base, as
determined by its first two members I and R, with the natural relations determined by P. For
intuitively a world-base should contain a certain geometry iff it also has certain relations among
its individuals. This and other problems do not seem to be insurmountable, but attempting to

incorporate solutions into the construction would make the exposition so complicated as to
severely obscure the principal philosophical ideas involved. So I have omitted them.

Chapter four also contained
properties of (and relations

a discussion of

among) complex

how

to

extend

SN

to cover the intrinsic

individuals. Roughly, the idea outlined there

introduce an expanded range of classifications, determinables, determinates
c

-classifications, c-determinables etc.

-

to

be the properties of the complex

etc.

— which

entities.

was
1

to

called

Their

constructions parallel those of the constructions of intrinsic properties (and relations among)

simple particulars, except that they were constructed relative
c-classifications

were

to the class of

some equivalence

complex

m> where

identified with identified with triples <!', S,

particulars:

some subset
and m is some
I'

is

of

on 1'
metric defined on the set that consists of the equivalence classes induced by S on 1' together with
the empty set; sparse c-determinables were those c-classifications having a sufficiently high
degree of naturalness; sparse c-determinates were pairs of a sparse c-determinable and one of the
the set of complex particulars, S

is

equivalence classes or the empty

indexed

set,

relation that

is

total

to indicate its location in the

c-determinable-space

defined by m; and so on.

However,
of

and

relations

simple properties,
require

some

complex particular supervene on the properties
an intuition that has no parallel in the case of
cover the intrinsic properties of complex entities, it will

intuitively, the properties of a

among
if

SN

its

is

parts.

And

extended

since this

to

is

additional constraint to guarantee this intuition. In chapter four, this

formulated as follows: two complex should be classified alike by

all

was
whenever

c-classifications

they are "part-duplicates".

For simplicity, I have also ignored the properties of complexes individuals in
constructing the worlds of mathematical ersatzism. But again complicating the account so as
to accommodate them does not seem to present any unsurmountable problems. The most
straightforward way fo proceed would seem to be as follows. Having constructed the worldbases,

we

next construct for each world-base <1, R,

D>, an extended world-base

<1'*’,

R,

members of /. R
is that P'' contains all members of I together with all fusions of
as before (once the issues discussed above having to do with the relations among

.The idea

much

P,

P"'',

is
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individuals have been sorted out).

again a quadruple <C", N*, D**,d*'^> where C*‘

is

is

the collection of c-classifications of

members of I*. As before, N* is an assignment of some
degree of naturalness to each of the members of C+. However, unlike before, N+
cannot be
any arbitary total function from members of C" to the positive reals on pain of violating
the
having to do with the supervenience of the intrinsic properties of complex
individuals on the intrinsic properties of and relations among their parts. Rather, only
those
functions from members of C*" to the positive real numbers that result in the following
intuitions

conditions being satisfied should qualify:
classifications of simple particulars;

and

N+

matches N in its assignments to all
any two complex particulars are part-duplicates,

if

then they are classified alike by all sparse intrinsic property c-determinables. This latter
condition guarantees roughly that any complex particulars that are duplicates at the "atomic
level" are themselves are intrinsic duplicates (see above 4.3 for a definition of 'part-

change induces corresponding changes in the account of D*+, d* and D.
Where, as with NT, we take a possible fact <F, x> to represent that x instantiates or falls
under F. Or, in the extended account discussed in fn. 50, we take <R, x|,..., xn> to represent

duplication'). This

that

Xn instantiate or

XI,...,

52 This will have to include
are,

but

will

I

55 Here

is

assume

that

an example

under

fall
all

it

R.

the truths of set-theory.

It is

no easy task

to illustrate

how

the theory

is

supposed

to

physics nothing, not even the universe as a whole, has a mass of
possible that there be something which

ought

of modality

what

to say

all

these

can be done.

is

lOl^^kg

in

mass.

work. According
lOl^^l^kg.

to current

But intuitively

And an adequate

it is

metaphysical theory

to explain this intuition.

To explain

this intuition the

above version of mathematical ersatzism must, by

(Al),

world that represents that some particular has a mass of IQllll^kg. By [R],
there is some world that contains an L-sentence that means that there is a

entail the existence of a

be the case

this will

particular that has a

iff

mass of

consistent extension of

some

10l*lllkg.

By [W],

D, where

D is

there will be such a world as long as there

<Being

lOl^^^^kg,

o> where o

Now, under what

is

some

this will be the case iff there is a

the distribution relation of
is

some world-base

maximal,

some world-base.

<1, R, P,

D> such

element

D contain

that

Clearly,

D contains

particular or other.

conditions will a world-base's

final

such a pair?

That depends on what the property of being IQl^^^kg in mass is, and here we must turn to SN.
According to SN, the essence of a determinate property like the property of being

IQlOOkg

mass consists

in

in a certain classificational role.

At the actual world,

this role is

played

having a certain degree of naturalness. The first member of the pair
«P, S, m>,
mass determinable. This consists of three elements: P, the set containing (at least most) of

by a pair
is

the

the actual concrete particulars; S, the (equivalence) relation that x bears to y

iff

x

is

actually the

same mass as y; and m, some function from the real line to the members of the partition induced
by S on P together with the empty set. Roughly, m encodes the same sort of structure as the real
line on this partition. The second member is the empty set — reflecting the fact that nothing is
to indicate the unique location of this
actually lO^^^^kg in mass — indexed by the number
particular mass property in the structure built into the mass determinable by m.
And SN entails that any pair at a different world that plays the same classificational role
as

«P, S, m>,

iglOOkg

in

mass

m'>, [ujp

is

m'>

w

S',

at

is

at its

the very

same property; any such

world. To be a

little

more

precise, at

the the property of being lO^^^kg in
is

third, [ujjand

m and

is

the property of being

some other world w,

iff: first,

a pair

«P

,

the degree of naturalness of

as the degree of naturalness of <P, S, m> at the actual world,
m' encode the same sort of structure — that of the positive reals, and

exactly the

second, roughly,

mass

pair just

same

occupy the same position

in this structure

—

roughly,

=
j

S

,

<P,
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So, if S\ is correct about the nature of properties, a world-base's final
element D will
contain the pair <Being 10'*^0kg, o> where o is some particular or other iff that
world-base's
collection of properties P, which is itself a quadruple <C, N, D*, d*>, contains
the pair «P',
S ,
>, [o]p in its final member d*, where this latter pair satisfies the above three conditions
required for it to be the property of being lO^O^kg in mass at that world(-base). And clearly

m

this will

many world-bases. Consider any characterization of the collection of
some world-base <C, N, D*, d*>. Let o be one of the individuals that exist at that

be the case of

properties of

world-base. By the axioms of impure set-theory alone,

m'> where m' encodes

the

same

C w ill

include the classification <P',

structure as the positive reals and

the cells on the partition induced by

S'

on

P'

indexed

w here

lo||o^^^

is

one

S',

of

to indicate its position in the

determinable space defined by m'. Now, consider just those quadruples whose N is some
assignment that assigns to this classification the same degree of naturalness as the mass
determinable. Clearly, there will be many such quadruples. And their fourth members will
contain the pair

each such pair
bases

«P, S, m>,

just is the

lo)]0^^^>- By the transworld identity critieria of determinates,

property of being

whose D's include «<P,

S,

in

m>,

mass. So there will be

and so many worlds

many world-

that represent that o

instantiates the property of being 10^*^®kg in mass.

^‘^There was also a second category of metaphysical principles - those having to do with the
supervenience of properties of complex particulars on the properties and relations of their
parts. In fn. 50 above merely sketched an approach to incorporating facts about complex
I

entities into the theory that

guarantees that no world violates these principles.

If

this

can be

worked out adequately, then it seems to me that the theory can be developed so as to
guarantee that none of its worlds entails the violation of the second category of metaphysical
principles.

Or

in the

extended version of the theory (see

tuple of particulars
x],...,
It

Xp instantiate or

fall

fn. 50), it contains <R, x|,..., Xn> for every nXn> (whether simple and complex) and every relation R such that
under R.

entails the existence of

worlds representing

uninstantiated, though they are
clear

compounds

facts involving properties that are actually

of properties that are. For instance,

from the constructions and the example discussed

in fn. 53, that

it

it

should be

entails the existence

of worlds at

which the property of being both gold and being (merely) lO^^kg

instantiated.

As

mass shows,

it

in

the discussion of the possibility of there being something which

mass
is

is

10^*^^kg in

also entails the existence of worlds representing facts involving actually

"missing" determinates.
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